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Abstract	
  	
  
Over the course of the last decade there has been an increasing emphasis on recipientcountry ownership, or the “effective exercise of a government’s authority over development
policies and activities, including those that rely…on external resources” (OECD 2007),
within the international development community. This new emphasis is not only rhetorical
but has resulted in a host of new aid programs promising increased ownership. Broadly
speaking, these aid programs are supposed to change the institutional relationships between
donors and recipient-country governments and allow aid beneficiaries to have a say over the
development policies that impact their daily lives. However, despite their prevalence, we
know relatively little about how such aid programs affect donor-government relationships
and the policy decision-making process in aid-dependent states.
In the following dissertation project, I analyze four “ownership” aid programs in postgenocide Rwanda: the poverty reduction strategy program; budget support; the aid
coordination, harmonization, and alignment framework; and the Rwandan Joint Governance
Assessment. In each case study, I look for evidence that the aid program has resulted in the
outcomes predicted by their proponents: increased government and citizen influence, and
decreased donor influence. Data largely come from fieldwork I conducted in Rwanda during
2009 and 2010.
My analysis suggests that key Rwandan government officials use the idea of
ownership to seek influence over decision-making processes. However, the aforementioned
aid programs have not resulted in the outcomes predicted by proponents of the ownership
approach in two key ways. One, donors have not retreated nor given control over

development policy to recipient countries. Rather they have sought alternative ways of
influencing the policy process. Two, what we see emerging in Rwanda is not broad national
ownership. Instead, donors work with an elite group of government policymakers. I call this
type of aid relationship “centralized collaboration,” meaning that multilateral and bilateral
donors work with a small group of domestic actors to design and implement socio-economic
development strategies.
I conclude by arguing that this outcome is largely the result of three things: donor
preferences, the amount of leverage the GoR is able to exert over donors, and existing statesociety relationships. These three factors provide a framework for assessing and analyzing
donor-government relationships and ownership aid programs in other aid-dependent states.
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Chapter	
  1 	
  

Introduction	
  
As has been widely acknowledged in developed and developing countries alike, the first
generation approach to development assistance was essentially paternalistic and
condescending in nature. This is because it was based on the philosophy that the provider of
assistance possessed not only financial resources, but also the monopoly of wisdom, as well
as the expertise required to transform the beneficiary...The new global consensus explicitly
rejects this approach, primarily because development outcomes, as well as the philosophy
that underpinned them have been found wanting. Instead of the 'giver knows all' paradigm,
the new global consensus places at the centre of development assistance, policy ownership by
the receiving country.
-His Excellency Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda
November 22nd, 2006
In developing countries throughout the world, the presence of foreign assistance is
ubiquitous. Emblems and flags of donors dot the landscape, often accompanied by signs
proclaiming that the American people or the Swedish people or the Japanese (the list goes on
and on) people paid for this well, school or hospital. In capital cities, there are enclaves of
foreigners working for development agencies and myriad restaurants, hotels, and bars to
service them. Governments complain about development agencies poaching their best staff,
while residents worry about rising prices due to the influx of foreigners with money in their
pockets.
Foreign aid often brings a needed source of capital to developing countries, but, at the
same time, it can disrupt the social, political, and economic fabric of everyday life. Over the
past decade, there has been a worldwide push to give more control or “ownership” over such
changes to those that are supposed to benefit from foreign aid. Instead of being passive
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recipients of foreign assistance, recipient-country governments and their citizens are
supposedly being given the opportunity to take charge of their own development. Instead of
being forced to rely on foreigners to tell them what is best, developing countries are
purportedly being given the opportunity to decide when and where those wells, hospitals, and
schools will be built.
The verdict is still out on whether or not new practices in foreign assistance over the
past decade have actually fostered positive change, but a few things are clear. The hotels and
bars catering to foreigners haven't closed down, and donor emblems still dot the landscape.
So, what has changed?
Findings from this dissertation suggest that what you see more and more often is
government boardrooms filled with donor-staff working side-by-side with government staff.
Instead of foreigners proclaiming their ideas for economic development from a lectern, they
have moved inside the ministries and now sit alongside government officials drafting policy.
The line between “donors” and “the state” is increasingly harder to draw. Is this the
ownership Rwandan President Kagame seeks in his vision of the new development assistance
paradigm? Perhaps not.

1.1.	
  	
   Summary	
  of	
  the	
  Project	
  
Historically, donors have sought to impose development from the outside. Under the
“donorship” approach, donors used conditionalities and monetary incentives to pressure
recipient countries to make “necessary” donor-identified reforms; or they funded stand-alone,
donor-driven aid projects. Both means of disbursing aid are now thought to lead to
unsustainable development strategies that are out of touch with the actual needs of people
and communities within a particular country. Instead, “ownership” or the “effective exercise
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of a government’s authority over development policies and activities, including those that
rely – entirely or partially – on external resources” (OECD 2007) has become the new silver
bullet of international development assistance.
Under this new ownership approach, control is thought to shift to the recipient
country. Instead of donors calling the shots, recipient countries are supposed to dictate the
terms of their own development through an inclusive process involving multiple domestic
actors. This is supposed to alter existing donor-government relationships and allow aid
beneficiaries to have a say over the development policies and practices that impact their daily
lives. But, does ownership actually allow recipient countries to call the shots?
In this dissertation, I analyze “ownership” aid programs in post-genocide Rwanda.3 In
each case study, I am looking for evidence that the ownership aid program has achieved the
outcomes predicted by their proponents: increased government and citizen influence, and
decreased donor influence. That is, I am looking for evidence that ownership aid programs
have resulted in a policy decision-making process that is guided by a wide-array of domestic
actors, not by donors.
In this introductory chapter, I provide a synopsis of the dissertation presented in the
following chapters. In the forthcoming section, I provide a brief overview of my research
design and summarize my findings. Then, in the subsequent section, I outline the
forthcoming chapters and explain the significance of the project.

3

An aid program is “a time bound intervention involving multiple activities that may cut across sectors, themes
and/or geographic areas” (Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). See Chapter Three for more details.
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Research	
  design	
  

In this dissertation, I analyze four “ownership” aid programs in post-genocide and
civil war Rwanda. Members of the Government of Rwanda (GoR) leadership frequently (and
often aggressively) push for more ownership in Rwanda. The GoR’s emphasis on ownership,
combined with the eagerness of donors to support the current regime, has spurred several
new aid programs intended to foster ownership. If ownership is feasible, it ought to be
feasible in Rwanda.
In my case studies, I analyze the following aid programs: Rwanda’s poverty reduction
strategy and budget support; the aid coordination, harmonization, and alignment framework
(ACHA); and the Rwandan Joint Governance Assessment (JGA). For the purposes of this
study, Rwanda’s experience with the poverty reduction strategy program and budget support
constitutes a single case study, as the two aid programs are so interlinked.
Poverty reduction strategies are “nationally owned” development strategies drafted by
national governments. Budget support entails a direct transfer of funds into the national
treasury. Collectively, the two aid programs purportedly increase ownership by allowing
recipient-country governments to outline their own plans for development and then fund such
plans using aid deposited into their treasuries. Rwanda finalized an interim poverty reduction
strategy in November 2000, and the push for budget support began shortly thereafter.
The ACHA framework is a multifaceted attempt by donors and the government to
coordinate and harmonize aid in Rwanda through a series of working groups, donorgovernment forums, and policies regarding aid practices in Rwanda. The ACHA framework
purportedly increases coordination, harmonization, and alignment, allowing donors and the
GoR to work together more effectively on government-driven initiatives. Meetings between
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donors and the GoR resumed immediately following the 1994 genocide and moved to
Rwandan soil in 2000; however, the ACHA framework did not really take off until 2002.
The JGA is a collaborative effort between donors and the GoR to establish a common
framework for assessing and improving governance in Rwanda. By allowing the GoR to have
a say over governance indicators, the JGA purportedly establishes a partnership between the
GoR and donors regarding governance. The JGA is much newer than the other aid programs
analyzed in this dissertation. While the idea was first put forth in 2005, the first report was
not published until 2007. Additionally, while poverty reduction strategies, budget support,
and aid coordination mechanisms have been established in other aid-dependent states, the
JGA is unique to Rwanda.
The new emphasis on ownership presumes that more government participation will
lead to more recipient-country government influence, decrease the influence of donors over
development policy, and increase the influence of citizens over policy decision-making.
Therefore, in each case study, I look for evidence that the introduction of the aid program(s)
has: (1) increased the influence of the recipient-country government, (2) decreased donor
influence over policy-decision making, and (3) increased the influence of Rwandan citizens.
Throughout the dissertation, I make an important distinction between participation
and influence. That is, it is not enough that governments are more involved in the policy
process, there has to be evidence that they have more influence over the policy process.
Similarly, it is not enough for citizens to merely participate more; there must be evidence that
citizens have more influence over the policy decision-making process. I also pay close
attention to changes in both the degree of donor influence (i.e. how much?) and the type of
donor influence (i.e. what kind?).
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To build my case studies I use a process-tracing methodology. Instead of relying on
covariation between units, process tracing connects the dots over time to establish a causal
narrative, paying particular attention to causal mechanisms. Validity is increased when we
find similar trends across the aid programs and rule out alternative explanations using sound
evidence.
Most of the data for my dissertation come from in-country fieldwork that I completed
in 2009 and 2010. While in the field, I conducted forty-seven interviews with donor,
embassy, and NGO staff, Rwandan government officials, and independent consultants (see
Appendix 1, pg. 177). Additionally, I observed relevant meetings and conferences whenever
permitted. To supplement fieldwork, I also conducted substantial textual analysis on
pertinent documents produced by the GoR and donors (see Appendix 2, pg. 179).
Findings	
  

My case studies of ownership aid programs in Rwanda suggest that government
policymakers actively seek to influence decision-making processes. However, the
aforementioned aid programs have not resulted in the outcomes predicted by proponents of
the ownership approach in two key ways. One, donors have neither retreated nor given
control over development to recipient countries. They are simply influencing the policy
process in different ways. Two, what we see emerging in Rwanda is not broad national
ownership. Instead, donors work with an elite group of government policymakers. I call this
type of aid relationship “centralized collaboration,” meaning that multilateral and bilateral
donors work with a small group of domestic actors to design and implement socio-economic
development strategies.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, donors have been unwilling to relinquish their authority.
Instead, the Government of Rwanda has become like a co-pilot to donors—sometimes
allowed to take the wheel, but still very much dependent on aid contributions and bound by
the parameters set up by donors. Instead of fostering a more inclusive political space, these
new aid programs perpetuate a highly centralized state. Rather than increasing domestic
participation, the aid modalities I examined allow political authority to remain centralized
with the executive.
Instead of pressuring from the outside, my case studies suggest that donors now
increasingly exert influence from the inside. Donors, particularly those who advocate for
more recipient-country ownership, increasingly appear to engage with the state. Instead of
working against it, they work with it and through it. As a result, the relationship between
donors and the GoR is less hierarchical and less outwardly antagonistic. However, donors to
Rwanda are certainly not subservient to the government. Instead of relinquishing authority,
donors merely shifted their role to one that that is less visible and more technical. This
qualitative change was most apparent among those donors, like the United Kingdom, that
emphasize ownership as a matter of their own internal policy.
At the same time, my cases studies also suggest that, rather than opening the
Rwandan political space, the new emphasis on ownership has further centralized authority
into the hands of a select group of domestic actors. Although the emphasis on ownership has
not led donors to abandon their influence over the policy process completely, it has given the
GoR an opening. Ownership aid programs have integrated top GoR officials into policy
decision-making processes, but they have excluded other domestic actors. Domestic
stakeholders, such as civil society groups, have recently been invited to sit at the table.
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However, my case studies suggest that their involvement is typically only symbolic or a way
of informing such actors to the policy agenda already decided by the executive branch.

1.2.	
  	
   Chapter	
  Outline	
  
This dissertation is composed of eight chapters, including this introduction. Chapters
four through seven comprise the major analytical portion of the dissertation, with chapters
five through seven presenting the case studies. Chapter eight concludes by summarizing my
empirical findings, outlining the implications of these findings, and discussing their broader
applicability.
In chapter two, I present the theoretical underpinnings of this project. This chapter
documents prominent critiques of foreign aid and explains why “ownership” is thought to be
a solution to these critiques. The chapter’s purpose is to provide the reader with a better sense
of where the new emphasis on recipient-country ownership comes from, what problems it
seeks to address, and the challenges facing this new approach to international development.
In chapter three, I explain my method and research design in greater detail. I
summarize my independent and dependent variables and explain the method I used to
analyze my cases, process tracing. I also justify my case selection and summarize my three
case studies. Lastly, I explain my data sources and the fieldwork I conducted in Rwanda for
this dissertation project.
In chapter four, I outline the contemporary history of development in Rwanda and
examine the major donors currently providing development aid to Rwanda. In order to
understand contemporary development schemes and practices, it is important for the reader
to have a basic understanding of the Rwandan context. Additionally, how ownership plays
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out in a particular country is likely to be affected by both the country context and who the
country’s donors are.
In chapter five, I focus on the aid programs most associated with the ownership
approach: poverty reduction strategies and budget support. I conclude that, in Rwanda,
neither has led to a retreat of the donor. Donors simply seek to influence policy decisionmaking in alternative ways. In fact, in Rwanda, budget support donors appear to actually
have more influence – not less – than non-budget support donors. Additionally, far from
opening the political process to citizen input and criticism, introducing these two aid
modalities has allowed the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MINECOFIN)4
to dominate domestic development policy processes.
In chapter six, I present the findings from my case study on the aid coordination,
harmonization, and alignment (ACHA) framework. While the ACHA framework has
increased coordination, harmonization, and alignment (at least to some degree), it has not
decreased donor influence. Donors that readily support the ACHA framework have merely
become more integrated into state structures; while other donors have largely continued
business as usual. In either case, bilateral negotiations still take precedence, and donors are
still clearly influential. At the same time, the ACHA framework has largely excluded civil
society, centralizing influence with donors and a select group of domestic actors.
In chapter seven, I present the findings from my case study on the Rwandan Joint
Governance Assessment (JGA). I find that the JGA has allowed the GoR a larger platform
for their governance agenda, and that donors often remain at the periphery of governance
debates. This comes at a cost to other domestic actors. Civil society groups, local

4

From here on out, I refer to the Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Development by its French
acronym, MINECOFIN or simply as the ministry of finance.
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governments, and even parliament are periphery of debates of consequence regarding
governance in Rwanda. The JGA has not changed this. Instead, the aid program has (thus far)
assisted in keeping governance debates on governance centralized at the national level.
In the concluding chapter, I summarize the core findings of the empirical research
presented in chapters four through seven. I suggest that the ownership approach has altered
the institutional relationship between donors and the GoR, but not in the ways predicted.
Instead of decreasing donor influence, the ownership approach has merely made influence
less transparent. Additionally, instead of increasing citizen influence, the new emphasis on
ownership permits the executive branch of the GoR to monopolize domestic authority.
I conclude by arguing that this outcome is largely the result of three things: donor
preferences, the amount of leverage the GoR is able to exert over donors, and existing statesociety relationships. These three factors provide a framework for assessing and analyzing
donor-government relationships and ownership aid programs in other aid-dependent states
and suggest several policy implications for development practitioners.

1.3.	
  	
   Significance	
  of	
  the	
  Project	
  
This dissertation is part of a growing body of literature that is concerned less with the
quantitative amount of foreign aid, and more with the quality of foreign aid. As frustration
with foreign aid continues to grow, many scholars and practitioners are recognizing that how
aid is disbursed is central to its impact, and concluding that the answer is not just more aid
but better aid. The new emphasis on recipient-country ownership proposes to transform the
relationship between government policymakers and donors and, as a result, make aid more
effective. However, its actual impact in recipient countries is still largely unknown.
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My dissertation is both an empirical examination of the impact of ownership aid
programs in one recipient country, and an opportunity to build theory on donor-government
relationships more broadly. Despite the fact that we know that donor-government
relationships impact the quality of foreign aid (Pomerantz 2004), we know very little about
the factors that shape the relationship between donors and recipient countries, and how
variations in this relationship change the way foreign aid is distributed. My dissertation
narrows in on the relationship between donors and government policymakers. Only by
understanding this relationship and its policy implications, can we begin to improve the
effectiveness of foreign assistance.
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Chapter	
  2 	
  

The	
  Problem	
  with	
  Ownership	
  	
  
Historically, foreign aid has served a variety of diplomatic, development, and
commercial functions (Lancaster 2007), but the major benchmark for aid effectiveness has
typically been economic growth. However, isolating the relationship between aid and growth
has been anything but straightforward. At a simplistic level, there appears to be no direct
relationship between foreign aid and growth. Some countries that have received huge
influxes of foreign aid, such as Botswana, Indonesia, and Korea, have experienced rapid
economic growth, but others, such as Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, have experienced spiraling poverty (Radelet 2006). Growth has been
particularly slow in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the fact that more than $500 billion dollars
(the equivalent of four Marshall Aid Plans) was dispersed in Africa from 1960-1997, per
capita GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa actually declined throughout much of this period
(Ayodele et al. 2005).
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a better sense of where the
new emphasis on recipient-country ownership comes from, what problems it seeks to
address, and the challenges facing this new approach to international development. I begin by
outlining the tenuous relationship between foreign aid and growth, noting divergent schools
of thought on the subject. I then argue that in order to fully understand the relationship
between aid and growth we have to open the black box of aid, exposing the multiple links in
the causal chain connecting aid to county outcomes.
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In this dissertation project, I focus on the link between donors and policymakers in
recipient countries. Although relatively little is known about this link, principal-agent theory
suggests that it will be fraught with moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The link
between donors and recipient-countries is further challenged by a broken feedback loop,
which makes it difficult for beneficiaries to express discontent when an aid policy is not
working.
The new emphasis on recipient country ownership attempts to correct for this broken
feedback loop by encouraging country-level policy decision-making. Instead of aid policy
being determined in boardrooms in Washington, DC and Brussels, aid policy is supposed to
be decided in recipient-countries. Proponents of ownership argue that by increasing the
participation and influence of recipient-country governments, donor influence will decrease
and citizen influence will increase. However, these predictions are based on several highly
problematic assumptions.
The chapter is composed of five major sections. I begin by reviewing the literature on
aid and growth and the various policy responses to widespread pessimism regarding the
ability of foreign aid to promote economic and social development. I then make a case for
opening up the black box of foreign assistance and focusing on the relationship between
donors and policymakers. I summarize principal-agent theory and the challenges facing
foreign aid and explain what the new, global emphasis on ownership is predicted to change
about the way aid is delivered. I conclude by arguing that the new emphasis on ownership is
based on three faulty assumptions: (1) greater participation does not mean greater influence;
(2) donors are unlikely to relinquish their influence; and (3) government influence doesn’t
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equal national influence. These problematic assumptions make it unlikely that the ownership
approach will actually result in the predicted outcomes.

2.1.	
   Aid,	
  Growth,	
  and	
  Development	
  	
  
In this section, I outline divergent opinions on the relationship between aid and
growth. When I use the term “foreign aid,” I am primarily referring to what some call
“development aid” or “development assistance.” Alternative forms of aid, such as debt relief
and humanitarian aid, comprise a significant part of aid totals, but they are not central to the
research questions of this dissertation. Foreign aid totals are typically captured by official
development assistance (ODA) figures recorded by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), which define ODA as:
Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic
development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and
which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent
(using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows
comprise contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to
developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral institutions.
Lending by export credit agencies—with the pure purpose of export
promotion—is excluded (OECD 2003).
ODA totals exclude certain types of development assistance, such as remittances, foreign
direct investments, or aid from private donations.5 Furthermore, ODA from countries such as
China, who choose not to submit their aid totals to the OECD, is not captured in ODA totals.
Scholarly	
  views	
  on	
  aid	
  and	
  growth	
  	
  

Over the course of the last thirty years, three broad views on the relationship between
aid and growth have emerged in the scholarly literature on foreign aid.6 Divergent opinions
5

These are not insignificant sources of funding. The Center for Global Prosperity at the Hudson Institute reports
that, in 2007, philanthropic flows equaled $49 billion, remittances $145 billion, and private investment $345
billion. In comparison, official flows equaled $107 billion (Center for Global Prosperity 2009, 18).
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are often based on disputes over methods and data, which continue to rage despite new
econometric techniques and better (although still very limited) data.
First, on average, aid has a positive relationship with growth (see, for example,
Hansen and Tarp 2000; 2001; Lensink and White 2001; Sachs et al. 2004). That is, while aid
has not worked in every country, on average and controlling for other factors (such as
geography, political conflict, policies, and institutions), aid has contributed to growth.
Scholars in this camp argue that, after controlling for certain variables and diminishing
returns, a positive relationship between aid and growth emerges. However, they concede that
there is significant variation around the trend line.
Second, aid has no effect on growth and may actually undermine development and
growth (see, for example, Mosley 1980; Mosley, Hudson, and Horrell 1987; Rajan and
Subramanian 2008). Scholars in this camp point to the potential for aid to undermine private
sector investment incentives and productivity, to reduce domestic savings, and to cause
currency to appreciate and undermine the profitability of tradable goods (“Dutch Disease”).
While these studies have been highly influential, few studies have reached this conclusion in
the past decade. Additionally, many of these studies only examine aggregate aid, which rules
out the (likely) possibility that different types of aid have different types of effects on growth
(Radelet 2006).
Third, aid has a conditional relationship with growth. That is, aid promotes growth
under certain circumstances or conditions. Conditions argued to be important include
recipient-country characteristics (e.g., domestic policy, type of government, and warfare);
donor practices (e.g., aid fads, special interests, and political motivations); and type of aid

6

This literature review draws heavily from Radelet (2006).
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(e.g., conditional, untied, and multilateral). The most vibrant debate in this camp centers
around Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) claim that aid produces better outcomes in countries
with good policy and, therefore, by extension should be targeted to countries with good
policy.7 While conventional wisdom says that better policies lead to more effective aid,
several recent papers have called this assumption in to question (see, for example, Collier and
Dollar 2002; Hudson and Mosley 2001; Hansen and Tarp 2001, 2000; Easterly, Levine, and
Roodman 2004).
Policy	
  actions	
  on	
  aid	
  

These three scholarly perspectives map on to three, divergent policy tactics: stop aid;
increase aid; and make aid more effective. Citing evidence that aid has not produced
aggregate economic growth, the “aid pessimists” (Wright and Winters 2011) argue that
donors and recipient states should abandon foreign aid altogether. This perspective has
gained traction due to Moyo’s (2009) popular book, Dead Aid. However, given that both
donors and recipients remain deeply invested in the current aid structure, abandoning aid
altogether is unlikely to happen anytime soon.
According to the “aid optimists” (Wright and Winters 2011), the solution is to
increase aggregate aid flows. As part of its push to reach the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) by 2015, the UN is once again urging developed countries to contribute at least .7%
of their GNP to ODA,8 and, at the G8 summit in Gleneagles in 2005, rich countries pledged
to dramatically increase their contributions to development assistance from $80 billion in

7

This is exactly what the new US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) does (for more details, see
http://www.mcc.gov/).
8
This target, first pledged in a 1970 General Assembly Resolution, was reaffirmed twice in 2002 at the
International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico and at the World Summit on
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa.
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2005 to $130 billion in 2010 (OECD 2009c). As a means of channeling this new funding, a
host of new initiatives, such as Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa, George W. Bush’s
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC), have sprung up; each promising billions more in aid.
For those who believe that aid has a conditional effect on growth, the solution is to
increase the effectiveness of aid. That is, instead of (a) abandoning aid or (b) increasing it, the
focus should be on improving the quality of the aid already being distributed. This is the
most dominant school, as it requires neither a blind faith in aid, nor a willingness to abandon
aid all together. Scholars and practitioners in this school advocate for evidence-based
research on specific aid practices in order to decipher what works and what does not. As part
of the effectiveness agenda, a host of edited volumes and policy papers (often based on
country case studies) have emerged that draw on the lessons of ineffective aid to produce
policy recommendations on how to “reform,” “improve” or make aid “smarter” (see, for
example, Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren 2001; Joseph and Gillies 2009; Carlsson,
Somolekae, and van de Walle 1997; van de Walle and Johnston 1996).

2.2.	
   Opening	
  the	
  “Black	
  Box”	
  
While improving the effectiveness of aid is an important goal, figuring out how to do
so has been quite challenging. Much of the research on foreign aid runs into the same
problem over and over again. After disbursement, aid travels through a complex causal chain,
making it extremely difficult to isolate aid’s impact on particular country outcomes.
Controlling for the numerous variables that likely impact foreign aid (not to mention
problems of endogeneity) is all but impossible. Consequently, isolating the relationship
between aid and growth (or lack of growth) is incredibly difficult.
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Given this reality, senior World Bank economists François Bourguignon and Mark
Sundberg argue in a 2007 article in The American Economic Review that to improve aid
effectiveness we must open up the “black box” of aid. That is, instead of blindly trying to
link donor inputs to development outcomes, we need to examine the causality chain behind
aid. Bourguignon and Sundberg identify three types of links inside the black box: donors to
policymakers, policymakers to policies, and policies to outcome. Figure 2.1 below depicts an
adoption of the causality chain Bourguignon and Sundberg layout in their article.
Figure	
  2.1:	
  Opening	
  the	
  Black	
  Box	
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By “policies to outcomes” (arrow 3), Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) refer to
knowledge at the micro or project level. For example, how does the tax structure or trade
policy of a state affect growth and/or poverty? Do micro-finance programs contribute to
poverty reduction? Research in this area is an essential part of understanding the relationship
between aid and growth and is a growing part of the development literature, especially in
light of the new advances in impact evaluations based on experimental or quasi-experimental
designs (see, for example, Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Karlan and Appel 2011).
“Policymakers to policy” (arrow 2) refers to the link between systems of governance
and policy choices. For example, do democratic systems lead to better economic policy? As
Bourguignon and Sundberg point out, in practice, most research bypasses policy choices,
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instead pointing to the importance of governance on outcomes (for example, Svensson 1999;
Boone 1996). Consequently, our understanding of this link is limited.
The last link, “donors to policymakers” (arrow 1), refers to the relationship between
donors and domestic policymakers (typically government officials). As Bourguignon and
Sundberg point out, this link is largely built on a body of circumstantial evidence stemming
from years of failed aid efforts. In other words, we know more about what does not work
than what actually works.
This dissertation narrows in on the link between donors and policymakers. Not only is
this the link that we know the least about, but it is also the beginning of the causality chain.
Consequently, its impact will be felt all the way down the line. As Pomerantz (2004) notes,
the quality of the relationship between donors and domestic policymakers is likely more
influential on policy directions and development outcomes than aid money itself. If aid is not
distributed in a way that is conducive to good policymaking and good policies then it is
unlikely to result in the desired country outcomes.

2.3.	
   Relationship	
  between	
  Donors	
  and	
  Policymakers	
  	
  
The little that we do know about the link between donors and policymakers is
usefully summarized using principal-agent theory, also known as agency theory. Principalagent theory, a subset of institutional economics, is a set of assumptions and rules that are
thought to underlie all modern organizations, including organizations designed to distribute
foreign aid. This theory provides insight in to why the link between donors and policymakers
is often fraught with challenges.
By donors, I mean both bilateral donors (e.g., the United States and Sweden) and
multilateral donors (e.g., international finance intuitions (IFIs) like the World Bank and
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international organizations like the United Nations). Consistent with my working definition
of foreign aid, I exclude donors that only distribute private donations (for example, the
Clinton or Gates Foundations).
By policymakers, I mean the key domestic decision makers. Who the key
policymakers are can vary from context to context. However, they generally hold positions of
authority (either by election or by force) in the domestic government.
Principal-‐agent	
  theory	
  

Principal-agent theory begins with the observation that modern organizations are
often hierarchically structured. In other words, they are made up of both principals and
agents, with principals giving instructions to agents. Because principals cannot make all
decisions and carry out all tasks by themselves, they delegate some of the work to agents. In
doing so, they cede full control of information and activities. This results in two types of
problems.
First, agents may choose to ignore the principal’s instructions, instead carrying out
tasks in a way that benefits their own interests. This is called the problem of moral hazard.
In the case of foreign aid, a moral hazard problem arises when foreign aid is redirected
towards non-desirable purposes. For example, a recipient-country government is often given
foreign aid for the purposes of poverty alleviation. However, instead of allocating aid to the
poor, it is sometimes used to support undesirable military operations or deposited into
personal bank accounts.
Second, given that agents may have access to information that principals do not, they
might manipulate information in ways that run contrary to the principal’s interests. This is
called the problem of adverse selection. In the case of foreign aid, an adverse selection
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problem arises when need is inflated for personal gain. For example, if the local leaders who
are responsible for allocating food aid artificially inflate the number of persons requiring
assistance, there will be a surplus. Leaders are then able to use the surplus for their own gain,
accumulating more for their own families or selling it on the black market for a profit.
Both moral hazard and adverse selection are inherent problems when tasks are
delegated. Therefore, they are, to some degree, unavoidable in all modern, hierarchical
organizations—including aid agencies. Consequently, it is important for development
agencies to design institutions that mitigate the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection
whenever possible.
The	
  broken	
  information	
  feedback	
  loop	
  	
  

The problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are common in all modern
organizations and have been explored in detail in agency theory. However, as Martens
explains below, an exceptional problem of foreign aid is a broken information feedback loop:
…a unique and most striking characteristic of foreign aid is that the people for
whose benefit aid agencies work are not the same as those from whom their
revenues are obtained; they actually live in different countries and different
political constituencies. This geographical and political separation between
beneficiaries and taxpayers block the normal performance feedback process:
beneficiaries may be able to observe performance but cannot modulate
payments (rewards to the agents) as a function of performance (Martens 2002,
14).
Domestic redistribution programs, such as Medicare, face a number of principal-agent
problems. However, contrary to foreign aid programs, taxpayers and beneficiaries are the
same people. Consequently, they have information about success and failure and can reward
accordingly. On the other hand, dissatisfied foreign aid beneficiaries have no way to express
discontent to the taxpayers who are footing the aid bill, if foreign assistance is not meeting
their needs. The result is a broken feedback loop.
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This broken feedback loop is exacerbated by the complex chain of principals and
agents involved in aid distribution. The complex chain of principals and agents weakens
information flows, introduces a myriad of motivations, and makes monitoring and
accountability difficult (Radelet 2006). Donors themselves are complex organizations, made
up of the taxpayers that fund them, the politicians that allocate taxpayers’ money, donor
agencies, and contractors. On the recipient side, a similarly complex relationship exists
between recipient-country governments, NGOs (who receive and distribute aid), and the
intended beneficiaries of aid. These multiple principal-agent relationships exacerbate the
problems inherent in hierarchical modern organizations.
Conditionality	
  

One proposed solution to the challenges identified by principal-agent theory is
conditionality. Conditionality is most often identified with structural adjustment loans.
However, all donors use conditionality to some degree. The rationale for conditionality is at
least partially based on principal-agent theory. The idea is that if donors tie aid to certain
policy conditions or actions that are seen as necessary for growth, adverse selection and
moral hazard problems will be mitigated. However, conditionality faces several challenges,
and the practice has faced intense criticism since the early 1990s.
First, it is often unclear what policies are the most appropriate (and in what context).
Therefore, when selecting conditions, donors may elect to include conditions that are
unhelpful or even damaging. This challenge is exacerbated by a broken feedback loop
because beneficiaries have few mechanisms at their disposal to express dissatisfaction.
Second, aid is often highly political, and the conditions attached to aid may serve donors
more than recipients. For example, some donors “tie” aid or require the recipient-country to
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spend aid money in the country that grants the aid. For example, the United States requires
the majority of food aid to be produced and packaged in the US, even though higher food
prices and added shipping costs means that less food per dollar is delivered to the recipient
country. Third, the logic behind conditionality itself might be quite problematic. As Streeten
succinctly puts it, “Why would a donor pay a recipient to do something that is anyway in his
own interest? And if it is not in his interest, why would the recipient do it anyways?”
(Streeten 1988, as quoted in Martens 2002, 9).
Explanations for why conditionality has not produced better outcomes vary as widely
as the explanations for foreign aid’s failure overall,9 and research on the topic has also found
it difficult to isolate the impact of conditionality, given the multiple intervening variables. As
Radelet (2006) notes, conditionality has mirrored thinking about development, consequently
the types of conditions required by donors have historically varied.10 Therefore, it is possible
that the problem is not conditionality but the type of development policy pursued.

2.4.	
   From	
  Donorship	
  to	
  Ownership	
  
Despite little hard evidence explaining why conditionality does not seem to work,
there is a growing consensus that (overt) conditionality has failed (Collier 1997) and that a
new approach is needed. The narrative that has emerged to explain conditionality’s “failure”
is that conditionality does not produce the desired outcomes because it relies on top-down

9

For example, Dollar and Svensson (2000) argue that SALs succeed or fail based on domestic politicaleconomy forces. Alternative, Collier et al. (1997) argues that contemporary uses of conditionality have failed,
because they focus on “inducements.” This results in a piece meal approach to reform and crowds out other uses
of conditionality.
10
A state-led approach dominated in the 1950s and 1960s, while a basic human needs approach took over in the
1970s. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the focus became open markets, shifting in the mid-1990s to intuitions.
Currently, the debate centers around whether or not aid should be conditional on good policy and democratic
reform (Radelet 2006).
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pressure from donors to act in externally prescribed ways. Instead of being decided on by
beneficiaries, policy is being dictated by donors. This narrative is clearly apparent in a 2009
Oxfam report, which argues that:
50 years of foreign aid have proven that even when they understand how
development happened, donors cannot reduce poverty by themselves. When
donors impose solutions, the solutions are often wrong from the context. Even
when development solutions are right, they are rarely implemented properly.
That is history’s lesson. (Oxfam 2009, 4).
Out of this narrative has emerged an approach to development that emphasizes local
ownership. As Wood notes, after the Cold War “a consensus emerged that aid would be most
effective if donors forged better partnerships with recipient governments, and if those
governments in turn had greater ‘ownership’ of policies” (2005, 394). The following section
examines the concept of ownership and its promises in greater depth.
Aid	
  effectiveness	
  and	
  the	
  Paris	
  Agenda	
  

Ownership is the cornerstone of a global policy agenda that was solidified in a series
of international declarations on aid effectiveness in the early 2000s. The most notable of
these declarations is the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The Paris Declaration
puts forth an agenda for increasing aid effectiveness known as the Paris Agenda or the Paris
Consensus and was signed by more than 140 developed and developing countries and
international organizations.
The Paris Agenda puts forth a set of principals (known as the “Paris Principals”) that
are seen as instrumental to improved aid effectiveness (see figure 2.2). At the heart of the
Paris Agenda is ownership (Hayman 2006). While principals such as alignment and
harmonization are advocated for on their own merits, they are most often tied to the need for
ownership. As figure 2.2 suggests, both harmonization and alignment are seen as improving
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ownership by ensuring that donors coalesce around an agenda set by “partners,” i.e.
recipient-country governments.
Figure	
  2.2:	
  Partnership	
  for	
  Great	
  Aid	
  Effectiveness11	
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Since its pronouncement in 2005, the Paris Declaration has resulted in a multitude of
working groups and subsequent meetings (both between high-level dignitaries and regional
and local working groups). In 2008, the third high-level forum on aid effectiveness took
place in Accra, Ghana. The forum resulted in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), which
follows up on the agenda outlined in Paris.12 The Paris Declaration also led to the so-called
“Paris Survey,” an annual evaluation rubric that rates recipient countries and donors on the
principals outlined in the declaration.
11

A fifth principal, mutual accountability, would later be added to the four principals depicted in the figure.
The fourth high-level forum on aid effectiveness will take place in Busan, South Korea from November 29th
to December 1st, 2011.
12
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The new emphasis on recipient-country ownership is more than just clever wording
for development practitioners. Theoretically, ownership is now seen as essential to improving
aid effectiveness.13 Suggesting that the Paris Agenda is rooted in a broad base of evidence,
one development practitioner summarizes the predictions of the ownership approach in this
way, "Aid delivered in the spirit of Paris at the very least shifts the balance of probabilities”
(Armon 2007, 653).
What	
  is	
  ownership?	
  

Although the concept of ownership currently dominates the development policy
agenda, there is actually a very poor understanding of what the word means. The OECD
statistical glossary defines ownership as the “the effective exercise of a government’s
authority over development policies and activities, including those that rely – entirely or
partially – on external resources” (OECD 2007). Yet, what does ownership actually look like
in practice? How do donors actually encourage ownership? What domestic actors are
responsible for ownership? These and other questions have gone largely unanswered in the
academic and policy literature on ownership and development.
While a degree of variation does exist in understandings of ownership,14 the most
widespread understanding is a change in the institutional relationship between donors and
recipient country governments. That is, a change in the “rules of the game” that guide the
interactions between donors and recipient-country governments (North 1990).

13

Many of the notions embedded in the ownership model are not new. In fact, the authors of a report
commissioned by the World Bank in 1969 make very similar points (Pearson 1969). However, over the past
decade, these concepts have profoundly shifted the worldwide discourse on development in ways that they had
not previously.
14
For example, an IMF working paper depicts ownership as “buy-in” by the recipient state (Boughton and
Mourmouras 2002).
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In the past, donors sought development primarily from the outside. Under the
“donorship” approach, which is exemplified by conditionality, donors used monetary
incentives to try and pressure recipient countries to make what they saw as needed reforms
and improvements. Alternatively, under the new ownership approach, control is supposed to
shift to the recipient-country. Instead of donors calling the shots, recipient-country
governments are supposed to dictate the terms of their own development.
Predictions	
  of	
  ownership	
  

Just as there is variation in how ownership is defined, there is variation in what
ownership is predicted to change. However, the common thread running through proownership work is the idea that ownership allows recipient-country governments to
participate more in policymaking. In other words, ownership gives recipient-countries a seat
at the table.
Increasing the participation of recipient-country governments is predicted to have
three effects: increase the influence of recipient-country governments; decrease the influence
of donors; and increase the influence of domestic citizens. The UK’s Department for
International Development succinctly articulated these three predictions in a 2005 white
paper:
For us, ‘country ownership’ requires that the country has leadership over its
development policies. It requires partner governments in consultation with
citizens to define a poverty reduction programme, which donors can
support….We do not only equate country ownership with government
ownership. We believe that civil society, including poor people, should also
have a voice and stake in their development, and that governments should be
accountable to them (DFID 2005, 11).
In other words, as the participation of recipient-countries increases, recipient-countries will
exercise more influence over development policy and donors will take a step back, letting
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governments lead. As a result, citizens will be better able to shape the policies that affect
their lives. The following section explains these three predictions in greater detail.
First, the influence of the recipient-country government will increase. Implicit in most
pro-ownership work is the idea that as recipient-countries participate in policy decisionmaking they will acquire more influence over policymaking; i.e., recipient-countries will “set
the agenda” and have more say over the development policies funding by foreign assistance.
The idea that recipient-country governments will gain more influence is reflected in the 2005
Paris Declaration, in which recipient-countries commit to, “[e]xercise leadership in
developing and implementing their national development strategies through broad
consultative processes,” and to “[t]ake the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in
conjunction with other development resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the
participation of civil society and the private sector” (OECD 2005, 3).
Second, donor influence will decrease. This prediction is not often explicitly stated.
However, implicit in conversations about ownership is the assumption that, as recipientcountries take a more active role in development, donor influence will decrease as authority
and influence transfers to recipient-country governments. Often this sentiment is expressed in
the idea that recipient-countries should “lead.” For example, the recent publication by Oxfam
America argues that, “Ultimately, ownership means supporting effective states and active
citizens’ efforts to determine how they use aid resources as part of their broader development
agenda” (2009, 37). The document equates ownership with control or letting the recipientcountry lead, and argues for changing US aid practices to be more inline with ownership
principles and commitments, such as untied aid, fewer earmarks, and increased budget
support. Similarly, donors signing on to the Paris Declaration commit to “[r]espect partner
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country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it” (2005c, 3). In other
words, donors commit to supporting and following recipient-country governments.
Third, citizen influence and participation will increase. The assumption here is that as
recipient-country governments become more responsible for development policy, the
opportunities for citizens to influence development policy will increase. Donors are not
accountable to citizens. However, domestic governments require citizens to stay in power,
and citizens are able to sanction them for poor performance through electoral and civil
society mechanisms. Introducing aid programs that emphasis ownership are predicted to
change the ability of citizens to exercise influence over domestic policymakers. According to
Hudson, “The impact of aid on the scope for domestic accountability depends on the extent
to which recipient governments are able to control and manage the aid that they receive,
incorporate it in their policy cycle, and spend it according to their own developmental
priorities” (Hudson and GOVNET Secretariat 2009, 9)
Implicit in each of these predictions is the idea that ownership will help fix the broken
feedback loop identified in the previous section. By giving more authority to recipientcountry governments, the thinking is that development policies become more aligned with
the actual needs of beneficiaries, because decision-making supposedly takes place closer to
the people who are supposed to benefit from development. According the aforementioned
Oxfam report “…the best hope for poor people lies in their own capacity to require
accountability and performance from their governments. That is why ownership matters”
(2009, 37).
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2.5.	
   The	
  Problem	
  of	
  Faulty	
  Assumptions	
  
The picture presented by pro-ownership scholars and policymakers provides a
convenient story to combat the perceived lack of aid effectiveness. However, it likely
oversimplifies reality. Both the older literature on foreign aid and newer work specifically on
ownership and ownership aid programs point out a number of factors that directly challenge
the assumptions and predictions implicit in the story of ownership outlined above.15
(1)	
  Greater	
  participation	
  doesn’t	
  mean	
  greater	
  influence	
  

The rhetoric on ownership in the literature on foreign aid often fails to distinguish
between participation and influence. However, conflating the two is highly problematic,
because it ignores important nuances in the positioning power of recipient-country
governments. Giving recipient-countries a seat at the table does not automatically give them
more influence over policy outcomes;. Assuming that participation is the same thing as
influence is not only logically incorrect but ignores long-standing power asymmetries
between donors and recipient-country governments.
Ownership, as it is defined above, may not actually be feasible in most aid-dependent
states. For example, Booth (2008) argues the new ownership agenda requires political vision
and leadership from domestic actors. However, we rarely see this in countries heavily
dependent on foreign aid. Similarly, Whitfield and her colleagues argue that the
characteristics of African states influence how much ownership a state can acquire (Whitfield
2009; Whitfield and Maipose 2008). If states do not have certain characteristics, such as the
ability to “project non-negotiability and the confidence that its actions will not lead to donors

15

Much on the newer literature on ownership is critical of particular practices, such as poverty reduction
strategy papers and general budget support. See chapter five (pg. 104) for a more extended discussion of this
literature.
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pulling out (or that it can manage aid on its own if they do),” then it is unlikely that
ownership will translate in to more than a nice headline or catchphrase (Whitfield 2009, 329).
Additionally, letting the recipient-country set the agenda is not the only alternative to
the old donorship approach. Several different types of relationships between donors and
recipient governments are possible. For example, ownership and partnership are often used
interchangeably (see, for example, Millennium Challenge Corporation 2010; European
Parliament Council Commission 2006). However, at least theoretically, the two terms
describe very different types of relationships. Partnership conveys the need for an equal
relationship between two or more “partners,” whereas ownership conveys a situation in
which one actor, in this case the recipient country, takes the lead.
(2)	
  Donors	
  are	
  unlikely	
  to	
  relinquish	
  their	
  influence	
  

There is also very little reason, either theoretically or empirically, to assume that
donors will be willing to relinquish their influence over development policy. Not only is it
likely to be bureaucratically challenging, but it also requires donors to voluntarily give up
control over vast sums of money that they are charged with using wisely for diplomatic,
development, and/or commercial purposes. This is obviously unrealistic (and probably
unwise). Donors are actors with interests and reputations to uphold. They are not neutral
parties but remain deeply invested in the process. Furthermore, donors have preferences that
are not likely to change overnight. However, these political-economic factors are largely
unaccounted for in the ownership predictions articulated above (de Renzio 2006).
Recently, several scholars have made a similar point when suggesting that there is a
gap between the rhetoric of ownership and actual practices on the ground. For example, some
have questioned whether the aid system is truly able to provide ownership given it continues
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to rely on conditionalities (Easterly 2008; Whitfield 2009). Based on country case studies of
“ownership” in several African countries, Whitfield and her colleagues suggest that “aid
officials start out with a commitment to ownership defined as control over policies, but as
soon as there is some disagreement over policy choices they tend to fall back on a definition
of ownership as commitment to their preferred policies” (Whitfield 2009, 2). In other words,
donors are willing to let recipient-country governments set the agenda, as long as it is their
agenda. This raises the question: does ownership actually change anything?
(3)	
  Government	
  influence	
  doesn’t	
  equal	
  national	
  influence	
  

Even if governments are granted more influence over the policy process, there is very
little reason to believe that citizen influence will increase as a result of this change. In fact,
the opposite may occur. Ownership is presumed to increase domestic accountability by
shortening the feedback loop. The idea is that, if domestic governments set the agenda,
citizens can sanction them for bad performance. However, in many aid-dependent states,
systems of patronage and clientelism alter the rule of the game, and mechanisms for citizens
to sanction policymakers cannot be assumed to exist (Wantchekon 2003; van de Walle 2003;
Kitschelt 2007). In fact, aid dependence may actually decrease the likelihood that citizensanctioning mechanisms are present, because revenue comes from donors, not from
taxpayers/citizens. Consequently, governments are accountable to the donors who pay their
bills not their own citizens (Moss, Pettersson, and van de Walle 2008; Moore 1998).
Foreign assistance arguably affects governance in aid-dependent states, because it
changes the institutional arrangements that structure cooperation and incentives to improve
governance (Bräutigam 2000). In his influential book, van de Walle (2001) argues that the
aid system actually prolonged many African neopatrimonial regimes by providing a huge
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influx of resources and technical capacity. And, in a large-scale statistical analysis of the
relationship between aid and governance, Bräutigam and Knack (2004) find that increases in
aid negatively affect governance.
Ultimately, even if governments have more influence, the person controlling the
purse strings does not change. Under the ownership model, revenue still comes from donors
not taxpayers. Therefore, there is no reason to predict that recipient-countries will take the
demands of their citizens more seriously. In fact, if the government is hostile to citizen
demands, increasing their influence may allow them to take the demands of their citizens
even less seriously.

2.6	
   Concluding	
  Remarks	
  	
  
In this chapter, I outlined the contemporary debates in the literature on foreign aid.
These debates have resulted in a new emphasis on recipient-country ownership, which is
predicted to fix many of the longstanding challenges facing foreign assistance. In addition, I
outlined the definitional contours and predictions of the ownership approach, contrasting it to
the older donorship approach. While the donorship approach relies on top-down
conditionalities, ownership seeks to change the institutional arrangements between donors
and recipient-country governments by allowing the latter to set the agenda. I then challenged
several of the assumptions implicit in the pro-ownership rhetoric.
The claim that that ownership is unrealistic has become a common refrain in some
policy circles. However, such refrains are largely based on anecdotal evidence and a
widespread skepticism about donors and foreign aid, not on systematic, empirical evidence.
Thus far, there has been little scholarly analysis of actual attempts to change the institutional
arrangements between donors and recipient countries. I provide such an analysis with this
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dissertation project. In the following chapter, I outline my research design in more detail,
noting how I propose to test the predictions of the ownership model using three case studies
of aid programs in post-genocide and civil war Rwanda.
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Chapter	
  3 	
  

Research	
  Design,	
  Methodology,	
  &	
  
Data	
  Collection	
  
In the previous chapter, I laid out the predictions of the ownership approach to
international development, contrasting it to the older donorship approach. In summary,
development practices that emphasize ownership claim to allow recipient-country
governments to participate more and have more influence over the policy process, while at
the same time decreasing donor influence and increasing the influence of citizens. In this
dissertation, I test these predictions using case studies of aid programs in one recipientcountry, Rwanda. Each of the aid programs I analyze attempts to provide more ownership to
the recipient-country by changing the institutional relationship between donors and the
recipient-country government, in this case the Government of Rwanda (GoR). In the
following chapter, I lay out the research design and methodology I used to test the
predictions of the ownership model, and how I went about collecting data.
The chapter is composed of three major sections. I first outline my independent and
dependent variables and explain process tracing, the method I used to analyze my cases.
Second, I make the case for looking at aid programs in Rwanda and summarize my three case
studies: general budget support and poverty reduction strategies, the aid coordination,
harmonization, and alignment framework, and the Rwandan Joint Governance Report. Third,
I summarize my data sources and the fieldwork I conducted in Rwanda during 2009 and
2010.
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3.1.	
   Variables	
  of	
  Interest	
  &	
  Methodology	
  
Independent	
  variable	
  	
  

In this dissertation, I am interested in the effect of ownership on the influence of
donors, government policymakers, and citizens of aid-dependent states. The independent
variable, a change in the institutional arrangement between donors and the government, is
operationalized through aid programs designed to allow the recipient country to participate
more in the policy decision-making process, i.e. “ownership aid programs.”
An aid program is “a time bound intervention involving multiple activities that may
cut across sectors, themes and/or geographic areas” (Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2011). An aid program is different than an aid project, or specific “development intervention
designed to achieve specific objectives within specified resources and implementation
schedules” (Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). However, aid projects are often
implemented within the framework of an aid program. For example, donors may coalesce
around an aid program on decentralization, which includes a variety of specific and
distinctive aid projects that are each designed to transfer authority to local decision-makers
and build local institutions.
Looking at aid programs, rather than ownership’s aggregate effect in a country,
allows for more specificity. Country case studies provide an important macro-level picture
(see, for example, Whitfield 2009). However, they have difficulty verifying that the
outcomes they describe are actually the result of an increased focus on ownership in the
recipient-country and not something else. By focusing on specific aid programs, I can better
specify causal mechanisms and explore variations between program outcomes, improving the
validity and specificity of my findings.
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Dependent	
  variables	
  	
  

The new emphasis on ownership assumes that more government participation will
lead to more recipient-country government influence, and consequently, a decrease in the
influence of donors and an increase in the influence of citizens over policy decision-making
in aid-dependent states. However, as explained in chapter two, there are several faulty
assumptions implicit in the story of ownership. Therefore, in this dissertation, I examine how
ownership aid programs affect each one of the predicted outcomes of the ownership approach
to international development.
First, in each case, I ask whether or not the influence of the recipient-country
government has increased as a result of the aid program. Here I make an important
distinction between participation and influence. It is not enough that governments are more
involved in the policy process, there has to be evidence that they have more influence over
the policy process. I look for evidence of government influence by asking questions such as:
Are there instances where donors and the government disagreed? If so, who prevailed?
Where donors have clear preferences, did they cede authority to recipient-country
governments?
Second, I examine whether or not donors have become less influential over policy
decision-making. Given that donor influence likely comes in several forms, I am interested in
changes in both the degree of donor influence (i.e. how much?) and the type of donor
influence (i.e. what kind?). In other words, I am interested in changes to not just the amount
of donor influence, but changes to how donors wield their influence as well. I look for
evidence of decreased donor influence by asking questions, such as: When, where, and how
have donors tried to influence the policy process? When government preferences conflict
with donor preferences, do donors allow the government to set the agenda?
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Third, I look for evidence that citizens in the recipient-country have become more
influential. Once again, it is not enough for citizens to merely participate more; there must be
evidence that citizens have more influence over the policy decision-making process. I look
for evidence of citizen influence by asking questions such as: Is there evidence of increased
political competition? Has civil society become more active and vibrant? Is there evidence of
increased accountability?
Process	
  tracing	
  	
  

To move from descriptive narrative to a causal story, my analysis relies on process
tracing.16 True to its name, process tracing emphasizes processes, attempting to connect X to
Y by exploring the causal link(s) between the variables of interest. Instead of testing the
relationship between two variables using, for example, statistical analysis, process tracing
builds a causal relationship through establishing the links and mechanisms that connect the
two variables. Process tracing, therefore, leverages the data points between time A and time
B to explain the relationship or lack of relationship between the variables of interest.
Process tracing is particularly advantageous because of its ability to account for
complex causal relationships, such as path dependency, critical junctures, and equifinality
(Bennett and Elman 2006). By tracing causal processes and mechanisms, process tracing is
able to describe causal process without substantial abstraction, building theory from the
ground up. This dissertation explores questions that have been hinted at, but have not been
systematically theorized or analyzed. Therefore, using an approach that is more detailoriented helps prevent heavy abstraction and the accidental omission of important variables.

16

For an overview of process tracing see George and Bennett 2005; Bennett 2010; Bennett and Elman 2006;
Checkel 2008.
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Process tracing can be used for a variety of purposes, including description, theory
generation, and theory testing. In this dissertation, I use process tracing in two ways. First, I
use it to test the predictions of the ownership approach. In each case, I look for evidence that
connects a change in the institutional relationship between donors and the GoR with an
increase in the influence of government policymakers and citizens and a decrease in the
influence of donors over the policy decision-making processes.
Bennett (2010) and Collier (2011), refer to this type of causation test as a “hoop test.”
The hypotheses under consideration must “jump through the hoop” in order to remain under
consideration. Passing the hoop test does not affirm a hypothesis; it merely suggests that the
hypothesis is likely to be valid. However, failing eliminates the hypothesis. In other words,
passing the hoop test is necessary for establishing causation but not sufficient.
Then, because each of the hypotheses predicted by proponents of ownership fail the
hoop test, I use process tracing to provide an alternative explanation of how the aid programs
actually impact the three variables of interest. In other words, I build an alternative, causal
account of how the introduction of ownership aid programs in Rwanda changed (or failed to
change) the influence of donors, the GoR, and Rwandan citizens over the policy decisionmaking process.

3.2.	
   Case	
  Studies	
  
Why	
  Rwanda?	
  

The universe of cases for this dissertation includes all aid-dependent countries.
Bräutigam defines aid dependency as “a situation in which a country cannot perform many of
the core functions of government, such as operations and maintenance, or the delivery of
basic public services, without foreign aid funding and expertise” (Bräutigam 2000, 2).
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Countries that receive ODA equal to or greater than approximately 10% of their gross
national income (GNI) are generally considered aid dependent.
If yearly figures for ODA as a percentage of GNI are averaged from 2000-2008,
forty-one countries fall into this category (The average ODA as percentage of GNI across all
forty-one countries is 21.44 %.). Additionally, another group of twenty-seven countries are
more moderately aid dependent with averages in the 4%-9.9% range17 (A complete list of
both groups can be found in Appendix 3, pg. 185). In my dissertation, I only look at aid
programs in one aid-dependent country, Rwanda. (Rwanda’s average ODA as a percent of
GNI from 2000-2008 is right at the median for aid dependent countries, 21.08 %.) The
question is then, why Rwanda?
By an accident of history, Rwanda is a “plausibility probe.” Rwanda emerged from
conflict when the aid agenda was being refashioned and ownership was taking center stage.
Donors championing the ownership approach (the United Kingdom, in particular) came into
Rwanda following the genocide and began using Rwanda as a test case for the new approach
(Hayman 2006).
The emphasis on ownership by donors has been echoed in the current regime’s
rhetoric. President Paul Kagame and his government are vocal supporters of the ownership
approach, rarely missing an opportunity to argue for the importance of local ownership and
castigate donor influence (see, for example, Handelsblatt 2009; Kagame 2007; 2009a 2009b;
2009c). As one of my interviewees put it, Rwanda is not a country that has signed on the
dotted line (Interview I-VIII, 11.02.2009). In other words, Rwanda projects the non-

17

Figures compiled from the World Bank Development Indicators.
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negotiability that Whitfield (2009) says is essential for country ownership. In a recent speech
to donors and senior GoR officials, Kagame argued:
It is therefore sometimes uncalled for, that we become subjects of endless
lectures of how we should manage ourselves. We know what is best for us.
No one should pretend that they know better than us what we need for
ourselves (Kagame 2010, 2).
Rwanda’s (rhetorical) commitment to ownership is perhaps best illustrated by a lexicon
change that came about during a conference in the late 1990s. Instead of being called donors,
agencies providing foreign assistance to Rwanda are always referred to as “development
partners” (Interview I-VI, 10.30.09).
Additionally, several contextual factors make it more likely that donors will actually
be willing to give ownership to the Rwandan government. As chapter four explains in detail,
Rwanda has seen tremendous economic growth over the past decade. As a result, donors are
eager to attach their name to its success and support the current regime. The current
government is also largely perceived as having “political will,” strong leadership, and strong
anti-corruption policies. In other words, Rwanda has the vision Booth (2008) says is
necessary. The perception of political will and leadership, combined with tremendous
economic growth, makes donors eager to back the GoR.
Lastly, a “genocide credit” likely gives the GoR more leeway to advance its agenda
(Reyntjens 2004). As chapter seven explores in more detail, donors have often been willing
to back the current regime, as it is largely seen as responsible for ending the 1994 genocide.
Additionally, donors are sometimes fearful of challenging government policies too much, out
of fear that conflict may once again erupt. As one of my interviewees noted, the role or
absence of the international community in 1994 is always in the background; the GoR is
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always thinking about it. The international community is not in a weak position, as it gives
lots of money, but in an ambiguous one (Interview I-XVIII, 01.13.09).
Collectively, the proactive nature of the GoR and the increased likelihood that donors
will actually grant ownership means that if a change from donorship to ownership is feasible,
it should be feasible in Rwanda. If we do not see ownership emerging in Rwanda, it is
unlikely we will see it emerging elsewhere. Therefore, although it is not representative of all
aid-dependent countries, the country offers an excellent place to begin analyzing the impact
of ownership in aid-dependent countries.
Summary	
  of	
  case	
  studies	
  

Within the Rwandan context, I examine four “ownership” aid programs – poverty
reduction strategies, budget support, the joint governance assessment, and the Aid
Coordination, Harmonization, and Alignment Agenda – through three case studies. Poverty
reduction strategies and budget support are distinct aid programs; participation in one does
not mean participation in another. However, they are tightly linked and both have similar
objectives. Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation, they constitute one case study in
this dissertation project.
Each aid program is designed to change the institutional relationship between donors
and the recipient-country government, giving more influence to the GoR. What differs is
what the GoR, as a result of the aid program, is supposed to have more influence over.
Poverty reduction strategies and budget support are supposed to give the GoR more influence
over the design and implementation of development policy. Alternatively, the Aid
Coordination, Harmonization, and Alignment agenda supposedly gives the government more
influence over the aid policy donors pursue in Rwanda. Lastly, the Joint Governance
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Advisory Report is supposed to give the GoR more influence over governance policy (see
table 3.1).
Table	
  3.1:	
  Predictions	
  of	
  Case	
  Studies	
  
Budget Support & Poverty Reduction Strategies:
Changes in influence over development policy
Joint Governance Report:
Changes in influence over governance policy
Aid Coordination, Harmonization, and Alignment:
Changes in influence over aid policy
Below, I briefly summarize each case study and explain why each is an “ownership” aid
program. More specifics about each case can be found in the case study chapters (chapters
five, six, and seven).
Rwanda’s	
  poverty	
  reduction	
  strategy	
  and	
  budget	
  support	
  	
  

Poverty reduction strategies began as a part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) program, a World Bank and IMF program that grants debt relief to low-income
countries. In 1999, the HIPC program began to require that participating countries lay out
their own medium-term development goals and strategies in a poverty reduction strategy
paper or PRSP (IMF 2010).18 As of early 2011, seventy low-income states either had a PRSP
or an interim PRSP, and many states are currently working on their second or third PRSP.19
Rwanda jumped on the poverty reduction strategy bandwagon quite early, finalizing its first

18

Other criteria for participation include (1) be eligible to borrow from IDA, (2) face an unsustainable debt
burden that cannot be addressed through traditional debt relief mechanisms, and 3) have established a track
record of reform and sound policies through the IMF and World Bank (IMF 2010). The PRSP program was
officially approved by the Joint Boards of the IMF and World Bank in December 1999 (Cheru 2006).
19
New PRSPs are generally prepared every three to five years. For a full list of all countries with a PRSP or
interim PRSP see http://go.worldbank.org/LYE7YNYBH0.
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PRSP in June 2002 and finalizing a second, the “Economic Development & Poverty
Reduction Strategy 2008-2012” (EDPRS), in 2007.
Poverty reduction strategies are said to represent an ownership approach, because
they ask countries to outline their own plans for development. As Cheru notes, “The PRSP
approach is supposed to represent a major departure from previous development strategies
whereby the World Bank and the IMF dictated the directions of economic policies in poor
countries” (Cheru 2006, 355). That is, instead of making aid conditional on World Bank and
IMF thinking, poverty reduction strategies are supposed to give authority to recipient-country
governments.
Following the introduction of the poverty reduction strategy program, donors began
issuing a new type of “program aid,” or aid that is not tied to a particular project.20 Budget
support is a resource transfer directly into the budget or treasury of the receiving country and
allows the recipient country to use its own allocation, procurement, and accounting
structures. The idea is that countries define their own priorities through the PRSP process,
and then budget support funds these priorities. Collectively, budget support and the poverty
reduction strategy program are supposed to give recipient-countries control over
development policy and the allocation of aid money. Because it supposedly gives recipientcountries the ability to spend aid money as they wish, budget support is often heralded as the
prime example of the ownership approach.
Rwanda’s	
  Aid	
  Coordination,	
  Harmonization,	
  and	
  Alignment	
  Agenda	
  

The Aid Coordination, Harmonization, and Alignment agenda (ACHA) is an attempt
by the GoR and donors to localize the Paris Declaration in Rwanda by providing higher

20

Alternative types of program aid include, balance of payment support and debt relief (Hammond 2006).
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levels of ownership through increased coordination, harmonization, and alignment.
Ownership is at the core of the Paris Agenda outlined in chapter two. However, additional
elements, such as coordination, alignment, and harmonization, provide the foundation for
ownership. If donors do not harmonize and align their activities with national systems and
priorities, it would be difficult for a recipient-country to take charge of development and aid
policy. At the same time, if donors remain fragmented, advancing one agenda led by the
recipient-country would be difficult.
In contrast to the poverty reduction strategy program and budget support, which are
global programs, ACHA is a Rwandan aid program. However, several other countries have
similar coordination, harmonization, and alignment mechanisms (for example, the Joint
Assistance Strategy in Zambia or the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania). ACHA brings
donors and the GoR together in a series of forums and working groups that are designed to
make sure donors and the GoR are on the same page and allow donors to support GoR
programs more effectively. For example, under the ACHA framework, high-level donor
representatives and GoR officials meet in a series of quarterly meetings, as well as a biannual Development Partners Meeting and an annual Development Partners Forum.
Additionally, under the ACHA framework, the Rwandan cabinet approved an Aid Policy in
2006.
The	
  Rwandan	
  Joint	
  Governance	
  Assessment	
  	
  

In contrast to the other case studies, the Joint Governance Assessment or JGA is
completely unique to Rwanda. The JGA is a “jointly owned” set of indicators that assess
governance in Rwanda and is arguably the first of its kind globally. The idea for the JGA
came about in 2006, and the first report was approved by Rwanda’s cabinet on September 12,
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2008 and adopted at the Development Partner’s Meeting in November 2008. The JGA covers
three broad areas of assessment: ruling justly, government effectiveness, and investment
climate and corporate governance (RGAC 2009; Williams et al. 2009). The JGA process is
supposed to result in an annual report. However, only one official report has been released
thus far.
The central objective of the JGA is to produce a single governance assessment that
donors and the GoR can both utilize. The JGA is a particularly interesting aid program,
because it deals with governance, a highly politically sensitive topic for the GoR.
Additionally, while the GoR and donors appear to see eye to eye about economic policy, they
have often butted heads when it comes to governance. These differences distinguish the JGA
from the other two aid programs analyzed in this dissertation.
Representativeness	
  

My research design is based on case studies from a single country. While the design
allows me to make fairly conclusive claims about the impact of the ownership approach in
Rwanda, its ability to make claims about the impact of the ownership approach globally is
limited. Therefore, the conclusions outlined in chapter eight will need to be corroborated in
other contexts to ensure their generalizability.
Two factors in particular make Rwanda a unique case, and may influence the
generalizability of my findings. First, the leadership provided by President Paul Kagame is
perhaps unique. As chapter four will explain with more depth, Kagame is not without his
critics (particularly in the human rights world). However, Kagame has found a voice with
many Western leaders and enjoys substantial support from powerful states like the United
States and the United Kingdom, whom he has courted extensively. Kagame’s support from
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the United States and United Kingdom is important to keep in mind, as it is likely to
influence the relationships between donors and the GoR. Second, the 1994 Rwandan
genocide provides a very particular country context. Although there has been no systematic
analysis of how the genocide affects aid disbursement in Rwanda, donors and scholars often
note a sense of guilt amongst donors that likely affects the relationship between donors and
the GoR.21
Both factors are likely to make Rwanda a unique context, particularly the 1994
genocide. Kagame has at times been linked with the “new generation of African leaders,” a
group of African presidents that were highly regarded during the 1990s (many have since
fallen out of favor).22 As such, his leadership is not a completely unique phenomenon.
However, the Rwandan genocide was a particularly important world event. Its dramatic
impact on present day Rwanda cannot, and should not, be ignored. I did not “control” for
these factors. However, throughout my research, I was very attentive to how the unique
features of the Rwandan case might influence my findings and conclusions. I will discuss
how generalizable my findings are in chapter eight.

3.3.	
  	
   	
  Data	
  Sources	
  
I obtained data for this dissertation from three main sources: (1) in-country fieldwork,
(2) primary documents, and (3) supplemental evaluations and reports. It was often the case
that it would be in the best interest of the actors I analyzed to focus on successes rather than
limitations. Therefore, I avoided relying on a single data source.
21

For example, Reyntjens (2004) speaks of a genocide credit that he argues lets the Kagame regime get away
with very serious human rights violations.
22
Leaders often included in this group (along with Kagame) include Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Meles
Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique,
and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa.
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Fieldwork	
  

I conducted approximately three months of in-country fieldwork in Rwanda during
October/November 2009 and June/July 2010. This fieldwork consisted of interviews with
Rwandan government officials, international development staff from bilateral and
multilateral donor agencies, NGOs, and independent consultants, as well as observations of
pertinent meetings and conferences. In addition, throughout my time in Rwanda, I was
introduced to and participated in informal conversations with countless individuals relevant
to my subject of study. Although these conversations are not directly reflected in my data
sources, they often alerted me to key aspects of the Rwandan case.
I conducted 47 formal interviews with 48 people.23 A list of interviews can be found
in Appendix 1. Interviews lasted anywhere from thirty minutes to more than three hours, with
the average being around an hour. I chose not to have a standard interview protocol for my
interviews. The information I desired from each interviewee was different, and I wanted to
have the flexibility to explore interesting topics that might arise spontaneously. Having a
rigid interview protocol would have prevented this type of flexibility. Therefore, before each
interview I established what I hoped to obtain from the conversation and outlined important
questions to ask that particular interviewee. However, I gave myself the flexibility to explore
topics that came up unexpectedly. I made sure to avoid leading questions, instead asking the
interviewee to describe their experiences or provide their opinion about pertinent topics.
The questions I asked varied based on several factors. First, I asked different
questions depending on whether the interviewee worked for a donor or the GoR. Several of

23

In some cases, interviews were with conducted with more than one person. In addition, I conducted more than
one interview with some individuals. All of these interviews took place in person in Kigali, save for one, which
was conducted via Skype.
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my interviewees who were Rwandan nationals had actually worked for both the GoR and one
or more donor. This led to many interesting conversations comparing the two experiences.
Second, I asked different questions depending on the interviewee’s job title/description. For
example, when interviewing donors it mattered whether the interviewee was the head of the
delegation or in charge of a specific aspect of the agency’s country program. When
interviewing government representatives it mattered if the interviewee was the head of a
division or a lower ranking civil servant. Third, I asked different questions depending on the
interviewee’s past experience and work on specific programs or aid projects.
Selecting whom to interview was not particularly difficult. Most donors, even the
largest agencies, have a relatively small staff on the ground in Rwanda and access was not
typically an issue. Each donor agency is arranged differently. However, in most agencies I
spoke to the donor representative working on governance/democratization and the donor
representative in charge of aid coordination (typically an economist). In the end, I was able to
speak with representatives of all the major donors. Government officials were slightly less
easy to identify, because there were more of them and sometimes access was more difficult.
That being said, I was able to speak with almost all persons that I identified as a key
informant, and I was pleasantly surprised at my ability to access high-level elites. The
greatest challenge I faced was that key informants on a particular subject were sometimes no
longer in Kigali.
Given that Rwanda is a relatively closed society, frankness was always a concern. I
was particularly concerned about the ability of government employees to speak openly. Most
of my conversations did not center on highly politically sensitive topics (i.e. human rights,
repression, ethnic relationships). However, the topic of governance, broadly defined, can be a
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delicate subject in Rwanda. Therefore, throughout my analysis I always kept in mind that my
informants might not have been at liberty to be completely forthcoming.
Due to concerns about openness, I opted not to tape record my interviews. Instead, I
took detailed notes during the interview and then spent anywhere from one to two hours
writing up the interview immediately after it was completed. Because I did not tape record,
my dissertation includes very few direct quotes by interviewees. While direct quotes would
have been an asset, I felt it was more important to establish a neutral space for my
interviewees than be able to quote them directly.
In addition to interviews, I was also able to attend and observe a few key meetings
between donors and the GoR, including a biannual Joint Budget Support Review, a
Workshop on the Joint Governance Assessment, and a Policy Dialogue on the Mo Ibrahim
Foundation Index. During these meetings, I was able to directly observe how donor
representatives and government policymakers interacted. This experience was invaluable to
my research, and enabled a deeper understanding of the current relationships between the
GoR and its development partners. Attending these meetings also allowed me to speak to
many more individuals than those I formally interviewed, and allowed me to observe
informal exchanges between development partners and government officials.
Primary	
  documents	
  

To supplement fieldwork, I also collected and analyzed primary documents about
development in Rwanda and the aid programs I analyzed. A list of documents consulted can
be found in Appendix 2. Primary sources mainly came in the form of: (1) key aid documents
and declarations by the GoR and its donors; (2) meeting agendas, power point presentations,
and minutes; and (3) documents specific to the identified program of interest. An online
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library on the Development Partners website (http://www.devpartners.gov.rw) provided a
wealth of information to analyze. In addition, I acquired more documents during my time in
Rwanda, as interviewees gave me documents, sometimes without me requesting them. I also
worked with staff at the External Finance Unit at the Ministry of Finance to obtain missing
documents.
Monitoring	
  and	
  evaluation	
  reports	
  and	
  academic	
  sources	
  

I also consulted several monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports on matters related
to aid in Rwanda. At times, I relied on evaluations and reports to verify my findings and, in
some cases, they provided powerful confirmation of my conclusions. However, I never used
them as the sole confirmation of a finding, because I have no way of verifying the accuracy
of their conclusions. Additionally, such reports are often critiqued for relying on a fly-in and
fly-out method in which highly paid consultants touchdown in Kigali for a day or two. I paid
close attention to the project descriptions to avoid particularly careless work. However, the
time spent on the report was still typically an unknown. Lastly, while these reports were
usually conducted by independent consultants, the scope and conditions of the project (and
sometimes the findings) often must be signed-off by the sponsoring donor(s) and the GoR.
Therefore, it is difficult to know how “independent” the reports actually are.
I also consulted the work of several academics who conducted extensive research in
Rwanda, including Peter Uvin, Filip Reyntjens, Gérard Prunier, and René Lemarchand.
While my case studies are largely based on my own data, I referred to works by these and
other authors to gain a fuller understanding of the Rwandan context and the history of donor
engagement in the country. In particular, I found Rachel Hayman’s thorough and meticulous
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work on aid to Rwanda in the post-genocide period informative and helpful (Hayman 2006,
2009a, 2009b).

3.4.	
  	
   Concluding	
  Remarks	
  	
  
In this chapter, I outlined my research design, which is based on my analysis of four
different aid programs implemented in the early 2000s in Rwanda. Each of these aid
programs promises an increase in recipient-country ownership. I use a process-tracing
method and rely on data collected during fieldwork in Rwanda, as well as primary sources
and external evaluations to make my conclusions. In each case study, I ask whether or not we
see: (1) an increase in recipient-country influence, (2) a decrease in donor influence, or (3) an
increase in citizen influence.
My goal is to develop middle-range theory on how global norms around aid
disbursement influence decision-making and policy choice in local contexts. As George and
Bennett note:
High general theories that attempt to formulate broad covering laws tend to
have quite limited explanatory and predictive power…They are pitched at a
level of abstraction that fails to give insightful explanation of foreign policy
decision or of interactions between states that lead to specific outcomes.
Middle-range theories, on the other hand, are deliberately limited in their
scope; they attempt to explain different subclasses of general phenomena.
Middle-range theory attempt to formulate well-specified conditional
generalizations of more limited scope (George and Bennett 2005, 266: my
emphasis).
Given that the purpose of my research is to generate theory that makes conditional
generalizations about a particular group of countries, the generation of middle-range theory is
appropriate for my purposes. Furthermore, middle-range theory is easier to translate into
policy relevant conclusions than high-level general theories, which provide little for
policymakers to go on (George and Bennett 2005). The ability to make policy-relevant
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conclusions is essential when analyzing a subject area such as foreign aid that is clearly
pertinent to a wide array of policymakers.
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Chapter	
  4 	
  

Donors	
  and	
  Development	
  	
  
…in the heart of the African continent, lie the highlands of Rwanda. The country is tiny, the size
of Massachusetts, and has one of the highest population densities in the world. This is not the
Africa of jungles, corruption, and failed states portrayed in movies. Temperatures fall to freezing
on some hill tops, cattle graze on velvety pastures, and the government maintains a tight grip on
all aspects of society. On the thousand of hills – in between tea plantations and eucalyptus
groves – millions of peasants eke out a living by farming beans, bananas, and sorghum.
-Jason Sterns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters (2011, 13)
In the following chapter, I outline the Rwandan context, describing the history of
development in Rwanda and the activities of bilateral and multilateral donors currently active in
in the country. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, in order to understand contemporary
development schemes and practices, it is important for the reader to have a basic understanding
of the Rwandan context. Second, both the country context and the country’s donors are likely to
affect how the ownership approach plays out in a particular country. Whoever benefits from
ownership is apt to be dependent on the existing power dynamics in the recipient county. If a
particular group of domestic actors have little authority in a given country context, there is little
reason to believe that ownership aid programs will drastically change how much influence they
wield. Likewise, if a donor does not prioritize ownership, we are not likely to see a great deal of
change in how they do business, even if there is a growing emphasis on ownership in Rwanda as
a whole.
The chapter is organized into three sections. In the first two sections, I provide a brief
overview of development in Rwanda. I divide this discussion into two time periods:
independence the genocide (1962-1994) and post-genocide to the present day (1994-2010). The
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1994 genocide is clearly a major turning point in Rwandan history; it changed development
practices and ushered in a new set of donors. I, therefore, use it to structure my discussion.
I then discuss the roles and strategies of the major multilateral and bilateral donors
currently active in Rwanda. While several donors are increasing their presence in Rwanda, I
focus on the donors currently providing the highest levels of ODA to Rwanda: the World Bank,
African Development Bank, European Commission, United Kingdom, and United States. I also
briefly discuss the United Nations. My discussion of Rwanda’s donors highlights differences in
the practices and priorities of the multiple donors currently providing aid to Rwanda. These
differences not only make coordination and harmonization difficult, they impact the types of aid
programs a donor pursues and the commitment to ownership a donor expresses.

4.1.	
  	
   The	
  Pre-‐Genocide	
  Period,	
  1962-‐1994	
  
The boundaries of modern day Rwanda were established in 1962 when the state declared
its independence from Belgium and separated from what is now the independent state of
Burundi.24 In the section below, I provide a very brief summary of more than 40 years of
development in Rwanda, from independence to the 1994 genocide. I also briefly summarize
ethnic divisions between the Tutsi and Hutu populations. Tensions between the two groups are
not only fundamental to understanding the civil war and genocide of the 1990s, but
contemporary politics and development practices in Rwanda as well.

24

What we now know as two separate countries, Rwanda and Burundi, were at one time the colonial territory known
as Ruanda-Urundi. Ruanda-Urundi was first assigned to Germany by the 1884 Berlin Conference but was allocated
to Belgium by a League of Nations mandate after World War I.
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Development	
  and	
  the	
  influx	
  of	
  ODA	
  	
  

Following independence, there was a gradual but steady increase in the amount of foreign
aid flowing into Rwanda (see figure 4.1). In 1960, ODA to Rwanda was calculated at $7.5
million. By the early 1990s, Rwanda’s ODA was over $300 million. Growth in ODA was
particularly strong in the 1970s. In this decade alone, aid increased more than seven-fold, from
around $22 million at the start of the decade, to over $154 million at the end of the decade. In the
1980s, ODA once again doubled, exceeding $287 million by 1990. This means that in 1990
alone, donors spent $41 for each of Rwanda’s seven million citizens.25
Figure	
  4.1:	
  ODA	
  to	
  Rwanda,	
  1960-‐1994	
  (current	
  USD	
  million)	
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  Source:	
  World	
  Development	
  Indicators	
  

Did this all this aid do any good? Poverty has always been a problem in Rwanda. In
1984-1985, 63.33% of the population lived in households with consumption or income per
person below the poverty line ($1.25 a day).26 Like most underdeveloped countries, Rwanda has
historically faced high-levels of debt, population growth, and pressure on the environment.
Historically, most Rwandans have engaged in subsistence agriculture, with the primary exports

25

It is estimated that around 200 bilaterials, multilaterals, and NGOs managed more than 500 aid projects in
Rwanda by 1986 (Hansson 1989, cited in Uvin 1998). This is an exceptionally large presence considering Rwanda
has a population akin to Virginia and is geographically the size of Maryland.
26
Source: PovcalNet. Available at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp
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being coffee and tea. This has placed a great deal of strain on the land and economy, as Rwanda
has the highest population density in continental Sub-Saharan Africa (Bureau of African Affairs
2011).
Despite these challenges, economic development in Rwanda was generally upwards
(although slow) in the decades following independence (see Table 4.1).
Table	
  4.1:	
  Rwandan	
  Economic	
  Development	
  Indictors	
  
Indicator
GNP per capita
Industrial Growth
Services Growth
Agricultural Growth
Energy Production
Gross Domestic Investment
Annual exports

Period
1965-88
1980-88
1980-88
1980-88
1980-88
1980-88
1960-80

Growth Rate (%)
+1.5
+3.6
+3.4
+.3
+5.5
+7.4
+7.8
Source:	
  Data	
  compiled	
  by	
  Uvin	
  (1998,	
  47)	
  

Rwanda’s economic growth during this time period is particularly impressive when you compare
it to economic growth (or lack of growth) in Rwanda’s East African neighbors. While Rwanda’s
neighbors saw their ranking among other least developed countries (LDCs) decrease, Rwanda’s
ranking increased (see table 4.2).
Table	
  4.2:	
  Rwanda’s	
  LDC	
  Ranking	
  Compared	
  to	
  East	
  African	
  Neighbors	
  
Country	
  ranking	
  among	
  LDCs	
  from	
  bottom	
  up	
  
	
  

1976
1981
1985
1990
Variation

Rwanda
7
16
18
19
+12

Burundi
11
14
11
11
-

Zaïre
16
12
9
12
-4

Uganda
33
13
N/A
13
-20

Tanzania
25
19
21
2
-23

Source:	
  World	
  Bank	
  Development	
  Reports,	
  compiled	
  by	
  Reyntjens	
  (1994,	
  35)	
  

During the 70s and 80s, Rwanda stood out among other states in Africa and became a
model for African development. The small but upwards economic trends in Rwanda, combined
with a belief that Rwanda possessed political stability, effective administration, and prudent and
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sound management, made the country very attractive to foreign donors (Uvin 1998). However,
the high rate of foreign assistance would have lasting effects.
From 1982-1987, foreign assistance financed over 70% of public investment (World
Bank 1989: 11), allowing the state to import much more than it exported (see Uvin 1998, 42-43).
Beginning in the 1980s, the system began to show signs of fatigue. In the mid-1980s, an
agricultural crisis hit Rwanda. Food production dropped sharply and the prices of tea and coffee,
Rwanda’s major cash crops, dropped dramatically on the world market. As a result, the country
spiraled into financial crisis. Foreign debt, which had previously been relatively low by regional
standards, increased rapidly from 16% of GNP in 1980 to 32% of GNP in 1990 (Uvin 1998).
The financial crisis was exacerbated by drought (1984), excessive rain (1987), plant
disease (1998), and, of course, the civil war that began in the 1990s. However, the major causes
of the crisis were structural. Rwanda’s dependence on coffee made the country vulnerable to
international price swings, and its industrial sector was mismanaged and expensive. Additionally,
since the 1980s the state had faced a balance-of-payment deficit and had been increasingly
dependent on foreign aid. Although the country did achieve a positive balance of payments and
public sector budget in 1984-1985, the collapse in the mining sector and the worldwide decline
in coffee prices brought about a crisis that the government was unable to manage (Uvin 1998).
These fiscal challenges resulted in a $90 million structural adjustment program (SAP)
with the World Bank in 1991, and additional SAPs in 1992 and 1993. The latter were only
partially implemented. The SAPs called on the state to devalue the Rwandese franc in order to
boost coffee exports (leading to inflation), reduce imports, and cut expenditures. There is little
consensus on the impact of the SAPs, because they were never fully realized due to the civil war
and 1994 genocide, which spiraled the country into economic and social turmoil. In the
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following section, I provide a brief overview of the ethnic tensions that, in combination with
economic challenges, fostered the civil war and 1994 genocide.
The	
  “ethnicity”	
  question	
  

Historically, three groups of people have co-existed in Rwanda, the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.
While ethnic identification is now forbidden, Hutus are believed to make up approximately 84%
of the population, Tutsis 15% and the Twa 1% (CIA n.d.). All three groups speak the same Bantu
language (Kinyarwanda) and have lived side-by-side and intermarried for centuries. Therefore, it
is inappropriate to call these groups “tribes.” However, there are stereotypically physical features
associated with each group.27
Ethnic divisions have been a part of Rwandan society for centuries. However, their
meaning and political significance has always been intertwined with class and power and have
varied over time and between regions (Newbury 1988; 1998). During the Belgian colonial state,
ethnic divisions became more entrenched and ethnicity became less fluid.28 The Belgian colonial
state required all Rwandan citizens to carry identity cards, on which their ethnicity was listed.
During the colonial state, Tutsis were to elevated to positions of power, while Hutus were
systematically removed from positions of power and excluded from higher education. This
stifled Hutu advancement for generations (Des Forges 1999). Tutsis gained increased authority
based on a combination of factors, including administrative efficiency, kinship institutions, and

27

The Bwatwa or Twa people are pygmoids who historically were hunters and gatherers in forested areas or
completed menial tasks for high-raking persons. Hutus are thought to have a more standard Bantu physical
appearance, resembling the populations of neighboring Uganda. On the other hand, Tutsi are thought to be very tall
and thin with sharp, angular facial features. While Hutus were historically pastoralists, Tutsis were associated with
wealth and power largely due to their ownership of cattle (Prunier 1995).
28
Prior to a census in the 1930s, ethnicity was relatively fluid. E.g., if a Rwandan acquired a great deal of cattle,
they might “become” a Tutsi. However, in the 1930s, all Rwandan adults were required to declare an ethnicity. This
ethnicity was then entered into the public record and indicated on mandatory identification cards. This made one’s
ethnicity more difficult - although not impossible - to change (Des Forges 1999).
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racist theories of evolution. The latter argued that Tutsis were a Hamatic race (i.e., the Tutsis
were descendants of Noah’s son Ham) and, therefore, superior to the Hutu population, which
was argue to be related to the “Negorid” population of Sub-Saharan Africa (Prunier 1995).
Through the colonial experience, the cleavages between Hutus and Tutsis grew more
pronounced and salient. In the 1950s, there were several clashes between the Tutsi minority and
the Hutu majority, and cleavages between the two groups continued to grow. After
independence, Hutus came to power, led first by Grégoire Kayibanda (1962-1973) and then
Juvenal Habyarimana (1973-1994). Over the following decades, ethnic tensions between the two
groups flared at multiple points, resulting in forced migration and death for many Tutsis. By
1964, approximately 336,000 Tutsis were living in exile in neighboring states. Between
December 1963 and January 1964 alone, an estimated 10,000 Tutsis were killed (Prunier 1995).
The question of ethnicity is exceedingly complex and difficult, and there are multiple
“contested histories” in Rwanda (Newbury 1998). What is most important to keep in mind is that
divisions between Hutus and Tutsis are not primordial. Although ethnicity is clearly a salient
cleavage in Rwanda, its importance is deeply tied to issues of power and class. As Uvin writes,
ethnicity in Rwanda is “not a matter of ‘objective’ cultural or physical distinctions but rather is a
social construct, an ‘imagined community’” (Anderson 1983; Uvin 1998: 15).29
Civil	
  war	
  and	
  genocide	
  	
  

In the 1990s, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a force largely composed of Tutsi
refugees living in neighboring Uganda, invaded Rwanda from the north. Their advancement
began a civil war and reignited ethnic fears. Far from being an unorganized and inexperienced

29

For a more details on ethnicity in Rwanda, the reader is encouraged to see works by Gérard Prunier (1995), Scott
Straus (2006), Alison Des Forges (1999), René Lemarchand (2009), and Lee Ann Fujii (2009).
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militia, the RPF contained experienced military personnel due to the training many members
received in the Ugandan Army.30 The RPF was originally commanded by General Fred
Twigema, but, when Twigema was killed (allegedly by friendly fire), Major Paul Kagame
returned from military training in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (USA) to take command. Under
Kagame’s leadership, the RPF advanced relatively quickly against the government forces, the
Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) (Prunier 1995). Approximately 9,000 soldiers and civilians
were killed as a result of the civil war (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005).
In 1993, a peace agreement between the Hutu-led government and the Tutsi-led RPF was
negotiated in Arusha, Tanzania. The so-called Arusha Peace Accords resulted in a cease-fire and
the implementation of a transitional government. Additionally, a UN peacekeeping mission
(UNAMIR) was dispatched to the region. However, the tides changed once again when, on April
6, 1994, a plane crashed over Kigali Airport, killing the current (Hutu) Rwandan president,
Juvenal Habyarimana, and his Burundian counterpart. Who is responsible for the attack is still
unknown, although many blame the RPF.31
Based on these speculations, within hours, what is now known as the Rwandan genocide
began. In approximately 100 days an estimated 800,000 Rwandans (mostly Tutsi and moderate
Hutus) were killed.32 The Rwandan army and militarized gangs and small local militias known as
the Interahamwe were largely responsible for the killings (Mamdani 2002; Straus 2006). The

30

Many members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front gained wartime experience through participating in the Uganda
Bush War, which brought the currently Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, to power in 1986.
31
In 2006, French judge Jean Louis Bruguiere issued arrest warrants for nine senior RPF officials, including
President Kagame, on charges that they were responsible for downing Habyarimana's plane. The indictment led to
the arrest of a senior aide to Kagame, Rose Kabuye, in Germany in 2008. The charges were vehemently denied by
Kagame and were eventually dropped in December 2010 after a leaked US cable suggested they were politically
motivated (Kanuma 2010).
32
This figure represents a median consensus that has developed in the literature on the Rwandan genocide. Some
reports cite the total number of deaths as low as 500,000 and others as high as 1.2 million.
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genocide (and civil war) officially ended on July 4th, 1994 when the RPF, led by General Paul
Kagame, took Rwanda’s capital city, Kigali.
Western	
  Involvement	
  

How much did Western states and aid agencies know about the possibility of genocide in
Rwanda? This too is a very difficult question (both because the facts are somewhat muddy and
the political implications are large). However, there is significant evidence that Western actors
knew that genocide was likely but chose to ignore the warning signs. By most accounts, it was
clear that the human rights situation in Rwanda was rapidly deteriorating in the early 1990s. In
1993, two international commissions (one from the UN and the other from a collection of human
rights organizations) warned of a possible genocide (Power 2001).
Some donors responded to alleged human rights violations by limiting foreign aid.33
However, overall, most donors did not make significant changes to their activities in Rwanda.
Although Germany and Belgium threatened to cut aid on human rights grounds, they never did
(Reyntjens 1994: 194). Uvin writes, “The aid community largely continued business as usual, as
if oblivious to the challenges facing Rwandese society” (1998: 86).
Warnings of an impending crisis intensified in early 1994. The so-called “Dallaire fax”
was sent on January 4, 1994, some three months before the genocide began. In this
correspondence, Romeo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR, reported to UN headquarters that a
reliable informant claimed, “he has been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. He suspects it is
for their extermination. The example he gave was that in twenty minutes his personnel could kill

33

For example, the Swiss Development Cooperation shifted its aid commitments from three to five years to annual
distribution. In 1992, the United States cut aid, and, in 1993, it channeled aid primarily through NGOs and the
World Food Programme (Uvin 1998).
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up to 1000 Tutsis.”34 Dallaire was prepared to act on this information by raiding arms caches
identified by the informant but was forbidden to do so by the then head of UN Peacekeeping,
Kofi Annan. (Annan would later become UN Secretary-General.) Instead, Dallaire was
instructed to inform President Habyarimana, whose government was later directly implicated in
the genocide, of the informant’s claims (Power 2001).35
Even once the genocide was underway, the international community did little to stop the
atrocities. Most donor agencies evacuated their foreign staff, leaving not only the population atlarge but also their own local staff to perish. During the three days in which approximately 4,000
foreigners were evacuated, approximately 20,000 Rwandans were killed. As Des Forges (1999)
points out, western leaders (often due to very little knowledge of the context) had difficultly
separating out the civil war violence from the genocidal acts being committed. Their focus was
on rescuing the now defunct Arusha Peace Accord instead of stopping the atrocities. Stepping up
the military intervention would have likely had a large impact. However, instead, UNAMIR lost
its best troops during the height of the killings when Belgium withdrew its forces from Rwanda
on April 19th, 1994 (Power 2001).
Enabling	
  and	
  fostering	
  genocide?	
  

While the lack of international intervention in 1993 and 1994 is by now relatively wellknown, the role Western actors played in enabling and/or fostering the genocide is discussed far
less. In particular, France has faced intense criticism for its support of Juvénal Habyarimana’s
regime. Located at the border between Francophone and Anglophone Africa, Rwanda is
strategically important for France, and the Habyarimana regime was closely tied to France and

34

A full copy of the fax can been seen at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/warning/cable.html.
For a full account of the UN response, or lack of response to the genocide, see Dallaire’s memoir (2005) and
Barnett (2002).
35
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its former president, François Mitterrand. There is little doubt that French support extended
Habyarimana’s presidency (Kroslak 2007; McNulty 2000).
Throughout the conflict between the Habyarimana government and the RPF, France
supplied arms and military training to the Presidential Guard; the same guard that eventually
trained the genocidal Interahamwe militias (McNulty 2000, 1997). Just two years before the
genocide, the French government financed a $6 million arms deal between the Egyptian
Government and the Rwandan government.36 In addition to financial support, there are
allegations that French paratroopers directly participated in the war against the RPF by manning
artillery positions and arresting Tutsis for the Rwandan army. While the French government
denies these allegations, there is a decent amount of evidence to support them (Melvern 2000).
To this day, France denies any responsibly for the genocide (Kroslak 2007) and tensions remain
strained between the Anglophone leaning RPF and Paris.37
In Aiding Violence, Peter Uvin extends the blame beyond France, arguing that the
“development enterprise” fostered the conditions that led to the 1994 genocide. Uvin argues that
development cannot be seen as distinct from Rwandan domestic socioeconomic and political
processes, as development always interacts with processes of elite reproduction, social
differentiation, political exclusion, and culture change. Uvin argues that development in Rwanda
exacerbated conditions of social exclusion and underlying tensions among Hutus and Tutsis.
Consequently, the development enterprise is not only guilty of failing to prevent and stop the

36

Boutros Boutros-Gahli, who was then the Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs but became UN Secretary
General shortly thereafter, oversaw the arms deal.
37
In 2008, a Rwandan commission produced a report (commonly called the “Mucyo Report”) on French
involvement in the genocide. The 500-page report cites evidence that France helped train the ethnic Hutu militia
perpetrators and accuses French troops of being direct involved in the killings. It also names thirty-three senior
French military and political figures (including the former President, Francois Mitterrand, and Prime Minister,
Edouard Balladur) that the commission argues should be prosecuted. France has denounced the report (BBC News
2008).
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genocide, but also of exacerbating the conditions that led to genocide in the first place (Uvin
1998).

4.2.	
   The	
  Post-‐Genocide	
  Period,	
  1994	
  to	
  the	
  Present	
  
In present day Rwanda, post-genocide development and reconstruction is generally
divided into three periods: the emergency aid period (1995-1997), the transition period (19982001), and the sustainable development period (2002-present).38 Although these distinctions are
somewhat artificial, they do reflect the changing nature of development and aid in Rwanda. The
period after the genocide was characterized by huge amounts of humanitarian aid. In the late
1990s, attention shifted towards building state-capacity and institutions. In 2003, the constitution
went into effect and the first post-genocide elections took place.
In the following section, I provide an overview of development and governance in postgenocide Rwanda. The current Rwandan leadership has often attempted to link Rwanda’s
economic development to that of the so-called “Asian Tigers;” whose approach to economic
development is characterized by interventionist policies combined with strong limits on political
freedom. The result has been a fairly impressive track record of economic growth since the
genocide. However, in recent years, criticism of the GoR and its policies has increased. Some
suggest that Rwanda is taking the South Korean or Taiwanese model (in which democratization
comes only after sustained economic growth), while others argue that Singapore is a more apt
model (Longman 2011).39

38

According to one of my interviewees, the government called a meeting in 1998 (which she was present at) and
said now the emergency phase is over. Now we are in the “development stage” (Interview I-XVI, 11.10.09).
39
Rwanda is also sometimes linked to Singapore, because of its tough stance on corruption (Zorbas 2011)
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Development	
  and	
  foreign	
  assistance	
  

Rwanda has developed at impressive rates since the genocide (see table 4.3). GNP
growth has averaged at over 6%. In 2008, GNP was $4.46 USD billion (up more than $3 billion
since in its lowest point in 1994) and the growth rate was an outstanding 11.23%.40 In 2005,
Rwanda reached the completion point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries program
(HIPC), entitling them to debt relief of $1.4 billion in nominal terms (IMF 2005).41 In 2009, the
World Bank labeled Rwanda the “top global reformer” in its “Doing Business” report (2009).
Table	
  4.3:	
  Economic	
  Indicators	
  for	
  Rwanda,	
  1994-‐2008	
  

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

GDP
(Current US$
billion)
0.75
1.29
1.38
1.85
1.99
1.93
1.74
1.67
1.64
1.78
1.97
2.38
2.83
3.41
4.46

GDP growth
(Annual %)
-50.25
35.22
12.75
13.85
8.86
7.58
8.10
8.50
11.00
0.30
5.30
7.10
7.29
7.94
11.23

GNI per
Aid as % of
capita, Atlas
National
(Current US$) Budget
160
94.41%
230
53.71%
240
33.66%
270
12.40%
270
17.60%
270
19.32%
250
18.53%
230
18.19%
210
21.83%
200
18.85%
220
24.84%
250
24.32%
290
20.67%
330
20.89%
410
N/A
Source: World Bank Development Indicators

Despite these positive trends, it is important to keep in mind that a considerable percentage of the
population still lives under the poverty line (56.9% in 2005/06). Additionally, many are
concerned about rising inequality in Rwanda. Between 1985 and 2000, Rwanda’s Gini

40
41

GNP per capita stayed relatively constant until the mid-2000s, largely due to the huge influx of returning refugees.
Nominal terms refers to the actual dollar value of debt service forgiven over a period of time (IMF 2005).
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coefficient rose from 28.9 to 46.8 (CIA n.d.), and the African Development Bank (AfDB 2008)
estimates that, in 2006, it rose again to 51.42
Furthermore, despite Kagame’s proclivity to denounce foreign aid, Rwanda continues to
be a highly aid-dependent nation. Rwanda’s aid dependency has decreased sharply from a high
of 94.92% immediately following the genocide. However, it remains well over the ODA as 10%
of GNI mark, which is generally utilized to identify an aid-dependent county. According to the
World Bank’s Development Indicators, ODA as a percentage of GNI has remained over 20%
since the early 2000s. Figure 4.2 below provides an overview of ODA to Rwanda from 19952008.43
Figure	
  4.2:	
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As figure 4.2 illustrates, Rwanda received a large amount of emergency aid immediately
after the genocide, but aid declined sharply in the years following.46 Additionally, there was a

42

See Ansoms (2005) for a discussion on growth, poverty and inequality in Rwanda following the genocide.
For a discussion of the different sources and discrepancies between Rwanda aid statistics see Tew (2009).
44
Foreign aid sent to refugee camps in neighboring countries (such as Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi) between 1995
and 2000 is not captured in figure 4.2.
45
OECD-DAC data is available at http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/. Date from the WDI project is available at
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
43
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smaller decline in ODA in the early 2000s. This was caused by increased Rwandan military
activity in Eastern DRC (where Hutu militants fled flowing the genocide). However, since 2003,
aid has been increasing steadily; ODA reached over $893 million in 2008 (OECD-DAC). This
means that, for the first time, annual foreign assistance surpassed the $882 million sent to
Rwanda immediately following the genocide. According to a recent report on ODA produced by
the GoR, 95% of aid to Rwanda comes in the form of grants, with more than half going to the
social sectors (GoR 2010d).
The official line is that ODA represents 49% of the GoR’s budget (GoR 2010d). This
number is conveniently under 50%, and the percentage is likely much higher. During field
interviews, one NGO representative put the actual figure closer to 90% (Interview I-VIII,
11.02.09). According to a senior UNDP representative (who was previously on staff at the
Ministry of Finance), the government’s recent emphasis on private development and
public/private partnerships is political. The government discourse on aid is that it is a short-term
solution not a long-term one. However, Rwanda remains a “donor darling” (Interview I-XIV,
11.06.09).
As table 4.4 below shows, Rwanda remains much more wedded to foreign assistance than
other Sub-Saharan African countries and other low-income countries. With only 34,193
taxpayers in 2009 (in a country with a population of more than 11 million people), dependency
on foreign aid is not likely to change anytime soon (Rwanda Civil Society Platform 2010: 5).47

46

There are discrepancies between different agencies reporting on the amount of aid sent to Rwanda (and
elsewhere). See Tew (2009) for a discussion of the different sources and discrepancies between Rwandan aid
statistics.
47
Decreasing dependency also means increasing compliance with the existing tax code. While large taxpayers have
a compliance rate of 94.9%, there is low compliance among small to medium taxpayers – 37.6% (Rwanda Civil
Society Platform 2010, 23).
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Table	
  4.4:	
  Aid	
  Dependency	
  in	
  Rwanda,	
  2008	
  
Rwanda
Amount of aid per capita ($)
As % of GNI
As % of gross capital formation
As % of imports

$96
21%
86.7%
63.6%

Sub-Saharan
Africa
$49
4.3%
22%
8.8%

Low-income
countries
$45
9.2%
39.6%
21.4%

Source:	
  World	
  Development	
  Indicators	
  
Post-‐genocide	
  governance:	
  The	
  Rwandan	
  Patriotic	
  Front	
  and	
  Paul	
  Kagame	
  

Since 1994, Rwanda has been led by the RRF, which now functions as a political party
and the state military. The core-base of the RPF is small, largely made up of English-speaking
Tutsis refugees who fled to Uganda prior to 1994. In other words, the core constituency of the
current regime is a small percentage of the already minority Tutsi ethnic group (Strauss and
Waldorf 2011).
At the helm of the RPF is its wartime leader Paul Kagame. Although Pasteur Bizimungu
(a moderate Hutu) was initially appointed interim president, Kagame ruled from behind the
scenes, serving as Minister of Defense and Party Chairman. Kagame officially took over as
president in 2000 after Bizimungu resigned.48 In 2003, Kagame won the country’s first postgenocide election with an overwhelming 95.5% of the vote. In August 2010, Kagame was reelected to another seven-year term with 93% of the vote (African Elections Database 2010).
There are both fans and critics of the current state of Rwandan politics and President
Kagame’s leadership. Well-known journalists and public intellectuals, such as Stephan Kinzer
(2008), Philip Gourevitch (2009), and Fareed Zakaria (2009), hail Rwanda as a site of
remarkable transformation. In a recent article, Zakaria wrote, “Rwanda has become a model for

48

Bizimungu later became a critic of the regime and attempted to form an opposition party. In 2002, he was
convicted for embezzling state funds, inciting violence, and criminal association. He claims these charges were
politically motivated (BBC News 2006).
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the African renaissance. It is now stable, well ordered, and being rebuilt every month.” He
added, “Ask anyone who has studied Rwanda—African or Westerner—what its secret is and
they will say leadership, by which they mean Paul Kagame” (2009). Kagame’s supporters
include President Bill Clinton, who awarded Kagame his Global Citizen award in 2009 (Clinton
Global Initiative 2009), and Former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who serves as an advisor to
Kagame (Wintour 2008). In 2009, Kagame was named on of the “fifty faces that shaped the
decade” by the Financial Times (2009) and one of Time Magazine’s “Time 100” in the category
“leaders and revolutionaries” (Warren 2009).
However, in other circles Kagame and his policies face intense criticism. Much of this
criticism has historically come from human rights advocates, who are critical of RPF
involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire),49 constraints on
individual freedoms and the press, and reports of arbitrary detention and coercive practices
within Rwanda itself.
Recently, more scholarly critiques of RPF policies have also emerged. In a recent volume
on state-building and human rights in Rwanda, several well-known Rwandan scholars “register
considerable concern.” In summarizing the volume, the editors, Scott Strauss and Lars Waldorf,
note that:
Based on their research and experiences, most contributors to this volume
have developed deep concern about the depth and durability of Rwanda’s
recovery, even while recognizing the country’s achievements…the volume
calls attention the social and political costs of repression, exclusion, growing
inequality, a general climate of fear and intimidation, and impunity for crimes
49

The RPF and Kagame have been accused of both supporting and participating in the ongoing atrocities in the Kivu
region of the DRC. Such accusation recently received more weight when a UN mapping exercise of the atrocities
committed in Eastern Zaire from 1993-2003 was leaked. The report suggests that the Hutu population living in Zaire
(not just persons responsible for the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis) were directly targeted, constituting a potential
genocide and documents RPF involvement in such campaigns (Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights 2010). The GoR denounced the mapping exercise both in the popular press (threatening to withdrawal
Rwandan peacekeeping troops in Sudan) and in a formal statement (GoR 2010e).
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against humanity and war crimes committed in Rwandan and in the DRC
(2011, 7).
The editors go on to suggest that Rwanda has all of the traits identified by James Scott as
necessary for “the most tragic episodes of state-initiated social engineering” (Scott 1998, 4;
Stauss and Waldorf 2011, 12-13).
As table 4.5 shows, Rwanda has made many improvements to governance since 1996,
including huge gains in “control of corruption” and “government effectiveness.” However,
Rwanda’s score for “voice and accountability” remains low due to limited freedom of expression
of the citizenry and press,50 and accusations of politically motivated detention, amongst other
things.
Table	
  4.5:	
  Worldwide	
  Governance	
  Indicators	
  for	
  Rwanda,	
  1996-‐2008	
  
1996 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Voice & Accountability
Political Stability
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption

12.4
4.8
5.7
5.4
5.4
N/A

8.2
4.8
18.5
13.7
13.7
28.6

8.2
4.8
14.2
22
22
35

9.6
23.1
28.4
28.8
28.8
37.9

11.5
26.4
43.1
31.2
31.2
55.3

13
37.3
48.3
33.3
33.3
59.4

Source:	
  The	
  Worldwide	
  Governance	
  Indications	
  Project51	
  

In particular, many are concerned about Rwanda’s laws on divisionism, sectarianism, and
genocide revisionism and ideology (see, for example, Burnet 2007; Human Rights Watch 2010).
Such laws, which have increasingly been strengthened over the course of the 2000s, establish
stiff penalties for those guilty of ambiguous crimes, such as “genocide revisionism” or being a
“spokesperson for genocide ideology.” They have been used to suspend the BBC Kinyarwanda

50

In August 2009, the GoR passed a new law on the media that gives the Media High Council a great deal more
authority, including the power to suspend newspapers and impose criminal penalties on journalists who incite
discrimination or show contempt to the president. The law also requires all journalists to have formal training in
communication or journalism, which most journalists at independent papers do not have (Department of State 2009;
Human Rights Watch 2010).
51
Available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
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radio service, accuse well-know human rights advocates, such as Alison Des Forges,52 and
remove opposition candidates from competition (Waldorf 2011). According to Waldorf, “…
Rwanda’s law on genocide ideology is so broadly drafted that it is easily manipulated for
personal and political reasons. It also conflates any challenges to the government with genocide
ideology” (2011, 59).
In Rwanda, power is largely thought to be concentrated in a small, inner circle. The 2003
constitution established an independent parliament and judiciary branch. However, parliament is
dominated by RPF representatives and is widely viewed as “a rubber stamp to policy initiatives
emerging from the ministries and the president’s office" (Burnet 2007: 4). In parliamentary
elections, the RPF and its allies won 73.8% of the vote in 2003 and 78.8% in 2008 (Longman
2011).53 Similarly, judicial independency is questionable on many fronts, and the RPF has not
been able to answer the many allegations leveled against it.54
Furthermore, since the mid-1990s, the GoR has expressed a strong skepticism about civil
society. In December 1995, the GoR suspended the operations of eighteen NGOs, and an
additional thirty-eight were told to leave within a week.55 The GoR produced reports in 1996 and
1997 that claimed NGOs were uncontrolled, uncoordinated, competitive, and diverted human
resources from the government. The reports also claimed that NGOs often overlapped, did not
cooperate in evaluations, were not transparent and spread too thinly, lacked quality staff, and

52

Des Forges, who died in a plane crash in 1999, was well-know for her activism and detailed accounts of the 1994
genocide (see, for example, Des Forges 1999). Therefore, accusing her with genocide denial is bizarre.
53
Longman (2011) argues that, while in 2003 presidential electors were altered to favor the RPF candidate, the 2008
parliamentary elections were altered to look more democratic. According to sampling carried out by EU election
monitors, the RPF actually got close to 94% of the vote. Longman argues that this was largely because communities
fear the repercussions of not supporting the RPF.
54
According to Human Rights Watch, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the RPF
killed between 25,000 and 45,000 civilians in 1994 (Human Rights Watch 2010: 2). However, Rwanda has only
tried 36 soldiers. Additionally, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has faced intense criticism for
declining investigations on war crimes allegedly committed by the RPF (Burnet 2007).
55
A third of the NGOs asked to leave were French (Hayman 2006).
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encouraged limited knowledge transfer (Hayman 2006: 100). NGOs that are critical of the
government’s record on human rights, including press freedom and arbitrary detention, have
been particularly targeted (Gready 2011).

4.3.	
  	
   Rwanda’s	
  Contemporary	
  Development	
  Partners	
  
Below, I discuss the aid portfolio of the largest multilateral and bilateral donors to
Rwanda. (See table 4.6 for a list of Rwanda’s top twenty donors.) There are important
differences between the donors’ approaches to development. These differences stem from a
variety of factors, ranging from traits of the donors themselves (i.e. ideology, purpose,
organization, and management) to the particular nature of the donor’s relationship with the
country or region. For example, the Netherlands and the UK both had ministers that took a
particular interest in Rwanda immediately following the genocide.
Additionally, how individual donor representatives view Rwanda and the Rwandan
leadership influences the country’s aid portfolio. As Hayman argues “…it is possible to ‘read’
Rwanda in very different ways, and this is very important for reflecting on relations between the
GoR and donors, as how donors understand Rwanda and the GoR depends greatly upon their
perceptions of the state and country” (2006: 145). Depending on what aspects are focused on, i.e.
Rwanda’s economic successes or its human rights record, the image can look very different.
(Unsworth and Uvin (2002) refer to this duality as the “contradictory faces” of Rwanda).
Differences between donors manifest themselves most readily in the types of aid
programs that donors pursue. As the subsequent chapters explore further, certain donors prefer to
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work with the Rwandan government and provide budget support, while others prefer to fund
individual projects. This section introduces the reader to these differences.56
Table	
  4.6:	
  Top	
  Twenty	
  Donors	
  to	
  Rwanda	
  
Top 20 Donors, ODA Total (net
disbursements), 2008 Only
Donor
US$ million
1. IDA
133.44
2. United States
114.81
3. United Kingdom
106.96
4. EC
95.57
5. Global Fund
77.64
6. AfDF
61.45
7. Belgium
60.67
8. Netherlands
36.16
9. IFAD
27.57
10. Germany
22.89
11. Spain
22.82
12. Japan
15.75
13. Canada
13.81
14. Sweden
13.73
15. Arab Agencies
10.65
16. Nordic Dev. Fund
10.37
17. UNICEF
7.86
18. Luxembourg
7.39
19. WFP
6.82
20. GAVI
5.87

Top 20 Donors, ODA (net
disbursements), 1994-2008
Donor
US$ million
1. IDA
1175.81
2. United States
1067.5
3. EC
1057.6
4. United Kingdom
1012.71
5. Netherlands
574.38
6. Belgium
501.1
7. Germany
442.48
8. WFP
382.31
9. AfDF
358.08
10. UNHCR
263.2
11. Canada
251.8
12. Sweden
234.01
13. Global Fund
230.89
14. Norway
206.01
15. France
203.42
16. UNICEF
165.84
17. Switzerland
156.42
18. IMF
126.67
19. UNDP
105.83
20. IFAD
96.76
Source:	
  OECD-‐DAC	
  

Multilateral	
  Aid	
  Agencies	
  

Figure 4.3 below provides an overview of ODA disbursements since 1994 for the three
largest multilateral donors to Rwanda: the International Development Association (IDA), the
African Development Bank (AfDB), and the European Commission (EC). IDA, better known as
the World Bank, is the largest donor to Rwanda. It has distributed over $1.2 billion USD to
Rwanda since 1994. However, funding from the World Bank has been highly variable with sharp
56

See Hayman (2006) for a lengthy discussion on the differences between all of Rwanda’s donors, as well as the
many reasons for these differences. See chapter three, in particular.
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declines in 2000, 2003, and 2006. The EC and AfDB (through its funding mechanism the
African Development Fund) provide a more consistent source of aid. Both have dramatically
increased their foreign assistance packages to Rwanda in the years since the genocide.
Figure	
  4.3:	
  ODA	
  from	
  Multilateral	
  Donors,	
  1994-‐2008	
  (current	
  USD	
  millions)	
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In addition to providing large amounts of aid, the World Bank is a very active
development partner in Rwanda. According to its Country Assistance Strategy, it currently has
eleven active projects in Rwanda, plus budget support. Commitments from the World Bank
Group57 are projected to reach $516 million over fiscal years (FY) 2009-12. The only sector that
the Bank does not have a presence in (intentionally) is political governance. However, no new
funding for education, water and sanitation, HIV/AIDs, urban management or public sector
reform is planned for FY2009-2012, as the bank focuses on budget support (The World Bank
2008). Currently the World Bank co-chairs four sectors, more than any other donor.58

57

The World Bank Group in Rwanda also includes the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); however, the amount of aid contributed by these organizations is much
lower than the amounts contributed by IDA.
58
Those sectors are agriculture, livestock, and forestry; energy, ICT, science, and technology; public administration;
and capacity building.
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Additionally, it took the lead in preparing both the agriculture and energy sector-wide
approaches or SWAPs (see pg. 128) (The World Bank 2008; AfDB 2008).
The next largest multilateral donor is the European Commission. According to its country
strategy paper, the EC plans to allocate €290 million (approximately $409 million59) in longterm programmable development	
   operations to Rwanda during FY 2008-2013 (European
Commission 2007, 38).60 The EC is an active donor in eleven sectors and leads the roads and
transportation sector (AfDB 2008; European Commission 2007). The EC currently sees itself in
a “fourth phase” of development in Rwanda. This phase is characterized by increased alignment
with the GoR and its poverty reduction strategy, and greater alignment with other donors.
As part of its focus on alignment, the EC has increasingly been providing direct budget
support. The EC began budget support in Rwanda in 1999 and, since 2000, has provided, on
average, €20 million (approximately $28 million) per year in budget support to Rwanda. During
the FY 2008-2013, 60% or €175 million (approximately $204 million) of the EC’s funding
envelope to Rwanda will come in the form of general budget support. In addition, the EC has
two major focal sectors, rural development, and infrastructure for regional interconnectivity.
Cumulatively, these sectors will receive 31% of the total amount of aid. The remaining 9% of aid
will be spread across governance, support for trade, and technical cooperation (European
Commission 2007).
In recent years, the African Development Bank (AfDB) has assumed a more central role
in Rwanda. (The current president of the AfDB, Donald Kaberuka, is Rwandan.) In the mid2000s, the AfDB began significantly increasing its funding to Rwanda, and its activity across

59

All euro to dollar conversions are based on the conversion rate on July 18th, 2011 (1 euro = 1.41 dollars).
This figure only includes A-allocation funds. There is also a smaller amount of B-allocation funds (€4 million) for
unforeseen needs.
60
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sectors grew. According to its country strategy for 2008-2009, the organization is guided by two
main pillars: economic infrastructure, and competitive and enterprise development. Specific
projects include involvement in the Methane Gas Project at Lake Kivu61 and the Rwanda Private
Sector Capacity Building Project (AfDB 2008). Recently the AfDB also began providing general
budget support to Rwanda. For the FY 2010/2011, the AfDB promised $27.6 million in direct
budget support to the GoR (Kagire 2009).
While the United Nations no longer provides large amounts of aid to Rwanda,62 it still
maintains a strong presence, due to its active involvement across sectors and its role in aid
coordination.63 As it does in many countries, the UN in Rwanda now serves less as a direct
funder and more as an administrator, advisor, and implementer. According to two interviewees,
the UN is moving towards a policy advisory role in Rwanda (Interview II-XI, 06.16.10;
Interview I-VI, 10.30.09).
The UN assumed responsibility of aid coordination in Rwanda in 1999, and today has the
largest on-the-ground presence of any organization in the country. They now co-chair a forum
for development partners and the GoR (see chapter six, pg. 121), and several common funds are
facilitated by UN agencies.64 Rwanda is also a pilot “One UN” country. The One UN program,
which began in 2007, is intended to coordinate the multiple UN bodies working simultaneously
in one country and is based on four principals: one leader, one budget, one programme, and one
office (United Nations 2007).

61

This project seeks to extract and convert methane gas currently found in Lake Kivu into energy.
Immediately following the genocide, UN institutions provided large amounts of ODA. In 1995 alone, UN
institutions gave $346.62 million. The majority of this aid was emergency aid and came from the UNHCR
($118.81m) and the World Food Programme ($178.63m). However, since the emergency phase, UN direct funding
has dropped dramatically. In 2008, the total ODA from all UN institutions was $25.76 million (OECD-DAC).
63
The five principals of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework in Rwanda are good governance;
health, population, HIV, and nutrition; education; environment; sustainable growth and social protection (United
Nations 2007).
64
Common funds include an election basket fund and a fund to support aid coordination.
62
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Bilateral	
  Aid	
  Agencies	
  

Figure 4.4 graphs annual ODA from Rwanda’s top four bilateral donors since 1994. As
the figure demonstrates, the US and the UK are by far the largest bilateral donors to Rwanda.
France is notably absent from this list. The GoR’s public fallout and recent shift away from the
francophone world had created ripples throughout the Rwandan donor community and marks a
dramatic change in Rwandan diplomatic relations.65 Immediately following the genocide, a
group of “new” donors arrived in Rwanda, including the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and
Sweden. In contrast to the more “traditional” donors, such as France and Belgium, these new
donors do not have a long history in Rwanda and are not associated with the previous
Habyarimana regime.
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65

Tensions between France and Rwanda have been strained since the genocide but came to a head in the mid-2000s.
In 2006, a French judge issued arrest warrants for nine senior GoR officials, including Kagame. This resulted to in
the severing of diplomatic ties. However, in 2010, France and Rwanda restored diplomatic relations (BBC News
2009; Sundaram 2010).

79
The largest of these “new” donors is the United Kingdom, which had no presence in
Rwanda prior to the genocide, and no bilateral aid program. Immediately following the genocide,
the UK began providing military and humanitarian assistance, and established an embassy in
Kigali in 1996. Shortly after, an election brought the Labour Party to power in the UK. The new
UK government was not only pro-development aid, but also included a strong ally of Kagame,
Clare Short (who was appointed Minister for International Development).66
Under the new administration, the UK’s bilateral program in Rwanda expanded rapidly.
Even though Rwanda isn’t strategically important to the UK, since 2000 it has been one of the
top ten recipients of UK aid (Hayman 2006).67 While the UK has increasingly been looking at
Rwanda with a more critical eye, it generally paints a very positive picture of Rwanda and the
GoR in its policy documents and in dealings with other donors. Former Prime Minister Tony
Blair serves as an advisor to Kagame, and, in 2009, Rwanda become the second non-former
colony to join the Commonwealth of States (Kron 2009).
At the same time that the UK began engaging in Rwanda, it also began experimenting
with a new approach to development that emphasized partnering with recipient countries.
Rwanda became a model for this new approach, and the UK began working in close
collaboration with Rwandan authorities and advocating for budget support to Rwanda. British
aid to Rwanda now overwhelmingly comes in the form of general budget support, and the UK is
by far the largest bilateral budget support donor.68
According to the new Development Assistance Database (DAD), the UK’s Department
for International Development (DFID) dispersed $56.9 million to Rwanda in the form of general

66

A representative from DFID put it this way, ‘the reason DFID is here is Clare Short’ (Interview I-XII, 11.04.09).
See Hayman (2006, chap. 7) for more details on the history and background of the UK’s engagement with
Rwanda.
68
Two-thirds of the UK’s aid to Rwanda is dispersed directly into the national budget (Interview I-XII, 11.04.09).
67
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budget support and an additional $5 million in sector budget support in 2007.69 In 2008, direct
budget support from DFID alone constituted 6% of the GoR’s national budget. Furthermore, the
UK has placed a great deal of faith in Rwandan systems and the current regime. To measure
progress, the UK relies heavily on the MDGs and targets established by the national poverty
reduction strategy, for which they strongly advocated. Top GoR officials often refer to the UK as
a “friend.”
On the other hand, the United States takes a very different approach in Rwanda (and
elsewhere). While the UK primarily supports the GoR and little is known about what it does
outside of the capital city, the United States is involved in multiple projects throughout the
country (primarily through USAID). The United States is very active in the health sector, where
it concentrates on HIV/AIDs treatment and prevention. During the FY2004-2008 the US gave
$151 million to the health sector alone. Rwanda is also one of the threshold countries for the
newly established United States Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC).70 In contrast to the
UK, US government funds to Rwanda are exclusively project funds, and, as a representative of
USAID put it, the US is not moving away from project funding unless Congress changes
(Interview I-III, 10.23.09).71
As figure 4.4 shows, US involvement in Rwanda spiked post-genocide, with ODA to
Rwanda reaching $194 million in 1994 and then sharply declining to $10 million 1996.
However, since the early 2000s, the amount of ODA provided to Rwanda by the US has steadily

69

Source: DAD Rwanda, http://dad.synisys.com/dadrwanda/ (December 1, 2010).
The new Millennium Challenge Cooperation targets countries that meet seventeen criteria. Countries fully
meeting MCC requirements (“compact countries”) are eligible for large, five-year grants. Countries that come close
to meeting the requirements (“threshold countries”) are eligible for smaller, three-year grants. Rwanda is a threshold
country, meeting ten of the seventeen indicators. More information about the MCC’s selection criteria can be found
at http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/selection/index.shtml.
71
The US is currently “exploring” the possibility of sector budget support to agriculture (Interview II-VIII,
06.09.10).
70
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increased. In 2008, Rwanda received $114.81 million in ODA from the United States. There are
a number of likely explanations for why ODA to Rwanda has increased rather rapidly, including:
remorse about the genocide, the creation of AFRICOM (which is responsible for US military
operations and relations in Africa), and the fact that Kagame is regarded highly by former US
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush (Totolo 2009; Kinzer 2008). However, it is
important to keep in mind that, although Rwanda gets a lot of its aid from the United States,
Rwanda is not a top recipient of US aid, nor is it a US priority country.
Several other donors, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden, have also been
active in Rwanda since the genocide. Belgian development aid has been in Rwanda since 1962,
when Rwanda achieved independence from Belgium, and Rwanda is currently the number two
recipient of Belgian foreign aid (OECD 2009a).72 Belgium is involved in many sectors; however,
its largest contributions are to the health sector. In contrast to the US, it now gives budget
support to the health sector (see chapter six, pg. 130), although it initially expressed reservations
about providing budget support.73
Since 1994, the Netherlands have been a top bilateral donor to Rwanda, focusing their
work on two broad areas: (1) effective, efficient and increased access to and delivery of basic
services, and (2) sustainable and equitable production, income and employment for the poor. The
Netherlands also provides sector budget support (see chapter five).
Lastly, Sweden’s development aid has historically come in the form of general budget
support, and its development agency, SIDA, is very active in efforts to promote aid coordination
and harmonization. Consequently, the GoR and other donors often see Sweden as an influential
and important donor despite lower amounts of ODA. However, Stokholm suspended general

72
73

Belgium aid is target to a much more limited set of country than the US or the UK.
For an analysis of Belgian support to Rwanda see Hayman (2006, chap. 7).
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budget support to Rwanda in 2008 after a UN report accused the country of supporting armed
rebellion in neighboring DRC (Swedish Government Offices 2008).74
Donor	
  differences	
  

Although several donors are active in Rwanda, how these donors pursue development
varies. While the US in many ways continues business as usual, other donors (in particular, the
UK, EC, and World Bank) have increasingly embraced new aid programs, such as budget
support, that are thought to promote recipient-country ownership. The difference is stark when
you look at the percentage of a country’s ODA that is recorded in the Rwandan national budget.
Table	
  4.7:	
  Percent	
  of	
  ODA	
  Recorded	
  in	
  the	
  National	
  Budget	
  by	
  Donor	
  
Donor
United Kingdom
European Commission
Netherlands
AfDB
World Bank
Germany
Canada
United Nations
Switzerland
Sweden
Japan
United States

2007
96%
80%
42%
86%
50%
46%
0%
20%
0%
52%
29%
0%

2008
74%
69%
79%
94%
73%
77%
33%
13%
34%
54%
43%
1%

2009/2010
94%
92%
90%
88%
85%
62%
59%
44%
39%
25%
16%
0%

Source:	
  Donor	
  Performance	
  Assessment	
  Framework,	
  DPAF	
  (GoR	
  2010b)	
  

While over 90% of ODA provided by the UK and the EC to Rwanda in FY2009/2010 was
recorded in the nation budget, 0% of US aid was. The implications of these differences will
become more apparent as I move through my case studies.

74

Sweden had previously suspended budget support in 2004. The Netherlands also suspended budget support after
the 2008 UN report but has since reinstated sector budget support.
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4.4.	
   Concluding	
  Remarks	
  
In this chapter, I first outlined the contemporary history of development in Rwanda,
discussing the role of donors and development schemes prior to, during, and after the genocide
and civil war. This discussion contextualizes the forthcoming case studies (chapters five though
seven). Rwanda’s history of violent conflict is all the more reason to be attentive to the political
implications of development and foreign aid in the country.
Second, I provided a summary of the current Rwandan political context. In particular, I
focused on the existing domestic power dynamics. Despite the fact that ownership emphasizes
recipient-country control, there has been little theory on how the domestic political climate
influences recipient-country ownership. Whether or not domestic actors are tightly or loosely
coordinated is likely to influence donors’ choices of who to work with, and, consequently, who
gains influence under the ownership approach. If one or two domestic actors are dominant, it
only makes sense that donors would work primarily with them.
In Rwanda, authority primarily rests with the executive branch led by the Rwandan
Patriotic Front. This is not to say that other domestic actors do not play a role, or that there are
not attempts to challenge political authority in Rwanda. Diaspora groups outside Rwanda are
actively organizing to challenge Kagame, and some have recently suggested that serious
challenges to Kagame’s authority are emerging within the RPF itself (Sterns 2010). However,
thus far, Kagame and his supporters have dominated the Rwandan political landscape, and
contestation has largely been kept under wraps. As a result, there is little reason to believe that an
ownership approach will increase the influence of citizens-at-large in Rwanda.
Third, I described the major bilateral and multilateral donors currently providing
development aid to Rwanda. While all donors claim poverty reduction as their main objective,
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their development strategies are quite different and the salience of the ownership model varies
across donors. If donors do not prioritize ownership, there is very little reason to expect a change
in their practices as a result of the global emphasis on ownership.
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Chapter	
  5 	
  

Poverty	
  Reduction	
  Strategies	
  and	
  
Budget	
  Support	
  	
  
In this chapter, I analyze Rwanda’s experience with the poverty reduction strategy
process and budget support. Poverty reduction strategies and budget support are the aid
programs most commonly associated with ownership and the Paris Declaration (Armon
2007; Hayman 2006; Koeberle, Stavreski, and Walliser 2006; Knoll 2008). Both are thought
to encourage donors to use national systems and priorities and increase the recipientcountry’s influence over development policy. Historically, aid has been channeled into
countries through donor-determined projects or through structural adjustment loans laced
with conditionalities. Alternatively, budget support and poverty reduction strategies allow
recipient governments to allocate aid towards self-determined priorities and then fund these
projects using aid money deposited into the national treasury.
Given the variables of interest outlined in chapter three, in this case study, I am
looking for evidence that poverty reduction strategies and budget support have allowed the
GoR to be more involved in decision-making and given them more influence over
development policy. At the same time, I am looking for evidence that donors have decreased
their role in policy decision-making, allowing the government to lead—even when it
conflicts with their interests. Lastly, I am looking for evidence that citizens are playing a
larger role in decision-making and have a greater say in development policy.
I find that the GoR has become more involved in decision-making processes.
However, this increased participation has not necessarily translated into increased influence.
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I find little evidence that government policymaker’s preferences take precedence over
donors’ preferences. Contrary to the predictions of the ownership approach laid out in
chapters two and three, I find that donor participation in budget support and the poverty
reduction strategy process may actually allow some donors to have more influence by
integrating them into the day-to-day operations of the Rwandan government. Instead of
giving up their influence, many donors have simply shifted their tactics, becoming more
involved in the “policy dialogue” or with technical assistance. This change is more
pronounced with those donors who have historically advocated for ownership and ownership
approaches.
Furthermore, I find no evidence supporting the prediction that poverty reduction
strategies and budget support increase citizen influence. The domestic actor that has profited
the most from the poverty reduction strategy process and budget support is the Ministry of
Finance (in combination with the president’s office). Citizens remain relatively removed
from decision-making processes, as do local governments and line ministries.
This chapter is organized into four major sections. First, I provide an overview of the
two aid programs, explaining how poverty reduction strategies and budget support are
thought to increase ownership in recipient-countries. I also note recent critiques of budget
support and the poverty reduction strategy program. My analysis builds on these critiques,
investigating many of the issues touched on in this work by empirically examining one
country’s experience with budget support and the poverty reduction strategy process. Second,
I provide a descriptive overview of the aid programs’ history in Rwanda. I provide a
summary of Rwanda’s two poverty reduction strategy papers, details on which donors
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provide budget support and how much they provide, and explain how budget support is
governed in Rwanda.
I then move on to my analysis. In this section, I argue that, in Rwanda, the poverty
reduction strategy program and budget support have resulted in three outcomes contrary to
the predictions of the ownership model. One, although donors are now more likely to use
national systems, there is little evidence that donors give preference to government priorities,
if they are not in line with their own. Two, rather than decrease the role of donors in the
policy process, participation in budget support likely increases a donor’s say over
development policy. Three, the Rwandan poverty reduction strategy process and budget
support have not made the policy process more inclusive or increased domestic
accountability; instead, these aid programs have centralized domestic authority in the
Ministry of Finance. I concluded by summarizing how my findings map on to the variables
of interest identified in chapter three.

5.1.	
   Poverty	
  Reduction	
  Strategies	
  and	
  Budget	
  Support	
  Worldwide	
  
Origins	
  and	
  prominence	
  	
  

The poverty reduction strategy program emerged in 1999 and budget support shortly
thereafter. In the 1990s, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program was
introduced by the Bretton Woods Institutions to provide debt relief to developing countries.
During a meeting in Cologne, Germany in 1999, the leaders of the G-7 countries added to the
HIPC requirements that participating countries lay out their own medium-term development
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goals and strategies in a poverty reduction strategy paper or PRSP (IMF 2010).75 As early as
2001, seventy low-income states had either a full or interim PRSP and many states are
currently working on their second or third PRSP.76 Almost all bilateral and multilateral
donors at least consult the recipient country’s PRSP when designing their country strategies.
A country’s poverty reduction strategy is supposed to provide a road map for
development in the recipient country and guide World Bank and IMF aid allocation in each
recipient country. Instead of countries being told which reforms to make, countries are asked
to outline their own plans for economic development, which is then funded by donors.
Following the introduction of the poverty reduction strategy program, donors began
issuing a new type of program aid (i.e., aid that is not tied to a particular project) linked to the
country’s PRSP - budget support.77 At a basic level, budget support is a resource transfer
directly into the budget or treasury of the receiving country. Budget support allows the
recipient country to use its own allocation, procurement, and accounting structures. While
sector budget support (SBS) is earmarked for a particular sector, such as education or health,
general budget support (GBS) is completely un-earmarked (Beasley et al. 2005).
The adjectives “new” or “partnership” are often added to the term “budget support” to
distinguish it from alternative forms of program aid, such as structural adjustment loans,
which were popular in the 1980s and early 1990s.78 “New” budget support places an
emphasis on partnerships between donors and the recipient government, poverty reduction,
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Other criteria for participation include (1) be eligible to borrow from IDA, (2) face an unsustainable debt
burden that cannot be addressed through traditional debt relief mechanisms, and 3) a track record of reform and
sound policies through the IMF and World Bank (IMF 2010). The Joint Boards of the IMF and World Bank
officially approved the PRSP program in December 1999 (Cheru 2006).
76
New PRSPs are generally prepared every three to five years. For a full list of all countries with a PRSP or
interim PRSP see http://go.worldbank.org/LYE7YNYBH0.
77
Alternative types of program aid include balance of payment support and debt relief (Hammond 2006).
78
For a discussion on whether or not budget support is really “new” see Knoll (2008).
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and, most importantly, supports the national development strategy articulated in the country’s
PRSP (Purcell, Dom, and Ahohamuteze 2006).
As one interviewee put it, the push for budget support comes from “50 years of
failure” (Interview I-XII, 11.04.09). Budget support is supposed to provide a more
sustainable approach to development assistance. Stand-alone development projects can leave
behind big, temporary structures that are no longer of any use (Interview I-XI, 11.04.09).
Alternatively, budget support funds long-term initiatives and contributes to the growth of
sound state structures by directly supporting the state and its initiatives.
Over the past decade, leading bilateral and multilateral donors have increased the
percentage of aid given as budget support. As budget support does not require individual
project approval or additional donor staff, it offers an easy way for donors to increase aid
quickly. In 2001, thirteen percent of lending from the World Bank came in the form of
budget support (Barkan 2009). Budget support now accounts for approximately half of
World Bank lending through IDA and half of the grants provided to Africa through the
Poverty Reduction Support Credit mechanism. Additionally, roughly half of UK and EC aid
is provided as budget support (Hayman 2011). The majority of budget support (60-70%) goes
to Sub-Saharan Africa, where, on average, 30% of a country’s budget now comes from
general budget support (Knoll 2008).
Accurate data on budget support are difficult to come by.79 However, from 2003 to
2008 the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA) conducted a yearly survey of African
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Data on budget support should approve soon. The DAD Working Party on Statistics agreed on a new
classification of aid modalities and instruments that will take effect in 2011 that includes GBS and SBS (OECD
2005b).
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countries engaged in general budget support.80 This dataset is not without its flaws: it is not
comprehensive, commitment and disbursement rates are self-reported, and the number of
countries in the survey fluctuates. However, it is the most extensive source of data on budget
support currently available. Using data from the SPA budget support alignment surveys,
figure 5.1 provides of snapshot of general budget support to Sub-Saharan Africa since 2003.
Figure	
  5.1:	
  General	
  Budget	
  Support	
  to	
  Sub-‐Saharan	
  Africa,	
  2003-‐2008	
  (in	
  USD	
  million)	
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  poverty	
  reduction	
  strategies	
  and	
  budget	
  support	
  

Poverty reduction strategies and budget support are thought to promote ownership for
several reasons analogous to the predictions of the ownership approach outlined in chapter
two. First, both PRSPs and budget support are supposed to increase the influence of
recipient-country governments by encouraging the use of national systems and priorities.
Historically, aid has been channeled into recipient countries via donor-determined projects or
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An overview of the survey is available at http://www.spasurvey.info.
The decline in budget support from 2007 to 2008 is largely due to a decrease in the number of countries
surveyed in 2008. If only countries w participated in the both 2007 and 2008 survey are included, the decrease
is only 1.1% (Strategic Partnership with Africa 2009).
82
Available at http://www.spasurvey.info/
81
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through grants that are conditional on the recipient making specified changes (i.e., structural
adjustment loans). In both cases, recipient countries must act according to donor wishes if
they want donor money.
Alternatively, the poverty reduction strategy process and budget support are supposed
to give more control over development policy to recipient-country governments. Instead of
aid being channeled into countries through self-contained projects with donor-determined
mandates, governments are supposedly able to allocate aid towards priorities that they
determine in their PRSPs and then fund these priorities using money that is directly deposited
into their treasury.
Budget support is even argued to encourage donors to use national systems for nonbudget support aid. Donors have to trust the accounts into which they deposit aid. Therefore,
donors often include capacity-building funds in budget support packages, and make budget
support conditional on improvements in national systems, particularly public financial
management (PFM) systems (Directorate General for Development 2006). Consequently,
budget support is argued to create incentives for recipient countries to improve their national
systems, and, if national systems improve, it is believed that donors will be more willing to
use national systems for all types of aid.
PSRPs and budget support are also supposed to decrease donor influence. In the past,
donors used top-down conditionalities to force recipient states to make specific policy
changes; or they provided aid in the form of stand-alone, donor-determined projects. This
resulted in hierarchical (and often antagonistic) relationships between donors and recipientcountry governments. Together, poverty reduction strategies and budget support are
supposed to decrease how much influence donors have over the policy process and let
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recipient-countries lead (Amin 2006; Oxfam 2009; Mosley and Abrar 2006). According to
Cheru, PSRPs “put country-led strategies for development at the heart of development
assistance” and “democratize recipient-donor relationships, by replacing the politics of
‘paternalism’ with the politics of ‘partnership’ and ‘mutual accountability’” (2006: 356-57).
Similarly, Barkan argues that budget support:
…requires no rigid conditionalities and is, in a fundamental sense, an
expression of trust by members of the donor community in the anticipated
performance of recipient governments and, by extension, their leaders. Budget
support starts with the premise that the relationship between donor and
recipient will be productive and harmonious and not adversarial (2009: 72).
Lastly, some argue that poverty reduction strategies and budget support increase the
influence of the recipient-country’s citizens by encouraging higher levels of domestic
accountability or "...the ability of citizens to hold the state answerable for its actions, and
ultimately to impose sanctions for poor performance" (Hudson and GOVNET Secretariat
2009: 4). Although aid provided in the form of budget support still comes from donors, how
it is spent is dictated by the poverty reduction strategy paper not development agencies.
Consequently, governments (who draft the PSRP) are responsible for allocating aid, not
donors. Furthermore, given that budgets are typically approved by the national parliament, in
theory channeling money through the national budgets allows parliamentarians (who are
elected by citizens) to influence how aid is allocated. If citizens do not approve of the way
aid is being spent, they can express discontent through elections and civil society
mechanisms. Under alternative forms of aid distribution, no such mechanisms exist because
donors are not reliant on citizens to stay in power (Directorate General for Development
2006).
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Critiques	
  of	
  budget	
  support	
  and	
  PRSPs	
  

Early evaluations of both budget support and PRSPs often focused on implementation
challenges, such as predictability (Celasun and Walliser 2006; Eifert and Gelb 2006) and
fungibility (Koeberle and Stavreski 2006). However, there has recently been more focus on
the “political dimensions” of each aid program (Hayman 2011). Much of this newer work
suggests that there are several flaws with the aid programs, but has not yet provided a clear
story on how budget support and the poverty reduction strategy program impact aiddependent states. Nor has it outlined the specific reasons why budget support has not resulted
in the predicted outcomes.
Regarding the impact of the aid programs on donor influence, there is some confusion
in the literature (and sometimes within the same document). According to some, budget
support and PSRPs have dramatically impacted donor-government relations—often not for
the better (Craig and Porter 2003; Unwin 2004). However, others are quick to point out that
conditionality remains part and parcel of international development, implying that little has
changed (Hayman 2011).
What this literature has in common is the claim that donors have not retreated in the
way often assumed by proponents of the budget support. Missing is a broader understanding
of when and how donor practices have or have not changed, and a precise understanding of
the impact of such changes on the influence of government policymakers and citizens.
Additionally, some studies suggest that donor-government relationships may have changed
form (Gould 2005; Harrison 2001), but we have no direct evidence of this change, nor a clear
understanding of how and why such a change occurs.
Regarding the impact of the aid programs on citizen influence, previous analyses
have found little evidence of increased accountability or better governance as a result of
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either budget support or the poverty reduction strategy program. In Tanzania, Lawson and his
colleagues find that intra-government incentives and democratic accountability failed to
improve as expected (Lawson et al. 2006), and a five-country case study conducted by
USAID found that general budget support did not always appear to strengthen democracy or
public accountability (Beasley et al. 2005). In the most comprehensive evaluation of budget
support to date, it was found that that general budget support may strengthen the central
government, but it does not necessarily strengthen democracy or public accountability (IDD
and Associates 2006, xi).
What is again missing from this work is a clear picture of why budget support has
apparently not prompted more citizen influence, or governance reform more broadly.83 The
research outlined above suggests that citizen influence has not increased, but provides no
explanation of why it has not. Nor does it explore how budget support and the poverty
reduction strategy programs have impacted state-society relationships more broadly.
Furthermore, the assumption that government ownership equals national ownership
(see pg. 32) has gone largely unexplored in this literature. Hadziyiannakis and Mylonakis
argue that an implicit, but fundamental, assumption in budget support operations is,
“governments of recipient countries are genuine representatives of their peoples chosen
through democratic processes” (2006, 5). How likely is this to reflect reality in many aiddependent countries? If governments are not actually representative of their peoples, and
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Hayman (2011) argues that budget support recipients have largely been dismissive of donor pressures to
reform governance practices (including the withdrawal of budget support). Therefore, budget support has
largely been ineffective as an instrument of democratic change. However, this focuses on donor influence and
does not speak to the implicit assumption within predictions of budget support that citizens will be able
influence the policy process more if government policymakers are more involved and have more influence.
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budget support and the poverty reduction strategy process gives them more influence, then
why would we expect greater citizen influence?

5.2.	
   The	
  Poverty	
  Reduction	
  Strategy	
  Process	
  and	
  Budget	
  Support	
  in	
  
Rwanda	
  
Rwanda jumped on the poverty reduction strategy bandwagon quite early, finalizing
its first PRSP in June 2002.84 The first poverty reduction strategy was prepared by the
National Poverty Reduction Programme (set up by the Ministry of Finance), and was based
on an interim PRSP finalized in November 2000 and a Participatory Poverty Assessment
(GoR 2002a). The latter included a national survey, pilot testing of a community action plan,
and a policy relevance test. The first PRSP also built on Vision 2020, a document outlining
Rwanda’s economic aspirations published by the Ministry of Finance in 2000.85
The second poverty reduction strategy, the “Economic Development & Poverty
Reduction Strategy 2008-2012” or the EDPRS, was finalized in 2007. The EDPRS focuses
on three themes: Sustainable Growth for Jobs and Exports, Vision 2020 Umurenge, and
governance.86 The EDPRS builds on the previous poverty reduction strategy but focuses
more on implementation, which was seen as lacking in Rwanda’s first PRSP (GoR 2007e).
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The full document is available at http://www.imf.org/External/NP/prsp/2002/rwa/01/063102.pdf.
Vision 2020 sets out to transition Rwanda into a middle-income country based on free market principals and
private investments. Key targets include increasing the per capita income from 290 USD to 900 USD, halving
the poverty rate from 64% to 30%, and raising life expectancy by six years to fifty-five. Central to Vision 2020
is the move from subsistence agriculture to a knowledge-based society. Vision 2020 available at
http://www.gesci.org/assets/files/Rwanda_Vision_2020.pdf.
86
Sustainable Growth for Jobs and Exports is a public investment program whose goal is to reduce the
operating costs of business, increase innovation, and widen and strengthen the financial sector. Vision 2020
Umurenge is supposed to accelerating the poverty reduction rate by promoting the pro-poor elements of the
national growth plan; the goal is to increase the productive capacity of the rural poor though a combination of
public works, cooperatives, credit packages and direct support. The final flagship, governance, is supposed to
anchor pro-poor growth by building on a reputation for low levels of corruption and its comparative regional
advantage in soft infrastructure (GoR 2007b, i).
85

96
According to the GoR, it will cost 5,151 billion Rwandan Francs (approximately $8.7
billion) over the FYs 2008-2012 to implement the EDPRS.87 This figure includes public
recurrent expenditure, public capital expenditure, and private investment, with the public
component making up two-thirds or 3,434 billion Rwandan Francs (approximately $5.8
billion) (GoR 2007e). While all donors are, in theory, supposed to support the EDPRS and its
priorities, budget support donors directly fund the EDPRS by funding GoR’s budget. As a
representative of the European Commission told me, they try to support the EDPRS not
“impose from above” (Interview I-XI, 11.04.09).
Numbers	
  and	
  figures	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Figure 5.2 below provides an overview of general budget support to Rwanda from
2003-2008, as reported in the SPA budget support alignment surveys.88 As the chart shows,
since 2005, over $150 million per year has been distributed to Rwanda in the form of general
budget support ($185.83 million in FY2007/08). Over the years, budget support appears have
become more predictable, with almost 100% of committed funds being disbursed in 2008.
	
  
	
  

87

US dollar amounts calculated on February 1, 2011 using the current exchange rate ($1 = 592 Rwandan
Francs).
88
The surveys stopped in 2008.
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Figure	
  5.2:	
  General	
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  to	
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General budget support further increased during FYs 2009/2010 and 2010/2011. The budget
support packaged for 2010/2011 increased pledges by 21% to $335.4 million (Kagire
2009).89 Figures for sector budget support to Rwanda are incomplete and not worth repeating
here. However, the amount of sector budget support has quadrupled since 2007, and certain
sectors, such as education, agriculture, and health, are more supported by budget support than
others (GoR 2010d).
Proportionally, Rwanda receives more budget support than any other country in the
SPA Budget Support Alignment Survey (which surveys the countries receiving the highest
amounts of budget support in Sub-Saharan Africa). As table 5.1 below indicates, the largest
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In 2009, Rwanda changed its budget cycle when it entered the East African Community.
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recipient of general budget support in Sub-Saharan Africa is Tanzania. However, when the
relative size of each country’s economy is taken into account, we see that general budget
support actually constitutes a larger percentage of Rwanda’s GDP than it does in Tanzania or
any other country in the survey.
Table	
  5.1:	
  General	
  Budget	
  Support	
  Disbursal	
  Rates	
  by	
  County	
  

Benin
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Rwanda
Sierra Leone

Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia

2004 Survey

2006 Survey

2008 Survey

GBS
Disbursed
(US$m)

GBS as %
of GDP

GBS
Disbursed
(US$m)

GBS as %
of GDP

GBS
Disbursed
(US$m)

GBS as %
of GDP

Average
GBS as %
of GDP

10.92
131.55
193.48
301.69

0.53%
2.65%
2.41%
3.69%

0.76%
3.50%

306.71

2.04%

1.73%
3.12%
4.34%
4.57%
2.37%
5.18%
3.47%
4.93%

1.61%
3.10%
0.12%
3.44%
0.70%
2.62%
4.14%
2.00%
4.88%
6.47%
6.97%
3.82%
2.73%
1.41%

112.27
236.31

103.72
103.08
255.98
230.88
86.17
52.26
580.38
404.07

72.06
186.44
264.66
331.54
60.83
113.41
120.82
110.51
317.33
155.09
64.08
548.13
346.65
86.42

99.73
108.65
294.97
186.1
28.93
653.4

2.32%
1.44%
3.71%
5.55%
0.66%
3.76%

194.13

1.58%

1.06%
3.12%
2.06%
3.24%
0.35%
2.25%
3.08%
2.26%
4.84%
5.80%
4.93%
3.78%
3.75%
2.56%

Source:	
  Strategic	
  Partnership	
  for	
  Africa	
  Budget	
  Support	
  Alignment	
  Surveys	
  
Budget	
  support	
  donors	
  

The GoR has a clear and stated preference for direct budget support. In 2010, the
GoR declared that, “Rwanda's country systems are sufficiently solid and reliable for use by
Development Partners funds.” Therefore, “Use of country systems and choice of modality in
the Rwandan context is thus no longer principally dependent on technical improvements but
rather is subject to political decisions and legal constraints by Development Partners" (GoR
2010c, 2: emphasis in original). Despite the GoR’s decree, only a few donors provide
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substantial amounts of budget support to Rwanda. During the FY 2010/11, the World Bank
pledged $91 million, the EC $80.5 million, the UK $63.1 million, the AfDB $27.6 million,
Germany $15.2 million, Netherlands $14.4 million, and Belgium $4.3 million (Kagire 2009).
As these figures make clear, there are four major budget support donors in Rwanda:
the United Kingdom (UK), the European Commission (EC), the World Bank, and the African
Development Bank (AfDB). The UK was an early budget support donor due to a close
relationship between a former UK Minister of International Development, Clare Short, and
the Rwandan President Paul Kagame. When DFID began budget support in the early 2000s,
there were no public financial management structures in Rwanda. Therefore, the UK was
taking a huge leap of faith by providing budget support to the GoR (Interview I-XI,
11.04.09).
In the late 2000s, the World Bank and the EC emerged as Rwanda’s top budget
support donors. Between 2008 and FY 2009/10 both the World Bank and the European
Commission dramatically increased the percentage of their total aid package provided as
budget support. While budget support constituted 23% of the EC’s total aid package in 2008,
budget support was 70% in FY 2009/2010. Similarly, World Bank budget support grew from
37% in 2008 to 83% in FY 2009/10 (GoR 2010d).
Three bilaterals also provide smaller levels of budget support to Rwanda. Belgium
and the Netherlands only provide sector budget support, and Germany just recently began
budget support in Rwanda. The Dutch were supposed to begin general budget support in
2008; the money was even ready to be transferred. However, they suspended general budget
support to Rwanda due to Rwandan military activity in the Eastern Kivu region of the DRC
and other governance concerns (Interview II-XII, 06.17.10). Stockholm also suspended
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Swedish budget support in 2008 after a UN report accused the GoR of supporting armed
rebellion in the DRC (Swedish Government Offices 2008).90
Both the United States and Canada are exploring the idea of providing sector budget
support to agriculture to Rwanda (Interview I-XXI, 11.16.09; Interview II-VIII, 06.09.10).
According to a USAID official, they want to provide budget support and think it would be
good to do so. Therefore, they have told the government that they will explore whether or not
Rwanda meets the legal requirements (Interview II-VIII, 06.09.10).91 However, there is little
indication on when budget support could begin, even if it is deemed legally permissible.
The	
  Budget	
  Support	
  Harmonisation	
  Group	
  	
  

Budget support in Rwanda is currently overseen by the Budget Support
Harmonisation Group (BSHG); a working group of the Development Partners Coordination
Group (see chapter six, pg. 121). Members of the Development Partners Coordination Group
(which is open to all donors) that provide more than $10 million each year in budget support
are eligible for membership in the BSHG. The exception to this rule is the IMF, which is
considered a full member because of its role and mandate regarding macro-economic policy
issues. Additionally, those giving less can participate in the group as an observer (BSHG
2008).92 For example, the US was recently invited to sit in on BSHG meetings because of its
interest in providing sector budget support to agriculture (Interview II-VIII, 06.09.10).93
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One interviewee (a representative of a budget support donor) argued that the global trend toward
collaboration and partnerships is being complicated by “knee-jerk reactions,” such as withdrawing budget
support (Interview I-XI, 11.04.09).
91
However, they would have to provide more than $10m in budget support to have voting power on the BSHG.
92
The United Nations Resident Coordinator also has observer status. Additionally, those considering budget
support are often invited to observe.
93
However, they would have to provide more than $10m in budget support to have voting power on the BSHG.
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According to its terms of reference, the BSHG is a forum, not a technical working
group. Its objective is “to create a common understanding of achievements by and
performance changes for all budget support partners; to provide a forum for open discussion
and to reduce the transactions cost of budget support” (BSHG 2006b, 1). The BSHG is
chaired by the Secretary General and Secretary to the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance,
and donors alternate co-chairing the group every six months.
Signatories of the BSHG’s memorandum of understanding, commit to “enhancing
national ownership and domestic accountability,” giving the GoR leadership in this process
and committing to strengthening the GoR’s capacity to exercise leadership (BSHG 2008, 4).
Additionally, signatories “agree to ensure that assistance is channeled in a manner that
responds to the priorities articulated in national places, and making maximum use of
government systems…” (BSHG 2008, 4). However, the memorandum of understanding very
explicitly states that it does not supersede bilateral negotiations or treaties.
Twice a year, the BSHG conducts a review of budget support. These reviews are
multi-day events and assess Rwanda’s overall progress, as well as its progress in the
economic, social and governance clusters. The November review is an assessment, while the
review that takes place in April is forward looking (Interview II-V, 06.05.10).
During these reviews, the GoR reports to donors using the established Common
Performance Assessment Framework (CPAF). The CPAF is a set of fifty indicators based on
Rwanda’s second poverty reduction strategy paper, the EDPRS. These fifty indicators were
agreed on by donors and the GoR and are supposed to be used by donors as triggers to
disburse budget support. For example, the UK distributes budget support in both fixed and
variable payments or “tranches.” The CPAF triggers disbursement of the variable tranche
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(Interview II-X, 06.10.10).94 The idea is that the donor can choose from a set of triggers that
the government is aware of and has consented to. The CPAF process has struggled with
capacity challenges and it is time consuming. However, overall, my interviewees were
generally positive about the framework and the review process.95
Recently, a parallel assessment mechanism was established for donors, the Donor
Performance Assessment Framework (DPAF). The DPAF assesses donors on thirty-two
indicators.96 However, unlike the CPAF, the DPAF is not tied to aid disbursement. The idea
for the DPAF came from Mozambique, while the CPAF was a government initiative
(Interview II-I, 06.01.10).

5.3.	
  	
   Findings	
  
Poverty reduction strategies and budget support are hypothesized to allow recipient
countries to be able to exercise more control over the way aid is allocated by getting rid of
top-down conditionalities and stand-alone projects. At a simplistic level, they accomplish this
goal. Poverty reduction strategies are “owned” by the national government, and once budget
support has been transferred to the GoR, it is technically at the discretion of the government.
However, my review of the poverty reduction strategy process and budget support in
Rwanda highlights three findings that directly challenge the predictions of the ownership
model outlined in chapters two and three. First, I find that donors are now more likely to use
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If all CPAF triggers were low, it would say something about the GoR’s commitment and also affect the fixed
trench (Interview II-X, 06.10.10).
95
For example, one interviewee told me that the reviews can be a big burden and come with their own
transaction costs. However, he seem to see value in the CPAF overall. He noted that, although the report quality
is low, this is recognized and is being worked on (Interview II-XII, 06.18.10). Another interviewee told me that
when budget support started it was very disorganized. However, it is much better now, as things are more
structured and the ministries are better prepared (Interview II-XX, 06.29.10).
96
Twenty-six of these indicators apply to all donors. The remaining eight only apply to budget support donors.
Baseline data for the DPAF was collected in 2007 and reviews took place in 2008 and 2009/10.
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national systems; however, there is little reason to believe that they give preference to
government priorities if they are not in line with their own. Second, I find that, rather than
decreasing the role of donors in the policy process, participation in budget support increases
a donor’s say over development policy. Third, I find that the Rwandan poverty reduction
strategy process and budget support have not made the policy process more inclusive or
increased domestic accountability, but have instead centralized domestic authority in the
Ministry of Finance.
Use	
  of	
  national	
  systems	
  and	
  priorities	
  	
  

Table 5.2 uses data from the aforementioned donor performance assessment
framework (DPAF) to compare how often non-budget support donors and budget support
donors use national systems. The table shows that both groups have increasingly used
national systems since 2007 (the first year of the DPAF). However, budget support donors
use national systems much more often and both groups still use Parallel Implementation
Units (PIUs) quite often.97 There is no guarantee increases in the use of national systems are
due to budget support or the poverty reduction strategy; however, the figures do suggest that
recent efforts to increase the use of national systems through aid programs like budget
support have led to increases in the use of national systems.
Table	
  5.2:	
  Donor	
  Performance	
  Assessment	
  Results	
  
% of ODA disbursed:
B1

97

in the context of a
Programme-Based
Approach

Non- Budget Support
Donors*

Budget Support Donors**

2007

2008

2009/10

2007

2008

2009/10

10.2%

7.4%

19.7%

43.4%

40.8%

78.0%

The OECD defines PIUs as “dedicated management units designed to support the implementation and
administration of projects or programmes” (OECD 2011).
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B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7

using GoR budget
execution procedures
using GoR auditing
procedures
using GoR financial
reporting systems
using GoR
procurements systems
Number of parallel
PIUs
% of TC provided
through coordinated
programmes

8.2%

0.6%

10.0%

49.9%

49.3%

61.7%

10.8%

4.6%

36.7%

52.8%

42.4%

62.9%

10.8%

3.4%

39.9%

54.8%

49.1%

71.3%

14.8%

15.2%

50.0%

57.6%

52.0%

80.9%

19

14

9

22

4

22

59.4%

85%

72.6%

62.6%

68.3%

83.3%

Compiled	
  from	
  2009/2010	
  DPAF	
  (GoR	
  2010b)	
  
*the	
  number	
  of	
  budget	
  support	
  donors	
  was	
  eight	
  in	
  2007	
  and	
  2008	
  and	
  seven	
  in	
  2009/10	
  
**the	
  number	
  of	
  non-‐budget	
  support	
  donors	
  was	
  five	
  in	
  2007	
  and	
  2008	
  and	
  seven	
  in	
  2009/10	
  

Does the increased use of national systems mean national priorities are more reflected
in national policy? Not necessarily. By most accounts, budget support in Rwanda is well
aligned with the EDPRS. However, given that the EDPRS is a requirement of donors under
the HIPC program and was produced in heavy collaboration with donors, there is clear
reason to contest the EDPRS’s billing as a “homegrown” document representing national
priorities.
As noted, the poverty reduction strategy program came out of the HIPC program,
which provides substantial debt relief to participating countries. To qualify for HIPC, the
boards of both the World Bank and the IMF must endorse a country’s poverty reduction
strategy. Under the HIPC program, Rwanda received over $1,226.6 million in debt relief
from the AfDB, World Bank, and IMF (AfDB 2005). Therefore, producing a poverty
reduction strategy that will be approved by the IMF and World Bank boards is clearly
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advantageous to the GoR. Additionally, a country’s progress on its PRSP is reviewed each
year by the staff of the IMF and World Bank.98
Furthermore, there are clear guidelines for how PRSPs should be drafted,99 and
donors are often heavily involved in the drafting process. This was certainly true with the
EDPRS.100 At a high-level meeting between donors and the GoR in 2007, the Secretary
General of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning noted “that the EDPRS was
developed through an extensive 18-month consultation, led at a high-level by GoR and
involving all major stakeholders in 19 sector working groups and cross-cutting issue groups”
(GoR 2007d, 8). During my interviews, both GoR and donor representatives further clarified
that, although Rwanda’s PRSP was “government-driven,” it was produced by all
stakeholders (Interview II-I, 06.01.10). In other words, donors were actively involved in its
creation. One donor representative went as far as to say it was “signed off” by donors
(Interview II-X, 06.10.10).
The drafting of the EDPRS was officially overseen by the EDPRS National Policy
Steering Group, a body composed of GoR ministers (and chaired by the minister of finance).
However, the Technical Steering Group – which was composed of GoR representatives and
donor representatives from the World Bank, UNDP, EC, and DFID – actually monitored and

98

Each year a progress report is produced, and the IMF and World Bank assess these progress reports in a
“Joint Staff Advisory Note.” Guidelines for preparing these notes can be found at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/PDFs/jsan_apr_guidelines.pdf.
99
For example, the “PRSP Sourcebook” guides countries in developing and strengthening their poverty
reduction strategies. The sourcebook is available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPRS/0,,contentMDK:2017574
2~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:384201,00.html.
100
Hayman noted similar dynamics in the drafting of the first PRSP. She suggests that it was DFID that really
pushed for the PRSP process to begin with, as they needed for budget support, and that the PRSP was not
accepted by all parts of the government (Hayman 2006, 168). Additional, she notes that, although the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Credit programme, the World Bank’s mechanism for funding the PRSP, should have been
drawn from PRSP sector strategies, the World Bank was largely responsible for preparing the strategies (due to
low capacity and a desire to put Rwanda’s PRSC programme before the board in June 2004 (Hayman 2006, 71).
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oversaw the consultation process and drafting (GoR 2006a, 5).101 Additionally, donors were
active in the eleven sector working groups that designed the actual EDPRS policies and
interventions.
Furthermore, international consultants heavily supported the drafting of the EDPRS.
Two international consultants supported the Ministry of Finance with drafting for
approximately two years, and an international consultant supported each sector (Informal
Conversations: Kigali, 06.15.10; GoR 2006b). The use of international consultants is largely
justified by low ministry capacity. Additionally, consultants often lend a degree of credibility
to the process. International consultants are not supposed to represent donors; however, their
paycheck and future jobs are dependent on donors. Their active participation in the drafting
of the EDPRS indicates that international ideas and notions about how best to foster
economic development often heavily guide national priorities.
The active and influential role of donors in the EDPRS process does not mean that the
document does not reflect national priorities (at least to some degree). However, it does
suggest that national priorities cannot be assumed to have taken precedence during its
drafting. During my interviews with donor and government officials, I did not come across
any examples of government preferences taking precedence over donor preferences. Instead,
what was conveyed to me was a spirit of collaboration between donors and the GoR. As
Hayman writes:
In Rwanda, the policy process consequently involves the government putting
forward its agenda, which already reflects what donors want to see to a great
extent, and then a process of negotiation ensues with donors requesting
particular amendments to satisfy their needs (2009, 594).

101

Civil society and the private sector also had very minimal representation.
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As long as donors and the GoR are in agreement about what their national development
policy should be, their poverty reduction strategies are likely reflective of national priorities.
However, if GoR priorities deviate from donor priorities, there is little indication that they
will take precedence over donor priorities.
Increased	
  influence	
  of	
  budget	
  support	
  donors	
  

Furthermore, my interviews and observations in Rwanda suggest that, rather than
decrease the role of donors in the policy process, participation in budget support actually
increases a donor’s involvement in development policy. As one interviewee explained to me,
budget support donors can monitor and evaluate more. They are involved with the budget.
They know more what is going on and can better understand the context and people
(Interview II-XV, 06.23.10).
A review of the meeting minutes of the BHSG reveals that donors who participate in
this group are very active in technical aspects of the GoR’s operations. For example, when
the budget was presented to the BSHG during its June 2006 meeting, donors made comments
about how to best “mop up excess liquidity,” the need to have a clear picture of revenue
collection potential, and concerns about food distribution as a means to address a food
shortage (BSHG 2006a). When the education sector budget was presented at the January
2007 meeting, donors raised concerns about how performance contracts for teachers were
being used (BSHG 2007), and, at the fall 2009 Joint Budget Support Review, I observed that
donors were part and parcel of the policy process, asking very specific and technical
questions about the GoR’s operations and activities. Each of these presentations occurred
before the budget was presented to parliament for comment or review.
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During my interviews, donors and GoR officials appeared to be well aware that
budget support donors possessed heightened access. One highly ranked GoR official argued
that with project funding everything is defined. However, he suggested that when a donor
participates in budget support they are able to ask the “big questions,” such as what is the
impact of all of your poverty programs? (Interview I-XX, 11.13.09). A representative of
DFID argued that the US is often left out, as they are so tied to contracts and therefore have
less impact, particularly on the policy dialogue (Interview I-XII, 11.04.09).
A representative of UNDP told me that it is true that budget support donors have
privileged access to information (Interview II-XX, 06.29.10). Additionally, a senior GoR
official in the Ministry of Finance told me directly that budget support donors get more
information than other donors, can make sure that their resources are being used well, and
can “influence policy.” Because budget support donors come to the (CPAF) reviews, they
know what is happening in all sectors, instead of just the few sectors where they have
projects (Interview II-V, 06.05.10).102 A DFID representative put it more directly, telling me
“we do what we want” (Interview II-X, 06.10.10; my emphasis).
I also observed that non-budget support donors are well aware of the privileged
position budget support donors are given. A representative of the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) lamented at their inability to give budget support (Interview IIXVII, 06.24.10).103 A sector budget support donor noted inequalities between donors, telling
me that, even though they give sector budget support, the government likes to make them
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He went on to tell me that development partners are a check for the government and help them strengthen
their systems.
103
One way that Japan has gotten around their inability to provide budget support is the Counterpart Fund. This
aid project distributed fuel to the GoR. The GoR in turn was able to sell the fuel and use the revenue to fund the
government (Interview II-XVIII, 06.24.10).
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feel like they are not a part of things because they do not provide general budget support.
The same donor representative went on to tell me that there is a big different between how
donors and recipient-countries perceive the Paris Agenda. Recipient-countries thought it
would garner them more control. However, when you are a budget support donor there is a
need to discuss everything. You get access to everything (Interview II-XII, 06.18.10).
While donors have largely moved away from hard conditionalities, my case study of
budget support and the poverty reduction strategy process in Rwanda suggests that donor
influence has not decreased. Instead, donors have merely shifted how they exert influence.
Instead of making heavy demands upfront, donors have further integrated themselves into
decision-making processes and become active participants in what is often called the “policy
dialogue.” Consequently, donors exert influence in subtler but equally (if not more) powerful
ways by becoming part and parcel of state decision-making structures.104 This is much easier
to do if you are a general budget support donor, because you are given privileged access to
information and are invited to give your input on state practices.
Increased	
  authority	
  of	
  MINECOFIN	
  

Lastly, I find that the Rwandan poverty reduction strategy process and budget support
have not made the policy process more inclusive, nor increased domestic accountability, but
have instead centralized authority in the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance
manages both budget support and the EDPRS. As budget support has grown more and more
prevalent, the Ministry of Finance has grown more and more powerful. This has come at a
cost to other actors.

104

As one interviewee put it, everything is in the dialogue (Interview II-XII, 06.18.10).
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Recently, civil society has been invited to participate in various high-level meetings
between the government and donors (see chapter five for more details). Additionally, a more
user-friendly budget was recently created, and the Ministry of Finance did present the last
budget to civil society (Interview I-XVI, 11.10.09; Interview II-XXII, 07.02.10). However,
your average Rwandan citizen continues to have very little control over development policy
or budgetary processes.
Key reports, such as the CPAF, are only presented to donors, not to the parliament
(Interview II-XII, 06.18.10). Therefore, parliamentarians do not have the opportunity to
comment on indicators used for the CPAF or its findings. On the 2010 Open Budget Index,
Rwanda received a score of 11 out of 100. This score indicates that the GoR “provides the
public with scant information on the central government’s budget and financial activities
assessed by the Survey,” making “it virtually impossible for citizens to hold the government
accountable for its management of the public’s money” (Open Budget Partnership 2010, 1).
Budget support, in particular, excludes civil society. Civil society does not have
representation in the BSHG, and when funds are channeled through budget support instead of
through projects, their role as an implementer is cut off. The executive director of the
Rwandan Civil Society Platform worries about this, telling me that the government’s push for
budget support leaves civil society vulnerable (Interview II-III, 06.03.10). A 2006 report on
budget support in Rwanda found that budget support has resulted in “government
empowerment,” particularly of the Ministry of Finance, but had done little to foster domestic
accountability. The report notes that “the feedback process is not very inclusive,” with line
ministers and other domestic stakeholders not being fully engaged (IDD and Associates
2006, 89).
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The reasons for a lack of citizen engagement are not entirely clear. A representative
of the European Commission told me that most local NGOs are not interested in monitoring.
The EC tried to get local NGOs to monitor the EDPRS but could not get any to agree to such
oversight. While my interviewee was not sure if NGOs are fearful or just not interested in
monitoring (or both), she noted that what is clear is that the government is very strong and
civil society is very weak (Interview I-XVIII, 01.13.09).
In contexts such as Rwanda, where the state is strong and civil society weak, there
appears to be little reason to predict that aid programs that further centralize authority will
translate into increased citizen influence. The hypothesis that budget support increases
domestic accountability requires a pre-existing open political landscape, where civil society
and parliament already play an active role in keeping the central government in check. When
this does not already exist, as in Rwanda, there is little reason to believe that the poverty
reduction strategy process or budget support will do anything to make the policy process
more inclusive or to close the broken feedback loop in foreign assistance.

5.4.	
   Summary	
  of	
  Findings	
  	
  	
  
In this chapter, I examined two related aid programs introduced in Rwanda in the
early 2000s. Collectively, budget support and poverty reduction strategies are theorized to
promote higher-levels of recipient-country ownership. However, in this chapter I have argued
the following: (1) Although donors are now more likely to use national systems, there is little
reason to believe that donors give preference to government priorities, if they are not in line
with their own; (2) Rather than decrease the role of donors in the policy process, participation
in budget support likely increases a donor’s involvement in decision-making processes
regarding development policy; and (3) The poverty reduction strategy program and budget
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support have not made the policy process more inclusive or increased domestic
accountability in Rwanda. Instead, they centralize domestic authority in the ministry of
finance. Table 5.3 below outlines how these three findings map on to the variables of interest
in this study.
Table	
  5.3:	
  Summary	
  of	
  Findings	
  	
  

Changes in influence
over development
policy:

Government
Policymakers
The Ministry of
Finance has gained
more influence but is
still constrained by
donor preferences.

Donors

Citizens

Donors remain very
influential and active in
development policy

Citizen influence over
development policy
decisions remains low.

Regarding government policymakers, I find that the influence of government
policymakers has increased. However, influence has been limited to the Ministry of Finance
(in close collaboration with the president’s office). Alternative domestic actors, such as
parliament, line ministers, and civil society have not seen their influence increase. As a
result, citizen influence over development policy remains very low. Additionally, there is
little evidence that, if the government preferences conflict strongly with donor preferences,
government preferences will take precedence. Regarding economic issues, donors and the
government appear to act in relative congruence.
Furthermore, greater influence by the Ministry of Finance has not translated into less
influence by donors. Donors active in budget support and the poverty reduction strategy
process, such as the EC, the UK, and the World Bank, have not become shrinking violets.
Instead, they have merely changed how they exert influence, engaging more heavily with the
“policy dialogue” and in technical matters. This type of influence is perhaps less outwardly
antagonistic, but it does not decrease donor influence over development policy. In fact, it
likely makes it greater. By actively participating in budget support and the poverty reduction
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strategy process, certain donors have only become further integrated into domestic decision
making structures. Far from eliminating the government’s dependence on donors, links
between the GoR and budget support donors have become stronger.
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Chapter	
  6 	
  

The	
  Aid	
  Coordination,	
  
Harmonization,	
  &	
  Alignment	
  
Framework	
  	
  
In this chapter, I turn my attention to Rwanda’s aid coordination, harmonization, and
alignment (ACHA) framework.105 The wide-reaching ACHA framework is an attempt by the
GoR and its donors to localize the Paris Declaration in Rwanda. The objective is to enable
more country ownership through increased coordination, harmonization, and alignment.
According to an overview of the ACHA framework:
Aid effectiveness is at the center of today’s development discourse. Over one
hundred donors and developing countries, including Rwanda, signed the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In doing so, they agreed to measure their
success at making aid more efficient with a set of indicators and targets.
Donors and recipient countries now have a practical blueprint to advance
development, enhance aid effectiveness, and monitor progress. Inherent to the
Paris Declaration is the principal of country ownership. The Government of
Rwanda and its Development Partners are devoted to implementing global
commitments through their ACHA framework and within Rwanda’s national
policies and strategies (GoR n.d.: emphasis in original).
Ownership is at the core of the Paris Declaration’s agenda for improved aid effectiveness.
However, additional elements – such as coordination, alignment, and harmonization –
provide the foundation for ownership (see figure 2.2, pg. 25). If donors do not harmonize and
align their activities with national systems and priorities, it is difficult for a recipient-country

105

At one time, ACHA was the name of standing working group in Rwanda. In this chapter, I use the name to
represent all actions taken by donors and the GoR to manage aid in accordance with the Paris Declaration not
the defunct working group.
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to take charge of its own development policy. Similarly, if donors remain fragmented,
advancing a singular agenda led by the recipient-country is difficult. Therefore, since the
early 2000s, the GoR and its donors have been developing a series of forums and policy
procedures to realize the three principals of coordination, harmonization, and alignment in
Rwanda (see table 6.1). In the following case study, I examine the various components of the
ACHA framework, looking for evidence of increased ownership.
Table	
  6.1:	
  Definition	
  of	
  Terms	
  
Term
Coordination
Harmonization
Alignment

Definition
“sharing information, lowering transaction costs, and
avoiding duplication efforts”
“streamlining and simplification of development partner’s
procedures and practices”
“the assurance that assistance is given in accordance with
the GoR’s priorities and adopted to the Rwandan context”
Source:	
  Secretary	
  General	
  of	
  MINECOFIN,	
  Gatete	
  Claver	
  (GoR	
  2004,	
  25)	
  

To do so, I first look for evidence that the ACHA framework has increased
coordination, harmonization, and alignment in Rwanda. For example, I look for evidence that
donors are sharing more information with each other and working together to implement aid
projects. I also look for evidence that donors are sharing information with the GoR and
working towards goals and within parameters set by the government. I do find some evidence
to suggest that coordination, harmonization, and alignment have increased in Rwanda.
However, there is great variation between donors. Additionally, bilateral agreements still take
precedence, and partnerships primarily occur when it is advantageous for donors.
I then look for evidence that the ACHA framework has resulted in increased
government influence, increased citizen influence, and decreased donor influence. Just as
with budget support and the poverty reduction strategy process, I find that, although
government influence has increased as a result of the ACHA framework, this influence has
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been limited to the Ministry of Finance and has not spread to other domestic actors.
Additionally, donors have not receded into the background, but have maintained a great deal
of influence over aid policy in Rwanda.
The chapter is organized into five major sections. I first provide a summary of
Rwanda’s aid architecture and aid policy. Second, I discuss the multiple high-level forums
and meetings that take place between donors and the GoR each year. Third, I outline the
complicated system of sector and working groups in Rwanda. In this section, I discuss the
health sector and the new Division of Labour, which limits donors to participation in three
sectors. Fourth, I briefly summarize the new Joint Action Forums, which attempt to formalize
relations between donors and the government at the local level.
In the final section, I pull together each of the pieces of the ACHA framework
analyzed by listing the commonalities found across all, noting three core findings: (1)
Despite a number of initiatives to limit their influence, donors remained active and influential
in decision-making process about aid policy in Rwanda; (2) Donors’ commitment to the idea
of ownership varies; and, (3) Domestically, the Ministry of Finance dominates the ACHA
framework. I conclude by summarizing how my findings from this case study map on to the
variables of interest in this study.

6.1.	
  	
   Rwanda’s	
  Aid	
  Architecture	
  and	
  Aid	
  Policy	
  
The emphasis on aid coordination, harmonization, and alignment really began to take
off in Rwanda between 2002 and 2004 (Hayman 2009a). Since then, a complicated aid
system has emerged (see figure 6.1). Some components of the system, such as the Budget
Support Harmonization Group (BSHG), were previously discussed, as they relate directly to
budget support.
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Figure	
  6.1:	
  Rwanda's	
  Aid	
  Architecture*	
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Minster
Line Ministers
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Finance
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Agency HQ
representatives
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Development Partners
Coordination Group
Donors:
Managed by Aid
Coordination Unit (UN)
Members include, Heads of
Cooperation, Ambassadors,
senior technical staff
Co-Chair, UN Resident
Representative

Rwandan Government:
Managed by Financial
Resource Mobilization Unit
Members include, line
ministers, senior technical and
ministry of finance staff
Chair, Permanent Secretary
and Secretary to the Treasury

Budget Support
Harmonization Group
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Sector Working Groups
Line Ministries
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line minister
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Joint Action Forums
Adopted	
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Rwanda’s aid architecture is composed of forums and working groups that operate at
three different levels. At the diplomatic level, very senior donor and government
representatives come together in a formal annual meeting. Attendees include the Rwandan
president, ambassadors, and senior donor representatives (who often fly in from donor
headquarters for the occasion). Formal diplomatic visits between heads of state would also
fall under this category. At the operational/management level, mid-level donor and
government representatives meet frequently throughout the year to iron out the contours of
the aid relationship in a less formal setting. Lastly, the nuts and bolts are typically decided at
the technical level, where country-level, donor staff meet with government representatives on
specific topics, such as health policy or budget support.
In 2006, the GoR approved an Aid Policy, which is arguably an "adoption of Paris
principals, tailored to meet Rwanda's needs” (Rwangombwa 2006, slide 6).106 The Aid Policy
lays out twelve objectives related to the management of aid: operational development
strategies, reliable country systems, alignment of aid flows on national strategies,
strengthening of local capacities by coordinated support, use of country systems, avoiding
parallel implementation units (PIUs), aid is more predictable, aid is untied, use of common
arrangements, joint missions and analysis, results-oriented frameworks, and mutual
accountability (GoR 2006c). According to a representative of a major international NGO, the
Aid Policy was a political statement by the GoR, and the chapters flow directly from Paris. It
is not a joint assistance strategy (i.e., jointly approved by both the GoR and donors) but a
government policy (Interview II-XX, 06.29.10).
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In this chapter, I distinguish aid policy in general from the official Aid Policy by capitalizing the latter.
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The Aid Policy makes clear that the GoR prefers un-earmarked budget support and
articulates the GoR’s intention to decline any offer of assistance that does not meet its
standards.107 It outlines the conditions under which the GoR will accept loans and technical
assistance, and notes their concern with vertical funds (or funds delivered in structures
parallel to the government). In addition, the Aid Policy expresses the need for more
information about NGOs’ activities as a requirement for better aid management (GoR
2006c).
At first glance, the Aid Policy seems to be the epitome of national ownership.
However, a deeper investigation complicates the story. First, similar to Rwanda’s second
poverty reduction strategy (the EDPRS), it was produced with substantial input from donors.
A handout provided in a workshop on the development of an Aid Policy clarifies:
…there will be a number of elements in the policy that have direct bearing on
the work of the development partners and therefore the process of elaborating
the strategy must be a consultative one. It is important that the policy is both
effective and workable and both development partners and Government
agencies should buy into the finding (GoR 2005a).
Prior to the drafting of the Aid Policy, donors were invited to give feedback on several
documents, including a Baseline Survey on Donor Alignment and Harmonization in Rwanda
and an Aid Policy Consultation Policy. There was also an extensive dialogue, including a
four-day Aid Policy workshop (GoR 2006a). Donors themselves acknowledged their role in
the process in November 2006, when they signed a Statement of Intent regarding both the
Paris Declaration and the new Aid Policy. In this statement, donors recognized “…the
transparent and participatory approach that was adopted in the elaboration of the Policy,
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After un-earmarked budget support, the GoR favors sector budget support then stand-alone projects on
budget and on plan (GoR 2006c).
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allowing Development Partners to provide their views and feedback on the provisions of the
document” (“Joint Donors’ Statement” 2006).
While donors were involved in the process, there was limited input from domestic
actors outside the executive branch. Although local government officials were included in
Aid Policy discussions, meetings primarily sought to “sensitize” them (a popular word in
Kigali) to the document, not get their feedback and opinions (GoR 2007e; Highton 2009).
During a workshop for local officials, a senior Ministry of Finance official noted,
“Implementing the Aid Policy at the district level means building the capacity of local
government officials to work with donors to align their activities to national priorities and,
where possible, to harmonize their support and reduce transaction costs” (GoR 2007c, 1).
That is, the goal of implementing the Aid Policy at the district level is to align local
governments with priorities already decided on by the national government and donors.
The process by which the Aid Policy was approved is also telling. Instead of being
approved by the citizen-elected parliament, the Aid Policy (just like the Common
Performance Assessment Framework) was approved by the Cabinet, which is appointed by
the President. The decision to seek approval in this way was made by the Ministry of
Finance, which then reportedly dismissed criticisms about the approval process (Interview IIXX, 06.29.10).108
Moreover, the Aid Policy gives the Ministry of Finance full authority over
development assistance (GoR 2007a). Rather than donors negotiating aid packages with the
relevant line ministries (e.g., the ministries of education or health), the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, or local governments, all aid negotiation is now supposed to go through the Ministry
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MINECOFIN did reportedly face criticism for this decision. Their response to this criticism was the
consultation process could not go one forever (Interview II-XX, 06.29.10).
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of Finance. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still technically manages diplomatic
relations, the Ministry of Finance is now in the lead (Interview II-XXI, 07.02.10).109
Technically, a high-level group of government officials oversees the Aid Policy (e.g.,
implementation and policy outcomes). However, according to a representative of the
Ministry of Finance, this group does not meet very often. Instead, implementation falls to the
members of the External Finance Unit in the Ministry of Finance. This unit is currently
finalizing an Aid Policy implementation plan (Interview II-I, 06.01.10).

6.2.	
  	
   High-‐Level	
  Forums	
  
Development	
  Partners	
  Coordination	
  Group	
  and	
  Development	
  Partners	
  Meetings	
  &	
  Retreats	
  

The highest-level coordination meeting in Rwanda is the Development Partners
Meeting or DPM (see figure 6.1). Annual DPMs grew out of UN Round Table meetings that
took place in Europe immediately following the genocide. The first meeting on Rwandan soil
took place in 2000 (Hayman 2006). The annual meeting brings together senior GoR officials
(including the president) and high-level diplomats from donor countries.110 The DPM is a
diplomatic meeting, and the GoR uses it to drum up additional aid. Each year, the GoR picks
a theme they would like to emphasize, and makes several presentations highlighting its socioeconomic accomplishments. Each development partner is also permitted to make a statement.
At the organizational and management level, there is the Development Partners
Coordination Group (DPCG) and the Development Partnership Retreat (DPR). The DPCG is
an aid coordination forum composed of high-level GoR representatives (i.e. line ministers,
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GoR representatives did express concern about giving MINECOFIN so much authority at consultative
meetings prior to the drafting of the aid policy (GoR 2005c).
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Even donors that do not have a ground presence in Rwanda but contribute aid via multilateral institutions
sometimes attend DPM meetings.
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Secretaries General, and directors of planning), ambassadors, heads of development
corporations, and senior technical staff. The DPCG is a forum for political dialogue. It is not
a technical working group, but a coordination forum for feelings and opinions (Interview IIXXI, 07.02.10).
The DPCG was set up immediately after the 2002 DPM and held its first meeting on
November 18, 2002 (Hayman 2006). All donors with permanent representation in Rwanda
can participate in the DPCG, but China and Korea choose not to attend meetings (Interview
II-I, 06.01.10). The DPCG is co-chaired by the current Permanent Secretary and Secretary to
the Treasury to the Ministry of Finance and the current UN Resident Coordinator. Presently,
the DPCG meets quarterly.
In 2005, members of the DPCG began gathering in a retreat format. In contrast to the
DPM, the now annual Development Partners Retreat (DPR) brings together country-level
staff in a more intimate setting outside the capital city (typically on Lake Kivu in the
northeast part on the country). In contrast to the 400+ persons who typically attend the
Development Partners Meetings, approximately 100 GoR representatives and in-country
donor staff attend the retreats. There is more space for discussions about particular policy
issues and most discussions about aid coordination occur during the retreats.
Sessions at both the DPMs and DPRs are chaired by the relevant GoR line minister
and co-chaired by a donor working heavily in the area or sector being discussed. Most
sessions begin with a presentation by the GoR, followed by a response by a pre-selected
development partner, and then the floor is opened up for questions. Not surprisingly, the GoR
attempts to manage these discussions as much as possible, attempting to present the GoR in
the best possible light.
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Frequency	
  of	
  meetings	
  and	
  challenges	
  to	
  coordination	
  

The frequency of DPCG meetings is highly variable. At one time, the DPCG met
monthly. However, meeting frequency decreased to every other month in 2006 because of a
request from the government (GoR 2006b), and then gradually decreased to quarterly over
the following years. Now, even quarterly meetings do not always take place.111 When asked
why the DPCG meets less frequently than it once did, one GoR representative told me that
there is simply less to discuss (Interview II-I, 06.01.10). This is likely a variable, as meetings
recently increased after the GoR introduced a new initiative called the Division of Labour.
However, there is also some indication that the DPCG’s activities have decreased as budget
support donors have increased their meetings and activities.
In a conversation about the role of the DPCG, a DFID staff member questioned how
useful the DPCG is given that the Budget Support Harmonization Group (BSHG) now has
nine members (Interview II-X, 06.10.10). Not surprisingly, in my interviews, non-budget
support donors were much more inclined to see a clearer role for the DPCG, and
representatives of the UN (the UN co-chairs the DPCG) were particularly enthusiastic about
the importance of the body.
Concerns have also been raised about the current role of the DPM, which just recently
became biennial. During the 2008 retreat, a working group discussed the role of both the
DPM and DPCG, and concluded, “they should not simply be a forum for information
sharing. Instead, one should have real policy dialogue. Furthermore, participants stated that
they would like to be better prepared for the DPM” (DPCG 2008, 12).
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In 2010, the DPCG met three times.
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The latter concern is one raised by donors in multiple contexts, as the GoR often
moves very quickly on reforms and required documentation is often distributed at the last
minute. According to donors, this gives them very little time to prepare for major policy
discussions.112 As a representative of an international NGO noted, it is sometimes hard to
decipher the motive for the GoR’s quick pace.
In particular, my interviewee questioned whether or not the last minute distribution of
important documents is because of poor planning or a political tactic of the government
(Interview II-XXII, 07.02.10). In either case, the last minute nature of many policy actions
has visibly impeded coordination between donors and the GoR in several circumstances. As
another interviewee put it, the government works quickly and sometimes people get lost in
the process (Interview II-IV, 06.05.10).
Additionally, it is important to clarify that neither the DPCG nor the DPMs/DPRs
replace bilateral agreements or talks between donors and the GoR, rather they add to them.
For example, even through they are in charge of the DPCG, the UN’s bilateral relationship
with the GoR has not changed (Interview II-XX, 06.29.10). Country strategies are still agreed
on bilaterally with the GoR (the process for approval varies based on the donor), and donors
still hold annual bilateral forums and discussions. Under the auspices of the European Union,
many European donors have decreased (but certainly not eliminated) bilateral activities.
However, this has more to do with European integration than the ACHA framework.
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This concern was particularly evident at the 2005 DPM where both the EU and the US raised the issue in
their donor statements (GoR 2005b, 65 & 70).
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Participation	
  of	
  civil	
  society	
  

Even more apparent is the limited role that civil society has played in the DPCG,
DPM, and DPR. High-level forums, both at the technical and organizational and management
levels, are dominated by the national government and donor representatives. Civil society,
NGOs (even large international NGOs), and local government have historically been
excluded. As a representative of Norwegian People’s Aid told me, the DPCG is for donors
who fund the government, i.e. provide aid directly to the government through budget support
or stand-alone projects. She went on to say that “development partners” are really the large
bilateral and multilateral donors that fund the government, not smaller NGOs like
themselves. As an international NGO, they lack the status, representation, and access that
major bilateral and multilateral donors have (Interview II-XIX, 06.29.10).
As was noted in chapter three, the GoR has often expressed skepticism about civil
society. This skepticism continued throughout the 2000s. In June 2004, a report by a
parliamentary commission on genocidal ideology recommended the dissolution of several
international and local NGOs that “preached genocidal ideology and ethnic hatred.”
According to Burnet, this list included the “only local human rights organization willing to
criticize the government publicly and document human rights abuses committed by
government authorities” (2007, 4). Most of these organizations shut down between July 2004
and January 2005, and the organizations that remain are careful about criticizing the
government, the RPF, the president, or their policies.
In 2008, civil society was invited to participate in the DPM for the first time
(Interview II-XXII, 07.02.10). Prior to the meeting, civil society came together to formulate a
common statement that was read at the meeting. In this document, they called on the GoR
and donors to:
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…recognize civil society as an independent development actor in its own
right. Enhanced recognition of civil society and supporting CSOs to fulfill
their roles in the development process will be instrumental in developing and
further strengthening genuine partnership and good society-state relations
(Rwanda Civil Society Platform 2008b, 2).
In the lead up to the common statement, it was concluded in a workshop attended by over
160 members of civil society, that civil society as a whole faces many challenges in Rwanda.
These challenges include, “government perception of the Civil Society as a weak entity and
hence not considering it to be an important partner…” and “the fact that Civil Society
activities are to some extent donor driven, which hinders the independence and the
sustainability of actions…" (Rwanda Civil Society Platform 2008a, 1).
The activities that occurred around the 2008 DPM were a high point for civil society,
and the statement clearly articulates that some members of civil society would like the GoR
and donors to take them more seriously. However, since 2008, little has fundamentally
changed. While “civil society” now often attends high-level meetings, they lack a vote and
participation is still constrained.113
Civil society is represented at most donor-government meetings by the executive
director of the Rwandan Civil Society Platform, a group formed in 2004 for the purpose of
dealing with the government (Gready 2011).114 The Civil Society Platform represents
umbrella groups, not individual NGOs. In total, fifteen umbrella groups are now members of
the platform. These umbrella groups represent approximately 703 NGOs (Interview II-III,
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At the 2010 DPM civil society once again called on the GoR “to put in place an enabling environment for
meaningful engagement and for the voice of its citizens to be heard” (Rwanda Civil Society Platform and
Network of International NGOs 2010, 2)
114
International NGOs and the private sector also elect a representative to attend the DPCG meetings and other
forums. The formation of the civil society platform began in 2004 but was not officially launched until 2006
and not fully operational until 2007 (Interview II-III, 06.03.10).
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06.03.10).115 Under this arrangement, one person must speak for hundreds of organizations,
many of which are not even members of the platform and therefore lack a vote in
representation.
Additionally, at the same time that civil society is being invited to sit at some tables,
government control of their activities is increasing. All NGOs (local and international) are
required to register all activities with a series of GoR institutions, ranging from the Ministry
of Local Government, to the utugari or cell where they are working (Interview II-VI,
06.08.10; Interview II-XIV, 06.22.10).116 The Law on Non-Profit Associations, enacted in
2001, gives the government the power to control projects, budgets, and the hiring of
personnel. Additionally, it requires all organizations to obtain a renewable certificate of
registration from the Ministry of Local Governance. Numerous organizations have reportedly
encountered difficulties registering or renewing their registration.
During a meeting of the platform I observed, a government spokesperson reiterated
these registration requirements to participants. He paid lip service to civil society
independence, but then reiterated (in both English and Kinyarwanda) that there are guidelines
and rules governing civil society organizations. He warned that some civil society
organizations have been irresponsible and not followed these requirements, calling on all, “so
that a few organizations don’t punish your overall image.”
One interviewee noted that what the government really wants to do is sensitize (again,
this is a word I heard often in Rwanda) civil society to their agenda or mission; what they
want is a single voice (Interview II-IV, 06.05.10). Channeling NGO activity through the
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The platform has four main objectives: (1) forum for coordination; (2) information exchange; (3) represent
others; (4) lobby and advocacy (Interview II-III, 06.03.10).
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The exact process for registering is rather oblique.
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platform, which one donor suggested is (at the very least) pro-government, is certainly one
way to do this. Another interviewee told me that much of government work is about
sensitization and conformity in government; the idea of uniformity is untouchable. (Interview
I-VII, 10.30.09). Yet another interviewee, noted that civil society is often about two things:
keeping government accountable and keeping themselves accountable. The first is very hard
to do in Rwanda, but the government is very interested in the latter (Interview II-XXII,
07.02.10).
In order for NGOs to be heard, another interviewee told me, it is necessary for them
to partner with one another. They are, therefore, learning to speak with one voice (Interview
I-XVI, 11.10.09). This approach is likely to be the best way of gaining access to the highlevel forums and meetings currently controlled and dominated by the GoR and its
“development partners.” However, such a role is far from the commonly held idea of civil
society as a group of diverse agitators, challenging the status quo from a variety of different
perspectives.
Additionally, centralizing authority and voice makes it easier for the government to
infiltrate civil society. According to Gready, umbrella structures and the platforms “are
widely perceived to have been co-opted by the current government. Hierarchical in
organizational culture, many are led by people that act as mouthpiece of the government”
(2011, 90). Government is so pervasive within civil society that NGOs are jokingly said to
stand for the “Next Governmental Official” (Interview I-XVI, 11.10.09).

6.3.	
   Clusters	
  and	
  Sector	
  Working	
  Groups	
  
Underneath the Development Partners Coordination Group umbrella, there is a
complicated set of clusters, sector working groups, and sector wide approaches (SWAPs).
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These meeting groups have undergone several reforms over the years, and it is almost
impossible to get a clear picture of their current state. They are always changing, and
coordination structures are sector-specific. However, much of the nitty-gritty of policy work
occurs in the sectors, making them an important part of Rwanda’s coordination structure.
Sector activities in Rwanda are organized into three clusters: economic, governance,
and social (Interview II-V, 06.05.10). Within the clusters are sector working groups, where
the majority of the work is done.117 The names and labels of the sector working groups have
undergone many changes over the years, but, according to the latest chart of donor activities
by sector, there are currently fifteen active sectors. Depending on whom you ask, these
sectors are supposed to be aligned with either the budget or Rwanda’s Economic and Poverty
Reduction Strategy (both of which are also supposed to be aligned with one another)
(Interview II-II, 06.01.10; Interview II-V, 06.05.10). Each sector is chaired by a line minster
and co-chaired by a lead development partner, and sectors rotate reporting to the DPCG
during its quarterly meetings.
Each of the sector working groups is organized differently, with some being wellcoordinated and others more loosely organized. Additionally, some meet more frequently
than others.118 In an annual ODA report, the GoR notes that the justice, decentralisation, and
agriculture sectors are particularly harmonized (GoR 2010d). Additionally, the education
sector is often heralded as a model of coordination. There is an education partnership
agreement, and, as early as 2003, the sector had joint reviews and a sector strategy plan
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Sectors use to be called clusters. Therefore, the terminology often gets very muddled.
For example, the governance sector meets about once a quarter (Interview I-VI, 10.30.09).
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(Hayman 2006).119 Additionally, the education sector was the first to implement a Sector
Wide Approach or SWAP. From the government’s perspective, each sector should have a
SWAP, as SWAPs are thought to align the sectors, organize priorities, and pool funds and
objectives (Interview II-I, 06.01.10).
Spotlight	
  on	
  the	
  health	
  sector	
  

The health sector has the largest number of active donors, and receives the most ODA
of any of the sectors.120 The US provides the most money to health (largely because of
PEPFAR or the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief). However, Belgium has
taken on the role of as lead donor because of its lengthy involvement in the sector and an aid
portfolio that includes sector budget support to health.
Belgium, as lead donor, holds the Secretariat seat and is responsible for the sector’s
agenda. To distribute this burden amongst donors, they introduced a health “Development
Partners Group” in November 2008. The group meets every two months and has a rotating
chair. During these meetings, donors set the agenda for the next sector meeting (Interview IIXIII, 06.18.10). Both the chair (GoR) and the co-chair (donor) must sign the sector working
group reports; therefore, they must agree on the contexts (Interview II-V, 06.05.10).121
Coordinating donors in the health sector has not always been easy. The sector is
composed of a plethora of working and technical groups, which function at varying levels of
efficiency. There are currently six working groups, which then sprout out into around thirty-
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The justice; health and population; and transport and ICT sectors also have Joint Sector Reviews (GoR
2010d).
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The health sector is technically called the Health Coordination Group, because they were originally a cluster
and already had a terms of reference when sector system was implemented in 2004
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My interviewee also noted that having donors sign sector working group documents makes them ‘get their
hands dirty.’ His comment suggests an interesting point. Getting donor consent may be important to prevent
donors from resending on promises when it is convenient for them.
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four sub-groups. In addition, there is a new technical working group comprised of those
donors that provide budget support (DFID, Belgium, and Germany), and the Swiss, who have
a program for capacity building.122 In response to questions about the benefits and challenges
of so many forums, the health sector Chair told me that, although coordination is good, there
is the question of over-coordination (Interview II-XIII, 06.18.10).
Furthermore, it has not always been easy to get donors to align their priorities. More
than one donor mentioned to me that the US emphasis on HIV/AIDs due to the PEPFAR
program was not aligned with Rwandan needs (Interview II-X, 06.10.10; Interview II-XIII,
06.18.10).123 Additionally, in the health sector, the US has unilaterally drafted reports for the
GoR without the knowledge of other donors, leading some to question how deep their
commitment to the Paris Principals really goes (Interview II-XIII, 06.18.10).
The experience of the health sector with coordination, suggests that donor
coordination, harmonization, and alignment faces many challenges in Rwanda. Additionally,
it suggests that donors remain part and parcel of decision-making structures regarding aid
policy in Rwanda. Although the GoR technically chairs the sector working group, it is donors
that hold the Secretariat and set the agenda for the meetings.
Division	
  of	
  Labour	
  

At the 2010 Development Partners Retreat, the GoR introduced a new plan to
restructure donor sector involvement, entitled the Division of Labour (DoL). The new
Division of Labour limits donor involvement to three sectors. The GoR argues that, “Unequal distribution of donor support not only distorts equitable development of sectors, but it
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The prevalence of HIV/AIDs is much lower in Rwanda than many other African nations. UNICEF (2010)
estimated that the adult HIV prevalence rate (aged 15–49) was 2.9% in 2009 (UNICEF 2010).
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undermines national leadership of the development agenda” (GoR 2010a, 4). Therefore, in
early 2010, the GoR proposed the Division of Labour in order to limit donor involvement to
three sectors. During the following spring and summer, donors engaged in bilateral
discussions (often involving their headquarters), and proposed a Division of Labour that was
more reflective of donor preferences during a July 2010 meeting of the DPCG (see Table 6.2
below).
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  Division	
  of	
  Labour	
  in	
  Rwanda”	
  (GoR	
  2010a)	
  

The proposal caused quite an uproar upon its initial presentation at the January 2011
Development Partners Retreat. One interviewee told me it was “almost a fight,” with donors
calling line ministers and telling them they would not be able to support them (Interview IIV, 06.05.10). The plan was still a dominant topic of discussion when I was in Kigali the
following summer (2011). Donors conveyed a range of opinions about the DoL to me, and,
given that most were currently engaged in diplomatic discussions with the GoR, it was hard
to get a clear answer from many. In general, most conveyed a basic belief that the idea was a
good one, but pointed to hurdles and challenges for the plan.
For some donors, limiting engagement to three sectors is not a particularly big deal—
or at least that is what I was told. Some donors are only active in one or two sectors to begin
with and others are already working to focus their engagement on a few priority sectors to
maximize their return. For example, a representative at USAID told me that eighty to ninety
percent of US aid for 2010 is already in three sectors: health, agriculture, and economic
growth (Interview II-VIII, 06.09.10). Similarly, a World Bank representative told me that
they are lucky. They had previously developed a country assistance strategy with the
government, during which they were encouraged to concentrate in certain areas. These are
the sectors that they were given (Interview II-IX, 06.10.10).
However, concerns arise for donors that are currently active across multiple sectors.
A particularly challenging case is the United Nations. The organization is technically one
organization under the One UN program but has various agencies all with different foci and
agendas.124 Additionally, there are potential conflicts with the various agencies’ mandate
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The UN was broken down in to its various agencies in the final DoL.
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from the UN General Assembly. For example, UNDP cannot just get rid of their focus on
governance (Interview II-XX, 06.29.10).
A concern raised by many is that forcing donors to focus on three sectors will cause a
net decrease in ODA to Rwanda (Interview II-X, 06.10.10). The government response to this
concern is that donors should increasingly use silent partnerships, and sector and general
budget support. This would minimize donor involvement while maintaining (or increasing)
aid levels. How realistic this is varies by donor. For example, as was pointed out in chapter
five, the US is not likely to engage in general budget support in Rwanda in the near future.
At first glance, Division of Labour proposal appears to decrease donor influence.
However, as one interviewee put it, “the devil is in the details” (Interview II-XIII, 06.18.10).
There are a host of exceptions and ways of interpreting the policy that will likely allow
donors to continue business (at least somewhat) as usual. While many donors appeared to get
rather exercised when the proposal was first presented, most have now engaged in intense
bilateral negotiations that have resolved many of their concerns.
For example, USAID reached an agreement with MINECOFIN through meetings
with the head of the Africa division of USAID in Washington, DC (Interview II-VIII,
06.09.10), and the World Bank will continue to be involved in other sectors on the “soft
side,” i.e. through technical assistance and analytic work (Interview II-IX, 06.10.10). As one
donor representative put it, you are not supposed to have projects in other sectors, but
questions of expertise and technical input are “fuzzier.”
For donors engaged in general budget support, the problem appears to be even less of
an issue. Providing general budget support appears to grant donors the license to participate
in any sectors they desire. Given that they fund the state itself – not specific sectors or
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programs – they must monitor their entire aid portfolio and, therefore, are theoretically able
to attend all sector meetings (Interview II-X, 06.10.10).
The domestic actor that appears to benefit the most from the Division of Labour is,
once again, the Ministry of Finance. Not only is the Ministry of Finance exempt from the
Division of Labor (i.e. any number of donors can fund it), but the plan is a not so subtle
attempt to encourage donors to use funding mechanisms (like budget support) that are
entirely controlled by the Ministry of Finance (Interview II-X, 06.10.10; Interview II-XVII,
06.24.10). When the proposal was first introduced, both civil society and line ministries
raised concerns, fearing a drop in revenue and influence under the Division of Labour
(Interview II-V, 06.05.10).

6.4.	
   Joint	
  Action	
  Forums	
  
The last component of the ACHA framework that deserves attention is the new joint
action forums. Within the past few years, a joint action forum (JAF) has been established in
each of Rwanda’s thirty districts. These forums are intended to serve as the main
coordinating mechanism for the district level, and are supposed to improve service delivery
and economic development at the local level (SNV 2009). Similar to the Development
Partners Coordination Group, but at the local level, the joint action forums are supposed to
bring together donors, civil society, the private sector, and government. One interviewee
described the JAF a way for the government to evaluate them, but also a way for them to
evaluate the government. His colleague added that it is also a way to harmonize, as NGOs
share their current activities to avoid duplication (Interview II-XIV, 06.22.10).
In my interviews, I found that most bilateral and multilateral donors were vaguely
aware of the existence of the JAFs but rarely participated in them; one person put it this way,

136
“who goes to districts” (Informal Conversations: Kigali, 06.15.10). International NGOs were
more likely to have experience with the forums, given that they work at the district level
much more.
Joint Action Forums are relatively new, and I was told that some districts work better
than others. According to one of my interviewees, one challenge is that local authorities often
think of the JAF as a space for fundraising and reporting, not for coordination (Interview IIXXII, 07.02.10). To improve their functioning, the Director of National Planning at the
Ministry of Finance wants to put a person in each district that would serve as the focal point
for Rwanda’s EDPRS. This individual would also know the Aid Policy and have a direct link
with the Ministry of Finance (Interview II-V, 06.05.10).
This plan is unsettling, given concerns raised by my interviewees that the forums do
not actually provide an open space for discussion and dialogue. One interviewee noted that
that not everyone is happy with the Joint Action Forums, because priorities are predefined for
them (Interview II.IV, 06.05.10). Another noted that she doesn’t think NGOs really have
much of a say in forum proceedings; instead, the body is another way to report to
government on activities and budgets (Informal Conversation: Kigali, 06.24.10). A report
from the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) on the Joint Action Forums echoes
many of these concerns, noting that there is limited participation by civil society and the
private sector (SNV 2009). If a national point person was put in each district, centralization
would only likely increase.
Rwanda’s experience with the JAF further highlights challenges facing the ACHA
framework, such as capacity. Additionally, it suggests that coordination mechanisms are
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sometimes used as a tool to bring domestic actors into the fold. While this may increase their
participation, it does not increase their influence.

6.5.	
  	
   Summary	
  of	
  Findings	
  	
  
In this chapter, I analyzed Rwanda’s aid coordination, harmonization, and alignment
(ACHA) framework, individually summarizing the major components of the ACHA
framework, such as Rwanda’s Aid Policy and the Development Partner’s Meetings and
Retreats. Each of the policies and forums discussed has a number of interesting points in its
own right, and, collectively, they suggest a number of important points pertinent to the
research questions of this dissertation.
First, despite a number of initiatives to limit their influence, donors remain active and
influential in Rwanda’s aid policy decision-making process. Donors, particularly those that
are more vocal in their support of ownership, often take different approaches to exerting this
influence, avoiding formal conditionalities for a language of partnership. However, there is
little evidence to suggest that they do so at a cost to their interests or influence.
The ACHA framework has created a complex set of bodies and institutions to
coordinate, harmonize, and align donor and GoR practices. The GoR officially “chairs” these
bodies and institutions. However, donors “co-chair” them, often acting behind the scenes in
powerful ways (such as setting the agenda for the meetings). Additionally, these meeting
groups and forums are in addition to, not in place of, bilateral meetings and diplomatic visits.
At the end of the day, bilateral negotiations still supersede all commitments made in
coordination forums. As one interviewee told me, it is not difficult to figure out which
commitments are more important—those that are made via the Common Performance
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Assessment Framework, or those made through bilateral talks at the Kivu retreat (Interview
II-XII, 06.18.10). The latter takes precedent.
Second, donors’ level of commitment to the idea of ownership varies. Some donors
actively support the ACHA framework (e.g., the UK and the UN), whereas others are more
passive participants (e.g., the US), and still others do not participate at all (e.g., China and
Korea). As one interviewee told me, the Paris Declaration is supposed to get all donors, not
just those that provide budget support. However, some do a better than others (Interview IIXII, 06.18.10). My interviewees were particularly critical of the US on this point. For
example, a senior Ministry of Finance official told me that the US is probably one of his
biggest donor problems. (Interview II-V, 06.05.10), while a senior DFID official noted that
the ten commandments of Paris are lessons the Americans haven’t learned yet (Interview IXII, 11.04.09).
Third, just as with budget support, the Ministry of Finance dominates the ACHA
framework, resulting in the further marginalization of other domestic actors. Civil society has
become more visible recently, but there is reason to believe that their inclusion is mainly for
“sensitization” purposes and to pacify critics. Overwhelmingly, the reforms implemented
under the ACHA framework centralize authority in the executive branch and, in particular,
with the Ministry of Finance. The ACHA framework not only side-steps civil society,
parliament, and local government, but also limits the influence of other line ministers at the
national level. In all of my questions about donor coordination and government-donor
relationships in Rwanda, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was never mentioned. As one
interviewee put it, in Rwanda, the Minister of Finance is the donor coordinator (Interview III, 10.19.09).

139
Table 6.3 outlines how the findings from my case study of the ACHA framework
map on to the key variables of interest in this study.
Table	
  6.3:	
  Summary	
  of	
  Findings	
  

Changes in
influence over aid
policy:

Government
Policymakers

Donors

Citizens

The Ministry of Finance
has gained more
influence but is still
constrained by donor
preferences.

Donors remain very
influential and active in
development policy

Citizen influence over aid
policy decisions remains
low.

These findings are identical to those in the case study of budget support presented in the
previous chapter. The ACHA framework does appear to have altered the institutional
relationship between the GoR and its donors, but not in the ways predicted by proponents of
ownership. While the GoR has increasingly participated more in decision-making on aid
policy, donors remain influential and citizen participation has been marginal.
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Chapter	
  7 	
  

The	
  Rwandan	
  Joint	
  Governance	
  
Assessment	
  
JGA helps all of us in the direction of the Paris Declaration. In the context of the 2005 Paris
Declaration, there are injunctions to support partner country efforts to strengthen
governance and to increase aid alignment with partner country priorities. It is our firm belief
that the JGA will contribute to the implementation of this strategy by providing a basis for
reviewing governance priorities and monitoring progress.
-Anthony Kwaku Ohemeng-Boamah, UNDP Country Representative to Rwanda, 2009
The Rwandan Joint Governance Assessment (JGA) is a “jointly owned” set of
indicators that measure governance and progress in governance in Rwanda. The central
objective of the JGA is to produce a single governance assessment that both donors and the
GoR can use.125 The idea for the JGA came about in 2006, and the first report was approved
in 2008. It is arguably the first of its kind globally (RGAC 2009; Williams et al. 2009).
The JGA is different from the aid programs analyzed in the previous chapters in two
important ways. First, it is (by design) “jointly owned.” That is, donors are supposed to be
partners in decision-making processes. There is some tension between ownership approaches
that seek government control, and those that seek partnership with donors (see chapter two,
pg. 30). However, both attempt to decrease donor influence and increase the influence of
recipient-country governments. The JGA does not attempt to remove donors from the policy
decision-making processes, but it is intended to give the GoR more control and influence
over how they are measured and assessed as a government.
125

For a quick overview of the JGA and a discussion of the benefits and challenges of a joint assessment see
Williams et al. (2009).

141
Second, the JGA deals with governance, which is a highly politically sensitive topic
for the GoR.126 As was noted in chapter four, the Rwandan government has a reputation for
dismissing critiques of the regime and marginalizing and displacing dissenters. Additionally,
while the GoR and donors appear to be in congruence about economic policy, they have not
always agreed about governance. While donors have sometimes expressed concerns about
human rights, civil liberties, and freedom of expression, the GoR has continually asserted
that they must maintain consensus to preserve peace and national security. This tension is
referenced in the JGA document itself:
On this basis, five broad challenges for governance in Rwanda are discussed
below. These are necessarily selective….Everything cannot be achieved at
once, and there are priorities and trade-offs to be made. For example, the goal
of prioritising security and national reconciliation has implications for other
aspects of governance, and is reflected in the current preference for
consensual rather than adversarial politics, and strict laws prohibiting hate
speech, incitement and sectarianism. How best to balance these priorities and
manage trade-offs in the short to medium term will be a key ongoing issue.
(JGA Report 2008, 15).
Tensions about governance make the JGA a particularly interesting ownership aid program,
because it means that donor and GoR preferences are often likely to conflict. However,
tensions also presented challenges during data collection. Interviewees were likely to be less
forthcoming and documentation was likely to be less readily available and/or more
sensitized.
If the predictions of the ownership model are correct, the JGA should allow the GoR
to have more influence over decision-making on governance policy. Given that the JGA is
jointly owned, we should expect donors to remain a part of the policy process; however, they

126

One of my interviewees began his comments on the JGA by saying, ‘this is all a bit sensitive’ (Interview IXIV, 11.06.09).
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should not dominate it. Therefore, we should see evidence that the GoR is setting the
governance agenda with guidance and input from donors.
We should also see evidence that citizens have more influence over governance
policy. Evidence of this might include a more active and involved civil society, more
competitive elections, and greater domestic accountability. Not only are such predictions in
line with the ownership approach to international development, but they correspond to the
principals of good governance outlined in the JGA itself, including accountability,
responsiveness, fairness, inclusiveness, and legitimacy (JGA Report 2008, 7).127
My analysis of the JGA suggests that the government has been able to use the JGA as
a tool to increase its leverage over governance policy in Rwanda, and that donors, generally
speaking, have allowed the GoR to lead governance debates. However, this is likely at least
partly due to donor uncertainties about the stability of the Rwandan political climate. As one
of my interviewees put it, the genocide makes it less easy to challenge the government,
because no one knows the limit128 (Interview I-XVIII, 01.13.09). Additionally, the JGA has
not translated into more citizen influence. If anything, the JGA has allowed the GoR to
control the governance debate, limiting challengers and silencing critics.
The chapter is organized into three major sections. In the first section, I summarize
the JGA process thus far. In this section, I outline the global context out of which the JGA
emerged, and the motivating factors behind it. I then outline the drafting process for the first
report, which was approved in 2008, and discuss the difficulties that have plagued the
process since the first report was published.

127

The JGA also lists state capacity as a pillar of good governance.
Here my interviewee is likely referring to uncertainty over what practices and policies have the potential to
incite violence in Rwanda.
128
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In the second section, I present three findings that are directly related to the research
questions of this dissertation. First, civil society, parliament, and local government have not
been active throughout the JGA process, and their recent involvement has been somewhat
superficial. Second, the body that oversees the JGA, the Rwandan Government Advisory
Council, is anything but independent from the national government. Third, the JGA and its
related survey have been used to dismiss unfavorable reviews of government practices. In the
final section, I map my findings from this case study onto my variables of interest.

7.1.	
   Summary	
  of	
  the	
  JGA	
  Process	
  	
  	
  	
  
Governance	
  assessments	
  and	
  the	
  Paris	
  Declaration	
  	
  

Since the mid-1990s, governance has been increasingly linked to poverty reduction
and human development goals. Consequently, a number of governance assessments have
emerged to track progress and backsliding on governance in developing countries. According
to a recent survey by the OECD, governance assessments largely serve the needs and
concerns of individual donor agencies. Therefore, they are not well linked with governance
processes and concerns in recipient-countries and are often at odds with the 2005 Paris
Declaration (OECD 2008).
In an attempt to be more in line with the Paris Agenda, research on governance
assessments has increasingly emphasized peer and country-led assessments and highlighted
the importance of national institutions and local expertise. Examples of peer assessments
include the African Peer Review Mechanism (which Rwanda participated in), the peer
reviews overseen by the OECD, and the peer reviews needed to accede to the European
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Union. The only widespread example of a country-led assessment is International IDEA’s
State of Democracy assessment methodology.129
County-led and peer assessments are increasing popular, because they are thought to
foster a domestic dialogue on governance; something donor assessments typically are not
thought to be able to do (OECD 2009b). Instead of relying on “naming and shaming,”
domestic and peer-based assessments are believed to stimulate good governance from the
bottom-up by fostering a national discourse and debate on the topic. A recent document from
the UNDP claims:
…the value of a country-led governance assessment is that it serves as a critical
accountability and transparency mechanism for governance performance.
Democratic governance is more likely to be sustained if targets for attainment
and expectations of how governments should perform are formulated by those
who live within the political system. When local actors participate in the
assessment process, it stimulates their demand for governance information and
a demand for greater accountability from government (UNDP 2009).
That is, instead of just evaluating governance based on externally derived indicators,
assessments that are locally owned are supposed to promote a vibrant national dialogue on
governance. This dialogue is then thought to prompt more sustainable and meaningful
changes in governance practices by engaging citizens in debates on the policies and practices
that govern their lives.
It is within this global context that the idea for the Rwandan Joint Governance
Assessment emerged. The JGA assesses governance in three areas: ruling justly, government
effectiveness, and investment climate,130 and is monitored by both donors and the GoR. The

129

An overview of the methodology is available at http://www.idea.int/sod/.
Items included under the “ruling justly” category include establishing and maintaining security, national
reconciliation and transitional justice, rule of law, human rights and civil liberties, political rights, and voice and
accountability. Items included under the government effectiveness category include public financial
management, corruption, decentralization, public service delivery, and public service reform. Items included
130

145
process is co-chaired by the Minister for Local Governance and a lead donor,131 and overseen
by a joint steering committee, which is made up of donors and GoR officials. A technical
working group, led by a think-tank called the Rwandan Governance Advisory Council
(RGAC), supports the steering committee.
The JGA is the first of its kind globally and attempts to satisfy both the needs of
donors to assess governance in the contexts in which they are working and the desire for
more country ownership of governance assessment. Figure 7.1 is taken from a report by the
consultants that drafted the first JGA report, and depicts the individual and shared the
concerns of donors and recipient-countries. The reader will note that the Paris Principals is
the first joint concern listed.

under the “investment climate” category include ease of doing business, corporate law and governance, private
sector advocacy, and state-business relations (JGA Report 2008).
131
The first report was co-chaired by Victoria Kwakwa, then World Bank Country Manager, and Protais
Musoni, then Minister of Local Government (JGA Report 2008).
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Figure	
  7.1:	
  Purposes	
  and	
  Users	
  of	
  Governance	
  Assessments	
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Source:	
  Williams	
  et	
  al.	
  (2009,	
  3)	
  
Motivations	
  

According to several sources, the original impetus for the JGA came from “the top,”
President Paul Kagame (Musoni 2008, slide four; Interview II-XXIV, 07.13.10). During a
press conference, President Kagame challenged those present to create a dialogue guided by
facts, and challenged development partners to work with the government to develop
governance indictors. Following the press conference, the Ministry of Local Government
(MINALOC) drafted the terms of reference and the process got underway (Interview I-XVII,
11.10.09).
According to Professor Anastase Syhaka, who (in his capacity as Executive Secretary
of the Rwandan Governance Advisory Council) oversees the JGA, the JGA came about
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largely for two reasons. First, the JGA was justified on the grounds that it would result in a
single assessment that both the GoR and donors can support (AfricaTimes 2009). The
Rwandan Ministry of Local Government must respond to multiple requests and visits from
the external evaluators, consuming a large amount of time in a ministry that is already low on
capacity. On their side, donors often spend a great deal of time funding, responding to, and
deciding what is accurate from a myriad of reports on Rwanda. By producing one report that
all agree on, the transaction costs of both donors and the GoR are thought to decrease.
Second, the JGA was justified on the grounds that it would result in an assessment
that is locally produced and context sensitive (AfricaTimes 2009). While donors often
highlight the coordination and alignment facilitated by the JGA, the GoR has increasingly
emphasized the need for “local” reports, contrasting the JGA with “external” governance
assessments, such as Freedom House and the Mo Ibrahim Index. The GoR critique is that
external reports are often based on data collected from fly-in and fly-out missions and often
do not reflect the realities on the ground.
While the GoR is not the first to make this critique of governance indices, their
response is also at least partially defensive posturing. Several of my interviewees noted a
desire by the GoR to combat negative governance reports with a report of their own. They
pointed out that the JGA followed critical reports by the World Bank and Transparency
International (Interview I-XVII, 11.10.09; Interview I-XVIII, 11.13.09). On external reports,
Rwanda fairs well on indicators measuring corruption and government effectiveness.
However, the country often gets poor marks on measures of voice and accountability,
political rights and civil liberties (see table 4.5, pg. 71).
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An employee of the Ministry of Local Government who was actively involved with
the JGA’s drafting told me that one of the big reasons for the JGA was controversy. While
some reports were saying Rwanda is doing well and has a visionary government, others were
saying that there was no civil society involvement, no freedom of media, etc. (Interview IXVII, 11.10.09).132 According to another interviewee, “business was getting complicated;”
there were two versions of the same story (Interview I-XXII, 11.16.09). Another interviewee
put it more directly, saying that the GoR was “pissed off” at external people coming in,
spending little to no time in Rwanda, and making judgments (Interview I-XII, 11.4.09).
The	
  drafting	
  process	
  

After the initial idea for the JGA was conceived, the first report took time to realize.
One interviewee blamed the delay on “inept UNDP procurement” but securing an agency to
take on the report also proved to be difficult. Two other agencies were hired before a UK
firm, the Policy Practice, finally began the project in late 2007 (Interview II-XXIV, 07.13.10;
Interview I-XXII, 11.16.09).133 Policy Practice conducted approximately a month of intense
fieldwork before producing a first draft of the report.
The consultants originally felt very welcomed and were told nothing was off-limits.
However, at approximately the third meeting of the JGA steering committee, things turned

132

The same employee also told me that the JGA came about because they (the government) were able to
engage development partners in dialogue. Conditions on both sides allowed this. You have a government that is
committed to open dialogue and improvements and a global focus on ownership and partnership. There was
finally an understanding that no matter what the assessments said, in the end ownership has to be with the
government. Have to trust the process (Interview I-XVII, 11.10.09). Another interviewee told me the fact that
the government is open to assessment is special. It’s rare in African countries to have that openness, especially
in the highest office, and donors didn’t think they would be open to assessment (Interview I-XXII, 11.16.09).
133
One reportedly dropped out because of personal reasons and another because of cold feet (Interview IIXXIV, 07.13.10).
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contentious. Controversy over the document was eventually so high that the GoR rejected the
first draft (Interview I-XII, 11.04.09; Interview II-XXIV, 07.13.10).
The most controversial issues in the first draft revolved around the introduction to the
report, which was included to provide historical and contextual background. The consultants
originally believed (naïvely) that their comments in this section were uncontroversial, and
were caught off-guard when they turned out to be highly contentious to the GoR.134
Particularly difficult passages included comments about human rights abuses by both sides
during the civil war and genocide, commentary about Rwanda being a hierarchical society,
and a discussion about the recent change in the official language from French to English.
Furthermore, in an attempt to be independent and credible, the first draft referenced critics of
the regime. Such citations led the GoR to proclaim charges of genocide denial (Interview IIXXIV, 07.13.10).135
According to one of the original consultants, a key challenge for the Policy Practice
was confusion regarding its intended purpose. On one hand, it was suppose to be a joint
assessment between donors and the GoR. On the other hand, it was supposed to be an
international report. After the first draft was rejected, the Policy Practice realized that they
could not maintain independence, and the firm decided they could not “put their names to it.”
They therefore shifted their role to that of a “facilitator” (Interview II-XXIV, 07.13.10). As a
result, Policy Project did not have as much of claim on the document as originally intended
(Interview I-III, 10.23.09).

134

History has often been a point of contention in Rwanda, so much so that history hasn’t been taught in schools
since 1994. As Hayman notes, “The ‘history’ proposed by the GoR is one where pre-European arrival Rwanda
was characterized by unity and general peace and that hatred and sectarianism were sown by the Europeans”
(Hayman 2006, 143).
135
This is a common tactic of the regime.
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A second report was then drafted, this one largely dropping the entire historical
section and the discussion of ethnicity (Interview I-XII, 11.4.09).136 As one of my
interviewees put it, the GoR went through and slashed the document (Interview I-III,
10.23.09). The second draft (which my interviewee called a “consensus document”) was
much better received by the GoR and was finally approved in the fall of 2008. Table 7.1
summarizes the JGA process from the drafting of the terms of reference to the first report’s
approval.
Table	
  7.1:	
  Timeline	
  of	
  Joint	
  Governance	
  Assessment	
  Report	
  
Year
2006

Month
December

2007

January
February/October

2008

January
April
July
September
November
December

Activities
Engaged development partners; approved the terms of reference;
formed the steering and technical committees
Established funding mechanisms and contract management;
DFID and EU contributed funds while UNDP managed the
contract
A lengthy international bidding process to procure the assessing
firm. Policy Practice, Ltd. Finally engaged.
Inception report examined and approved by steering committee
Workshops and interviews begin (January 30th)
Draft presented to steering committee – found inaccurate
Final report examined and adopted by the steering committee
(July 28th)
Final report is sent to cabinet for consideration (Sept. 6th) and
endorsed (Sept. 12th)
Approved by donors at 2008 Development Partners Meeting
Formal launch

In general, I found that my interviewees expressed satisfaction with the first JGA
report, noting its imperfections but still suggesting it was a positive step forward. One donor
representative was highly critical of the document, telling me it was a sensitized document
and only reflected the government’s priorities (Interview I-XXI, 11.16.09). However, another
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As one of my interviewees put it, there will not be agreement on Rwandan history for at least another 50
years (Interview I-XII, 11.4.09).

151
noted that it actually dealt with a number of controversial items and allowed them to have a
lot of frank discussions (Interview I-XII, 11.4.09).
Moving	
  forward:	
  The	
  future	
  of	
  the	
  JGA	
  

The first JGA report established a set of indictors for an annual governance
assessment. The idea was to produce a yearly report that would note progress and/or
backsliding. However, there has been no follow-up report since the original was issued in
2008,137 even though work has been ongoing. In late 2009 and early 2010, a countrywide
survey was conducted to collect data, and, during the summer of 2010, a new team of
consultants began drafting a new report. However, the second report has been delayed
several more times and, as of the time of this writing, has yet to be released.
There are multiple reasons for the continual delays (including procurement), but my
interviewees most often noted coordination and capacity challenges. Many of the indicators
did not have baseline data until late 2009 or early 2010. This means that progress or
backsliding cannot be determined until another survey is conducted in 2011 (Interview II-IV,
06.05.10). Furthermore, the number of indicators has fluctuated. At one time, there were
more than 400 indicators, but that number has since decreased to a more manageable 45.
One interviewee told me that JGA process is difficult because it is hard to get people
together; they are still figuring out everybody’s role (Interview I-VI, 10.30.09). Another told
me that the process takes up way too much time and is not efficient. He went on to note that
there are lots of constraints because of government capacity (Interview I-XI, 11.04.09).
According to another interviewee, the process is challenged by issues such as the size of the
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It has now been recognized that an annual report is not feasible (Interview I-XVIII, 11.13.09). One of my
interviewees suggested that the report should be biennial, although even this appears to be difficult to
accomplish (Interview I-XI, 11.04.09).

152
committee overseeing the JGA, the fact that the government is relatively new, and that there
are not a lot of firms with expertise in this area (Interview I-XVIII, 11.13.09).

7.2.	
  	
   Findings	
  
The JGA is hypothesized to allow recipient countries to be able to exercise more
control over governance policy by allowing the GoR to have a say over the indicators that are
used to assess their governance practices. By its very existence, the JGA gives the GoR more
of a say over governance assessment. However, donors are in no way obliged to use the JGA.
While several of my interviewees expressed interest in replacing their own internal
assessments with the JGA, none have done so (at least entirely). While the JGA allows the
GoR more influence over how they are assessed in regards to governance, donors are not
required to listen to these assessments.
Furthermore, my analysis of the JGA suggests three findings pertinent to the research
questions of this dissertation. First, civil society, parliament, and local governance have not
been active throughout the JGA process, and their recent involvement has been largely
superficial. Second, the body that oversees the JGA, the Rwandan Government Advisory
Council, is anything but independent from the national government. Third, the JGA and its
related survey have been used to dismiss unfavorable reviews of the government practices.
The following section outlines each one of these findings.
Involvement	
  by	
  civil	
  society,	
  parliament,	
  and	
  local	
  government	
  	
  

Similar to the previous case studies, my JGA case study reveals little indication that
domestic actors outside the central government play an influential role in the process. This is
perhaps not surprising when one notes that, despite the fact that most Rwandans do not speak
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English, the JGA was originally written in English (it has now be translated in to
Kinyarwanda). This suggests that the document was originally targeted towards donors and a
more global audience, not Rwandan citizens.
The JGA was the subject of a short case study in a document prepared for a
conference on “Governance Assessments, Domestic Accountability and Agency Reform” in
Madrid, Spain in 2009. The case study, based on a mission to Rwanda by the Oslo
Governance Centre found “Low awareness and lack of involvement among national
stakeholders beyond the executive office and ministry of local governance” (Meyer, Foerde,
and Molanaers 2009, 13: emphasis in original). According to a short report on the case study,
the civil society platform spokesperson told members of the fact-finding mission to Rwanda
that the JGA was not much use to civil society, and a member of parliament told them that
the JGA was for the executive not parliament. Additionally, they report that the ombudsman
told them that the JGA was primarily for donor relations. Given this evidence, the case study
claims that the JGA is driven by the executive and MINALOC. They conclude, “[t]here is
little to no ownership of the JGA among stakeholders that are charged with oversight of the
government, including parliament and the committees on politics and good governance, civil
society, the ombudsman, the judiciary or the auditor general” (Meyer, Foerde, and Molanaers
2009, 15).
My interviewees made similar points. For example, one interviewee told me that
although parliament is monitored by the JGA, it is not represented in discussions on JGA
proceedings (Interview II-XV, 06.23.10). Another told me that he hasn’t seen a link between
the JGA and parliament; they maybe working on complementary things, but not because of
the JGA. He went on to say that research shows that civil society is not even aware of the
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indicators; therefore, they aren’t using them. They maybe are working on some of them
indirectly, but if they don’t know the JGA indicators are there, they can’t be using them
(Interview II-IV, 06.05.10).
Another interviewee told me that, if you really want the process to be “Rwandan,”
you need civil society involvement. Therefore, civil society is a part of the steering
committee. However, they are not involved in the day to day; it is “not their baby.” When
civil society is involved, it is through a representative of the Rwandan Civil Society Platform
(see pg. 125). The representative is only one person, and that person sits on the steering
committee. However, the real work is done on the technical committee, where they have no
input (Interview I-XVIII, 01.13.09). As a result, civil society input on the JGA has been
marginal to say the least.
Independence	
  of	
  the	
  Rwandan	
  Governance	
  Advisory	
  Council	
  	
  

The JGA technical committee is chaired by a newly minted think tank called the
Rwandan Governance Advisory Council (RGAC). Although the council was originally
created to oversee the JGA, they are increasingly expanding their activities. Their mission
statement reflects this larger purpose:
The mission of the RGAC…is to promote the principals of good governance
and monitor the practices of good governance in public institutions and
conduct research in civic, political and corporate domains, for achieving
institutions accountability, sustainable development and prosperity (RGAC
n.d.).
Besides overseeing the JGA, the council also organizes policy debates and provides a link
between national, regional, and international think tanks (Interview I-V, 10.29.09). In 2010,
the council piloted a project called the “mobile school of governance,” which translated the
JGA from English to Kinyarwanda and brought it in to local communities.
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The council has grown exponentially over the past year, both in terms of personnel
and mandate. When I first visited the council in October 2009, its small staff had only two
researchers, three support staff, and the Executive Secretary. The staff barely filled the large
space it had recently been allotted. When I returned only eight months later, the current staff
of fifteen was overrunning the space. The council is supposed to become a board, similar to
the Rwandan Development Board, in the near future. This change, which would take place
based on an act of Parliament, would expand and change the council’s mandate, as well as
bring additional institutions under it (Interview II-XV, 06.23.10).
The RGAC behaves in ways that make it appear to be a non-political research
organization. It is headed by a professor (and this is always noted) and staffed by individuals
with master’s degrees in population studies and statistics. Just recently, the RGAC introduced
a “peer-reviewed” journal,138 and, in August 2010, the council was asked to observe the
presidential elections and carry out research on several aspects of the electoral process.
However, despite appearances, the RGAC is actually a government body. Despite
repeated promises to sever ties, the RGAC remains a subsidiary of the Ministry of Local
Government (although it has moved from its original location inside the ministry).
Given this, it is not surprising that the RGAC often advocates for current GoR activities.
Many of RGAC’s publications look more like campaign advertisements than
governance assessments. A recently created Facebook page for the council is dominated by
links to positive press on the Rwandan government, particularly President Paul Kagame,139
and the council’s reports on governance largely ignore critics of the regime.

138
139

How the peer-review process works has not be specified by the RGAC.
See http://www.facebook.com/pages/Rwanda-Governance-Advisory-Council-RGAC/152531114805656
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The first article published in the aforementioned peer-reviewed journal summarizes
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for Rwanda (see table 4.5, pg. 71).
While the paper does not completely ignore negative findings, it emphasizes areas where the
GoR is doing well and glosses over weaknesses (RGAC 2010b). The council’s report on the
2010 presidential elections also focuses on positive findings, completely ignoring alleged
transgressions (RGAC 2010a). A recent publication on corruption in Rwanda (entitled
“Promoting Good Governance in Rwanda: An Out Standing Pace Towards a Corruption-Free
Society”) reads like a flyer for President Paul Kagame. It begins with a quote by and a photo
of Kagame and concludes as follows:
…different indexes (WGI, CPI, EABI, RGAC’s data) converge on the
conclusion: Rwanda is making an outstanding pace towards a corruptionfree society, a trend that is likely to be maintained. This situation results from
several measures that have been put in place by the Government including
institutional setup, mindset change and adequate enforcement of rules and
regulations that aim at completely eradicating corruption. If the trend is
maintained, can Rwanda aspire to become a corruption-free society before
2020? At this pace, there is no doubt that Rwanda can catch up with Asian
tigers in control of corruption before the end of H.E Paul Kagame’s term (20102017), the champion of the campaign against corruption in Rwanda (RGAC
2011b, 5: emphasis in original).
This is not to say that members of the RGAC staff are ill intentioned or uncommitted to
better governance. However, either because the political climate does not allow them to, or
because they are ideologically committed to the current regime, more often than not the
council clearly acts in ways that are intended to bolster the exact government they are
supposed to objectively assess.
Dismissal	
  of	
  External	
  Indices	
  	
  	
  

The tendency of the council to advocate for the status quo is especially apparent in
the RGAC’s response to external governance indices. RGAC staff repeatedly communicated
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to me that external indices don’t involve them in their research. According to one
representative of the RGAC, Freedom House and Mo Ibrahim rely on old data instead of just
talking to ministers (Interview I-XV, 11.06.09). Consequently, “real” information is missing
and the indices cannot be seen as valid or taken as a realistic portrayal of what is actually
occurring on the ground. At the 2010 DPM, Kagame concluded his opening address at
follows:
…because we want to promote a more reciprocal approach to good
governance and development, our Government is constantly working with
development partners to develop mechanisms that allow parties to conduct
evidence-based assessments of our governance systems and practices. We
welcome your support so the real story is not missed by some so-called
experts and governance ratings (Kagame 2010, 4: my emphasis).
The external index that has received the most attention (and criticism) is the Mo
Ibrahim Index. The Mo Ibrahim Index is billed as an “African” index of governance, and this
has given it prominence throughout the continent. In June 2010, the Rwandan Governance
Advisory Council invited staff members from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation to Rwanda for
“consultative meetings” prior to the release of its 2010 index.140
In each of the nine indices issued by Mo Ibrahim, Rwanda’s aggregate rank has been
somewhere in the middle of the pack (ranking anywhere from 29-32). In the most current
index, issued on October 2010, Rwanda ranked 31 out of 53, receiving high marks for
sustainable economic opportunity, but low marks for safety and rule of law (see table 7.2).
	
  

140

The signature component of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which was established by the wealthy Sudanese
businessman of the same name, is its governance index. Similar to other governance indexes, such as Freedom
House or the World Bank Good Governance Indicators, the Mo Ibrahim Index assesses African countries on a
variety of criteria pertaining to governance. However, in contrast to other indexes, the data is not collected by
the Index itself but is collected from a variety of other indexes and independent sources. The scores for each
indicator are then combined to produce scores in four broad categories (safety and rule of law, participation and
human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development) and an overall score. Lastly, from
these scores, a ranking of African countries is compiled.
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Table	
  7.2:	
  Rwanda’s	
  Rankings	
  in	
  the	
  2010	
  Mo	
  Ibrahim	
  Index	
  
Ranking	
  out	
  of	
  fifty-‐three	
  countries	
  

Overall 2010 Safety and
Ibrahim Index Rule of Law
31

39

Participation
and Human
Rights
34

Sustainable
Economic
Opportunity
10

Human
Development
25

Source:	
  Mo	
  Ibrahim	
  Foundation	
  

I had the opportunity to observe the meetings between the RGAC, other government
officials, and Mo Ibrahim staff.141 On one hand, the government should be praised for
engaging the foundation. According to a staff member of Mo Ibrahim, this was the first time
the foundation had consulted with an African government about the index, and governance
indices certainly have problems worth exploring in a policy dialogue. However, from my
vantage point, the meeting quickly became more about critiquing and “othering” all external
indices than engaging on the pluses and minuses of the Ibrahim Index.
There were a total of four sessions during the policy dialogue, one for each of the four
broad categories of the index. A representative of the Index first presented the results for
2010.142 Then a representative of the Governance Advisory Council responded, and the floor
was opened to questions. The presentations by the council staff critiqued the results of the
Mo Ibrahim report based on the argument that “local” data, most of it from the JGA and its
corresponding surveys, showed a different picture. As the report on the dialogue puts it,
“…it was found that some data displayed in Mo Ibrahim report were in total contradiction
not only with recorded and updated local data but also with the reality on the ground”
(RGAC 2011a, 4).

141

I attended a daylong workshop and evening reception. According the report on the meeting, a smaller
meeting also took place to following day to draft final resolutions (RGAC 2011a).
142
The foundation, quite strategically, asked African scholars who sit on their advisory council to present the
findings.
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The response by Mo Ibrahim to this critique was that their index needs to have crossnational data in order to make comparisons, and the data must come from a reputable,
international source to be credible. Therefore, if the council and the GoR see problems with
data used for the index, they need to supply better data to the various sources used by Mo
Ibrahim to calculate their score. This conversation resulted in a stalemate of sorts, with the
two sides largely talking past one another.
What was particularly fascinating about the conversation is how quickly the
comments from RGAC staff and other GoR representatives in attendance, particularly the
Ombudsman, turned into a blanket critique of all external indices. Additionally, things that
are valid critiques of governance in Rwanda, such as media freedom, were completely
dismissed as inaccurate, and concerns about reliability and international credibility were
outwardly ignored.
Even more telling is how the meeting was used when the 2010 Index was released in
October 2010. Within three days, no less than three articles in the government-leaning New
Times blasted the Mo Ibrahim Index and a nine-page official response were released. The
New Times first reported that:
According to government, there was no effort at all to use some of the latest
data collected and certified by different government bodies responsible for
research and data collection during this year’s ranking, hence the credibility of
the findings of the index questioned (Kagire 2010a).
In another New Times article, this time an opinion piece by a Senior Economic Advisor to the
President, the claim of bad data is reframed, this time with slightly more specificity:
Examination of research used to arrive at the above index, leads one to
question the methodology and variables used by Mo Ibrahim Foundation to
arrive at their inconclusive index of governance in Africa. African data
sources used in social research such as this one, have been known to be
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inaccurate, thus increasing the margin of error, that finally distorts results
obtained from such research (Mamasseh 2010).
In a third article, this time authored by Professor Syhaka, the claim is of bad data is driven
home along with the “we told them so” argument:
What is clear is that is that the index is not based on facts. Even on the last Mo
Ibrahim report, the government reacted over data discrepancies. We showed
them areas where there were data discrepancies, they promised to make sure
to rely on more accurate data next time…If you analyze properly you see that
whoever fills in this data has a plan to undermine or deliberately soil the
image of the country (quoted in Kagire 2010b, my emphasis).
Professor Syhaka’s statement also personalizes the index’s findings, arguing that the use of
bad data is intentional and malicious. This follows a pattern identified by Reyntjens, who
argues that, “Voices critical of the regime become victims of character assassination,
intimidation or even physical threat” (2004, 202).143
The attack continued at the November 2010 Development Partners Meeting, where
James Musoni, the current Minister of Local Government, proclaimed that “Some external
people and NGOs use baseless frameworks and indexes and have been misrepresenting
Rwanda’s governance status” (Musoni 2010, slide 8). Musoni went on to argue that the major
external challenges to governance include:
•
•
•

143

Some groups/ “experts” consistently define Rwanda contrary to our nation
building policy and process;
Mindset of “One size fits all” infringing on our freedom to define our political
system (consensus vs. majoritarian);
Negative/ biased reports and indexes on Rwanda’s governance

For example, the GoR condemned the International Crisis Group after they issued a report very critical of the
democratization process in Rwanda. The GoR issued a statement, claiming that “For the last two years,
International Crisis Group (ICG) has persistently waged a misinformation campaign designed to not only
malign the Government of Rwanda, but also to undermine the efforts of the Rwandan people regarding national
unity and reconciliation.” They go on to name particular ICG officials claiming that they “deliberately used the
ICG to advance the destructive agenda of negative organizations, including known and recorded terrorist
groups…” (GoR 2002b).
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•

Resistance to accept country’s socio-economic and political transformation
(Musoni 2010, slide 21).

Musoni contrasted these challenges to local challenges, such as poverty.
Instead of fostering a debate about governance in Rwanda, it appears that the JGA is
sometimes used to defend current practices and avoid addressing critiques. As one
interviewee told me, the government often rejects criticism; they want to be seen as perfect.
(Interview I-XI, 11.04.09). (He went on to speculate that they are trying to prevent
opposition.) Instead of inviting debate and discourse on governance, the JGA appears to
allow the GoR an opportunity to control the debate on governance.

7.3.	
   Concluding	
  Remarks	
  
Table 7.3 maps the findings of this case study on to the dependent variables of this
dissertation. The findings are slightly different from the previous case studies, as donors
appear more willing to let the GoR lead policy decision-making processes on governance
than those on development and aid policy. This is not necessarily surprising, given some
donors’ reluctance to get overly-involved with governance issues in recipient-countries,
particular in contexts like Rwanda that have a history of conflict and violence.
Table	
  7.3:	
  Summary	
  of	
  Findings	
  

Changes in influence
over governance policy:

Government
Policymakers

Donors

Citizens

The executive is largely
unchallenged publically
by donors regarding
governance practices.

Donors remain very
moderately involved in
governance policy

Citizen influence over
governance policy
decisions remains low.

This does not mean that donors are completely passive regarding governance. As was
noted in chapter five, both the Swedes and the Dutch withdrew budget support due to
concerns over Rwandan military activity in the DRC. However, donors often remain

162
relatively silent on governance issues in Rwanda, at least publicly. One interviewee told me,
the government doesn’t respond well to criticism, but things will sometimes change if they
are pointed out discreetly. She went on to note that donors have been remarkably silent on
current events, referring to the tensions surrounding the 2010 presidential elections
(Interview II-XXII, 07.02.10).
Even more clearly, the JGA has further centralized debates on governance at the
national level. Civil society, local governments, and even parliament are largely excluded
from debates of consequence on governance in Rwanda. Political competition remains low,
as do domestic accountability mechanisms. As a result, citizen influence over governance
policy remains small.
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Chapter	
  8 	
  

Conclusion	
  
The analyses presented in the previous chapters of this dissertation suggests that new
aid programs designed to foster ownership in post-genocide and civil war Rwanda have not
actually led to ownership, as idealized by the OECD and other bilateral and multilateral
donors. Instead, aid programs, such as budget support or the Joint Governance Assessment,
have resulted in what I call in this chapter “centralized collaboration.” By this, I mean a
condition in which multilateral and bilateral donors work with a small group of domestic
actors to design and implement socio-economic development schemes.
In this concluding chapter, I first summarize the empirical analysis found in chapters
four through seven of this dissertation. My case studies of ownership aid programs in
Rwanda suggest that government policymakers actively seek to influence decision-making
processes. However, the aid programs have not resulted in the outcomes predicted by
proponents of the ownership approach in two key ways.
One, donors have not retreated, nor given control over development to recipient
countries; rather they have sought alternative ways of influencing the policy process. Two,
what we see emerging in Rwanda is not broad national ownership. Instead, donors work with
an elite group of government policymakers. I call this type of aid relationship “centralized
collaboration,” and contrast it to the old “donorship” relationship and the idealized
“ownership” relationship outlined in chapter two of this dissertation.
I then argue that evidence from my case studies suggests that the new relationship
between donors and the GoR is largely the result of three things: donor preferences, the
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amount of leverage the GoR is able to exert over donors, and existing state-society
relationships. Given that there are several unique features of the Rwandan case, my findings
regarding the impact of the ownership approach in Rwanda are unlikely to be directly
generalizable to other cases; i.e., we will not necessarily find the exact same outcome in all
aid-dependent states. However, I argue there are broad similarities between many aiddependent states and these three factors (donor preferences, leverage, and state-society
relations) provide a framework for assessing and analyzing donor-government relationships
and ownership aid programs in other aid-dependent states.
I conclude by outlining four policy implications of my findings. One, the recent
emphasis on ownership within international development is laced with faulty assumptions.
Two, while donor-government relationships are susceptible to change, change is likely to
occur around the periphery rather than at the core. Three, when considering the impact of
ownership aid programs, it is important to consider the existing political context. Four,
ownership aid programs do not solve the broken feedback loop in foreign assistance. Each of
these policy implications are important for development practitioners to keep in mind.

8.1.	
   Centralized	
  Collaboration	
  	
  	
  
Collectively, my analysis of ownership aid programs in Rwanda suggests that such
programs have altered the nature of government-donor relationships in Rwanda—but not in
the ways predicted. Donor influence has not declined but has instead changed form.
Additionally, citizen influence remains low. In the following section, I first summarize my
empirical findings, tying together the three cases studies presented in the previous chapters. I
then argue that what we see emerging in Rwanda is not ownership (nor donorship), but what
I call “centralized collaboration.”
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Summary	
  of	
  empirical	
  findings	
  	
  

My case studies of ownership aid programs suggest that, in Rwanda, government
policymakers actively seek to influence the decision-making process. Through initiatives
such as the Aid Policy (pg. 116), the Division of Labour (pg. 131), and the Donor
Performance Assessment Framework (pg. 100), the GoR has asserted itself into decisionmaking processes that have historically been dominated by donors.
My interviewees were often quick to point this out. For example, one interviewee
noted that, in Rwanda, there is strong leadership, and they know how they want to guide you.
She went on to say that the GoR is very confident and “tells us no sometimes” (Interview IVII, 10.30.09). As another interviewee suggested, this likely makes Rwanda interesting and
different from than other places (Interview II-XXIII, 07.02.10).
By presenting themselves in this manner, the GoR fulfills Whitfield and her
colleagues’ ownership criteria of non-negotiability and confidence (Whitfield 2009). The
drive and rhetoric of the GoR regarding ownership has caught the attention of Rwandan
donors and has resulted in a language of partnerships and collaboration in Kigali. However,
ownership aid programs have not resulted in the outcomes predicted by proponents of the
ownership approach in two key ways.
One, donors have not retreated in the way often assumed by proponents of ownership.
Rather than granting control to government policymakers, evidence from my case studies
suggests that, in Rwanda, donors have merely sought additional means of influencing the
policy process. For example, they have increased technical assistance, stepped-up the policy
dialogue, and developed joint initiatives with the GoR.
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As outlined in chapter two, donors’ unwillingness to relinquish their influence is not
surprising. Asking donors to give up their influence in aid-dependent states amounts to
asking them to voluntarily give up control over vast sums of money that they are charged
with using wisely for diplomatic, development, and/or commercial purposes. Not only is this
unlikely, but it is not necessarily optimal from a development standpoint. It would, in
essence, amount to granting complete control over vast amounts of money to states suffering
from a variety of political and economic challenges.
However, this finding does challenge a narrative that is increasingly emerging from
Rwandan scholars, which depicts Rwanda as having “policy independence,” despite a great
deal of aid dependence (Zorbas 2011). It is clear that the GoR often asserts itself and has
attempted to gain more influence over policy decision-making in Rwanda. As Straus and
Waldorf note,
The RPF skillfully plays international donors: it exploits donor guilt over the
genocide, invokes the Paris Principals on aid effectiveness, makes defiant
assertions about Western neo-colonialism and Rwandan self-reliance, and
adopts donor preferences and rhetoric on issues its considers peripheral and
unthreatening (like gender mainstreaming) (2011, 15).
However, this does not mean that donors have simply given up their influence, or that the
GoR has “policy independence.”
The GoR’s hard line on donor influence has likely been somewhat effective regarding
donor involvement in governance, where donors are less likely to challenge the GoR for fear
of the unknown and renewed violence. However, regarding economic issues, the GoR has not
pushed donors aside. Instead, donors and the GoR often work in highly collaborative ways
that appear to be mutually beneficial. Instead of donors retreating, many have merely
changed their means of influence, working with the state instead of issuing commands from

167
above. In other words, the nature of donor-government relationships has changed in Rwanda;
not because donors have given up their influence, but because they have changed their
tactics. This allows the GoR to maintain a hard line on donor involvement, and donors to
appear to be upholding the Paris Principals. Under this arrangement, donors get to maintain
their influence, while the GoR retains billions of dollars in development aid.
Second, what we see emerging in Rwanda is not broad national ownership. Instead,
donors work with an elite group of government policymakers. As one interviewee told me,
Rwanda relies on a small group of highly-skilled people (Interview I-VIII, 11.02.09). The
case studies presented in the previous chapters suggest that ownership aid programs only
exacerbate centralization in Rwanda. Poverty reduction strategies, budget support, and the
ACHA framework strengthen the authority of the Ministry of Finance, and the JGA allows
for the discourse on governance in Rwanda to be further regulated and controlled.
It is unclear how much of this is intentional. As one interviewee pointed out, when
donors need quick results (two to three years) they work with government (Interview IXVIII, 01.13.09). Capacity remains low in Rwanda and civil society has not strongly asserted
itself. Therefore, when and if particular government agencies assert themselves, it seems
reasonable for donors to latch on to these bodies. At the same time, it does seem likely that
the current regime deliberately seeks out ways to perpetuate its authority in Rwanda.
Regardless of intentions, it is clear that the average Rwandan’s influence on policy
remains marginal. As one interviewee put it, ownership is serious here, but where is the
strength in the system? It is all very top down. Rwandans are not really involved. There are
key persons in the ministries that drive all the thinking. There is not enough involvement by
others. It’s a very autocratic way of doing things (Interview II-XIII, 06.18.10).
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Neither	
  donorship	
  nor	
  ownership	
  

Historically, donors have sought to influence development from the outside. Under
the “donorship” approach, donors either used monetary incentives and top-down
conditionalities to pressure recipient countries to make what they saw as needed reforms, or
funded stand-alone, donor-determined aid projects. Both are now thought to lead to
development strategies that are unsustainable and out of touch with the actual needs of aid
beneficiaries.
Alternatively, under the new ownership approach, control is thought to shift to
recipient countries. Instead of donors calling the shots, recipient countries are supposed to
dictate the terms of their own development through an inclusive process involving multiple
domestic actors. This is supposed to close the broken feedback loop in foreign assistance,
allowing aid beneficiaries to have a say over the development policies and practices that
impact their daily lives.
However, the situation in Rwanda looks like neither the old donorship approach, nor
the new ownership approach. Instead, my case studies of ownership aid programs in Rwanda
suggest that the new emphasis on ownership has resulted in an alternative aid relationship,
which I call “centralized collaboration.” Under this type of aid relationship, policy decisionmaking is a result of input from a select group of domestic actors in close collaboration with
donors (see table 8.1).
Table	
  8.1:	
  Alternative	
  Aid	
  Relationships	
  
Donorship:
Ownership:
Centralized
Collaboration:

Policy decision-making is a result of…
donor priorities and demands.
an inclusive process, involving multiple domestic actors.
input from a select group of domestic actors in close
collaboration with donors
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Instead of pressuring from the outside, donors increasingly exert influence from the
inside. Donors, particularly those who advocate for ownership approaches, increasingly
appear to engage with the state. Instead of working against it, they work with it and through
it. The result has been a relationship between donors and the GoR that is less hierarchical and
outwardly antagonistic. However, Rwandan donors are certainly not subservient to the
government. Instead of relinquishing authority, donors merely shift their role to one that that
is less visible and more technical. This qualitative change was most apparent in those donors,
like the United Kingdom, that emphasize ownership.
At the same time, my case studies suggest that, rather than opening up the Rwandan
political space, the new emphasis on ownership has further centralized authority into the
hands of a select group of domestic actors. While the emphasis on ownership has not led
donors to abandon their influence over the policy process completely, it has given the GoR
an opening. Ownership aid programs have integrated top GoR officials into policy decisionmaking processes, but this has not translated into broad domestic participation. Domestic
groups, such as civil society groups, have recently been invited to sit at the table. However,
my case studies suggest that their involvement is typically only symbolic or a way of
“sensitizing” such actors to the agenda already decided on by the executive.

8.2.	
   Towards	
  better	
  theory	
  and	
  development	
  policy	
  
In the previous section, I argued that a type of new aid relationship, which I call
centralized collaboration, has emerged in Rwanda. This aid relationship is qualitative
different than “donorship,” but it is also different from the “ownership” idealized in
international development circles. In this section, I address the broader question, why has this
new relationship emerged?
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The objective of this section is to clarify what the Rwandan case has to say about
ownership and government-donor relationships more broadly and to address how transferable
the findings of this dissertation are likely to be. Given that there are several unique features
of the Rwandan case, we may not see the exact same type of aid relationship emerging in all
aid-dependent states. However, my case studies are suggestive of a broader framework for
understanding donor-government relationships and assessing how ownership aid programs
play out in other aid-dependent countries. Additionally, they suggest several policy
implications that are important for development practitioners to keep in mind.
A	
  framework	
  for	
  understanding	
  donor-‐government	
  relationships	
  

Based on evidence from my case studies, in this dissertation I argue that what we see
emerging in Rwanda is not “ownership” but “centralized collaboration.” By the latter, I mean
a condition where policy decision-making is the result of input from a select group of
domestic actors in close collaboration with donors. But, why did such a relationship emerge
in Rwanda, and how likely is it to emerge elsewhere?
Throughout this dissertation, I note several factors and mechanisms that contributed
to the emergence of this new type of aid relationship; some are unique to Rwanda, while
others are found in aid-dependent countries around the world. However, broadly speaking,
my case studies suggest that the new relationship between donors and the GoR is largely the
result of three things: individual donor preferences, the amount of leverage the GoR is able
to exert over donors, and existing state-society relationships. These three factors provide a
framework for assessing and analyzing donor-government relationships and ownership aid
programs in other aid-dependent countries.
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First, my dissertation suggests that individual donor preferences shape donorgovernment relationships. As we saw in the Rwandan case, different donors have different
preferences. Some, such as the United Kingdom, prefer to work closely with the state and
have ideologies that closely align with the promises of ownership. Others, such as the United
States, have maintained a more traditional approach to development. While both rhetorically
support “ownership,” the UK’s preference for working with the state has changed the
relationship between the GoR and the UK, while the US’s relationship has remained
relatively stagnate. As a result, while both clearly have an interest in influencing the policy
process in Rwanda, the tactics of the UK have changed more than the tactics of the US.
Donor preferences are likely to remain somewhat constant in all aid-dependent states,
because they are a characteristic of the donor not a characteristic of the country where the
donor is working. For example, the UK and the US tend to work in similar ways and
implement similar aid programs in the countries were they operate. That being said, donor
preferences may change in different contexts based on country-specific events or the agenda
and legacy of a donor in the country. For example, if a donor has strategic or commercial
interests in a recipient-county, they may be more inclined to ignore transgressions.
Additionally, not all donors are active in all aid dependents states, particular since many
donors are attempting to target and concentrate their aid. My research suggests that before
one begins to analyze donor-government relationships or diagnose the likely outcomes of
ownership aid programs, it is important for researchers and practitioners to identify and
categorize donor preferences in the aid-dependent country being scrutinized.
Second, my dissertation suggests that how much leverage the recipient-country is able
to exert over donors is an important factor in understanding donor-government relationships.
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Unlike some aid-dependent states, the GoR has maintained a strong line on ownership,
asserting itself not only rhetorically but also through the implementation of programs such as
the Division of Labour and the Rwandan Aid Policy. A legacy of donor guilt from the
genocide, as well as a strong record of economic performance has only bolstered the GoR
claims for ownership. The GoR’s leverage is not absolute and is challenged by high-levels of
aid dependence. Additionally, my case studies suggest that the GoR has more leverage in
certain areas than others (e.g., governance). However, the leverage they do possess proved to
be important factor in the relationships that emerged between the GoR and its donors.
On this factor, there is likely a good deal of variation between aid-dependent states.
Leverage may depend of contextual factors, such as the genocide. However, leverage is also
likely to be related to who is in power in the recipient-country, and the government’s
bargaining position relative to its donors. The latter likely depends not only on the country’s
aggregate level of aid-dependence, but also on how dependent the country is on individual
donors. For example, does the country receive the majority of its aid from one or two donors,
or does aid come from multiple donors?
Third, my dissertation suggests that existing state-society relations shape the impact
of ownership programs. The aid programs analyzed in this dissertation were implemented in
a tightly regulated and hierarchical political context that has a legacy of violent conflict
between groups. Additionally, historically, civil society has not strongly asserted itself into
political spaces. As a result, donors seeking domestic partnerships have largely allied with
the government, cementing existing power dynamics rather than changing them.
However, if the political space of the recipient-country is more open or if there are
more domestic veto players, the impact of ownership aid programs will likely be different. In
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contexts where power is decentralized or where civil society is vibrant, ownership aid
programs may allow broader domestic participation and influence. That being said, it is not
unusual for aid-dependent states to have autocratic tendencies; therefore, there maybe more
cases that look like Rwanda in this regard than cases that do not.
In all aid-dependent counties, the recipient-country government relies on donors to
provide support for fundamental services and goods, without which the state would collapse.
This is implied in the very definition of an aid-dependent country. At the same time, donor
agencies rely on the existence of the aid-dependent state to stay in business. Additionally,
their reputation as an organization and, in the case of bilateral donors, the country they
represent relies on the success or failure of their programs (and the country as a whole). As a
result, in all aid-dependent countries, donors and recipient-countries are tightly linked and
such links are unlikely to be severed anytime soon.
My research suggests that alternative donor-government relationships and differences
between the outcomes of ownership aid programs are likely to come from variation in donor
preferences, the amount of leverage of the recipient-country government has over donors,
and existing state-society relations. When analyzing the likely impact of ownership aid
programs and donor-government relationships in other country contexts, these are the factors
that one should focus on.
Policy	
  implications	
  

Given that my dissertation is concerned with a dominant policy practice within the
international development community, it is also important to consider the policy implications
of my findings. My findings are not definitive enough to suggest a wholesale rejection of any
particular policy or practice. However, they do suggest a number of things that development
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practitioners ought to keep in mind when designing and implementing ownership aid
programs.
First, my findings suggest that the recent emphasis on ownership within international
development is laced with faulty assumptions. Each of the potentially problematic
assumptions laid out in chapter two were validated by my analysis of ownership aid
programs in Rwanda. This suggests that ownership, as it is currently discussed in the
development literature, is relatively ill conceived. If donors choose to implement ownership
aid programs, they need to be more upfront about the changes they wish to see and the
potential limitations of the programs.
Second, my findings suggest that, while donor-government relationships are
susceptible to change, change is likely to occur around the periphery rather than at the core.
Regardless of the aid program being implemented, donors retain interests and preferences in
aid-dependent states. If a recipient country strongly asserts itself, they may succeed in
changing the contours of their relationship with donors. However, donors will not simply
retreat but will likely seek alternative means of influencing the policy process. These changes
are meaningful, and should be accounted for by theory; however, they do not change the fact
that donors remain part and parcel of decision-making structures in aid-dependent states.
Third, my findings suggest that, when considering the impact of ownership aid
programs, it is important to consider the existing political context. Where authority lies is not
likely to change drastically on account of the introduction of ownership aid programs. If
anything, these programs might exacerbate an existing centralization of authority within the
recipient-country, as we see happening in Rwanda. Therefore, it is important to first survey
the existing political climate when considering the impact of ownership aid programs.
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Fourth, ownership aid programs do not solve the broken feedback loop problem in
foreign assistance. Even when ownership aid programs do give more influence to domestic
actors, they do not inherently foster a more inclusive feedback loop. In the best-case
scenario, ownership aid programs may permit high-level government policymakers to give
feedback. However, there is little evidence that ownership aid programs will allow citizens –
the supposed beneficiaries of development – to provide feedback on development programs
and aid policy.

8.3.	
  	
   Concluding	
  Remarks	
  
The new global emphasis on ownership is predicted to make the policy decisionmaking processes in aid-dependent countries less donor-driven and more inclusive of a wide
array of domestic actors. Doing so is predicted to make aid more effective by allowing
beneficiaries more input over their own development. If aid is demand-driven, it ought to
actually respond to the needs of the population better, increasing the rate of development in
the world’s poorest countries.
However, in my dissertation research, I find little evidence that ownership aid
programs have resulted in the outcomes predicted by their proponents. While my findings are
not necessarily directly transferable to other contexts, they do suggest several inherent
limitations to new ownership aid programs and challenge the idea that the new emphasis on
ownership, at least in its current incarnation, will actually improve aid effectiveness. Instead,
my research in Rwanda suggests that, at times, “ownership” may actually exacerbate traits of
foreign aid believed to hinder its effectiveness.
The dissertation also raises several other interesting questions such as, why do
ownership programs increase donor influence in some cases? What types of aid relationships
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are most conducive to economic growth and development? Can donor-government
relationships be altered to help with institutional challenges, such as commitment problems
or broken feedback loops? Research in each of these areas would extend the findings of this
dissertation in important and interesting ways.
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Interview
Number
Fall 2009
I-I
I-II
I-III
I-IV
I-V
I-VI
I-VII
I-VIII
I-IX
I-X
I-XI
I-XII
I-XIII
I-XIV
I-XV
I-XVI
I-XVII
I-XVIII
I-XIX
I-XX
I-XXI
I-XXII
I-XXIII

Date of
Interview

Ministry or Agency Represented

10.15.09
10.19.09
10.23.09
10.28.09
10.29.09
10.30.09
10.30.09
11.02.09
11.03.09
11.03.09
11.04.09
11.04.09
11.05.09
11.06.09
11.06.09
11.10.09
11.10.09
11.13.09
11.13.09
11.13.09
11.16.09
11.16.09
11.19.09

World Vision
KfW - German Development Bank
United States Agency for International Development
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
Rwandan Governance Advisory Council
United Nations Developing Programme
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
Norwegian People’s Aid
Search for Common Ground
Rwandan Governance Advisory Council
European Commission
Department for International Development, United Kingdom
United Nations Developing Programme/Rwandan Parliament
United Nations Developing Programme
Rwandan Governance Advisory Council
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
Ministry of Local Government
European Commission
United States Agency for International Development
African Development Bank
Canadian International Development Agency
World Bank
Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance

Summer 2010
II-I
06.01.10
II-II
06.01.10
II-III
06.03.10
II-IV
06.05.10
II-V
06.05.10
II-VI
06.08.10
II-VII
06.08.10
II-VIII
06.09.10
II-IX
06.10.10
II-X
06.10.10
II-XI
06.16.10
II-XII
06.18.10
II-XIII
06.18.10

Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance
Aid Coordination Unit (United Nations/MINECOFIN)
Civil Society Platform
L’institut de Recherche et de Dialogue pour la Paix
Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance
Rwandan Governance Advisory Council
Rwandan Governance Advisory Council
United States Agency for International Development
World Bank
Department for International Development, United Kingdom
United Nations Developing Programme
Netherlands Embassy, Rwanda
Belgian Embassy, Rwanda
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II-XIV
II-XV
II-XVI
II-XVII
II-XVIII
II-XIX
II-XX
II-XXI
II-XXII
II-XXIII
II-XXIV

06.22.10
06.23.10
06.23.10
06.24.10
06.24.10
06.29.10
06.29.10
07.02.10
07.02.10
07.02.10
07.13.10

Action Aid Rwanda
Independent Consultant
KfW - German Development Bank
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Norwegian People’s Aid
United Nations Development Programme
Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance
Trocaire/INGO Network
KfW - German Development Bank
Policy Practice
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Appendix	
  3:	
  Aid	
  Dependent	
  States	
  
Aid-‐Dependent	
  States	
  
Average	
  ODA	
  as	
  a	
  %	
  of	
  GNI,	
  2000-‐2008	
  

Liberia
Micronesia
Timor-Leste
Burundi
Marshall Islands
Afghanistan
Guinea-Bissau
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Eritrea
West Bank and Gaza
Mozambique
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Sao Tome and Principe
Palau
Malawi
Rwanda
Nicaragua
Zambia
Mauritania
Guyana
Cape Verde
The Gambia
Kiribati
Ethiopia
Niger
Uganda
Mali
Tanzania
Burkina Faso
Vanuatu
Madagascar
Lao PDR
Mongolia
Tonga
Djibouti
Bhutan
Kyrgyz Republic
Ghana
Tajikistan
Samoa

61.0
42.8
42.4
38.0
36.3
34.8
34.6
32.5
30.0
28.9
28.0
26.7
26.7
24.1
21.5
21.1
21.1
17.8
17.2
16.5
16.4
15.4
14.7
14.6
14.5
14.2
14.1
13.9
13.8
13.5
13.4
13.1
12.7
12.6
12.4
11.6
11.5
11.3
11.2
11.2
11.0

	
  

Moderately	
  Aid-‐Dependent	
  States	
  	
  
Average	
  ODA	
  as	
  a	
  %	
  of	
  GNI	
  
2000-‐2008	
  

Cambodia
Benin
Comoros
Chad
Senegal
Central African Republic
Dominica
Guinea
Bolivia
Congo, Rep.
Serbia
Cambodia
Benin
Comoros
Chad
Senegal
Central African Republic
Dominica
Guinea
Bolivia
Congo, Rep.
Serbia
Armenia
Papua New Guinea
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Honduras
Moldova
Nepal
Georgia
Lesotho
Cameroon
Jordan

9.7
9.3
8.8
8.8
8.5
8.2
7.9
7.5
7.3
7.0
6.8
9.7
9.3
8.8
8.8
8.5
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